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VINCENT ($"~~. ~ Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMAR~' ~e~ ~ l ta te university consistent with the 
Free Exercise Clause may prohibit a recognized student group from 
using university facilities for religious worship services or 
teaching. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp is an officially 
recognized student organization on the campus of the University 
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of Missouri. From 1973 until 1977 resp sought and obtained .... 
permiision to use univer~ity facilities for its weekly . bible 
studies and worship services. In 1977, the university prohibited 
'- ~~--------------this practice on the ground that resp's meetings violated 
regulations adopted by the Board of Curators in 197 2. The 
regulations provide that no" university buildings may be used for 
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by their 
student or nonstudent groups. 
Eleven student members of resp brought suit in federal DC 
claiming that the university had deprived them of their rights to 
free exercise of religion and freedom of speech. The federal DC 
found that the University's ban on religious activities in 
university owned buildings is required by the Establishment 
Clause. A University policy permitting regular religious 
services in university buildings would have the primary effect of 
advancing religion. No free exercise right was violated since it 
did not appear that the practice of holding religious services in 
a university owned building is a matter of deep religious 
conviction to these plaintiffs. It also found that the 
infringement, if any, of free exericse rights was justified by a 
compelling state interest - Missouri's long history of strict 
separation of church and state. 
The CA reversed. The CA first noted tha t the University had --undertaken a policy of permitting a wide vari ty of student 
groups to use the student center and other fa c ilities for 
--------~ ---
meeting, discussions, and so on. l( " It has created an open forum 




University's only condition is that no religious worship or 
religious teaching may take place. The Court held that if the 
University's limitation applied to all religious speech, it would · 
be invalid because the university has no right to regulate 
content. 
The Court then rejected the University's contention that the 
regulation was constitutionally required by the Establishment 
Clause. The CA conceded that a neutral policy would have a 
secular purpose and would avoid an entanglement with religion, 
but it disagreed with the conclusion that such a policy would 
have the primary effect of advancing religion. "An open door 
policy would no more commit the University to religious goals 
than they are now committed to the goals of the SDS, for example. 
v( 
See Healy v. James 408 U.S.l69 (1972). Moreover, in contrast 
with a neutral policy, the regulation has the primary effect of 
inhibiting religion. It singles out and stigmatizes certain 
religious activity and in consequence discredits religious 
groups. 
Finally, the Free Exercise Clause compels government to make 
some accommodation to religious realities and needs. Equal access 
to a public facility is such an accommodation. See O'Hair v. 
Andrus, 613 F. 2d. 913 (DC Cir. 1979) where the CA held the mall 
could be used for the Pope. This case is distinguishable from 
those that involve the requested use of classr ooms for prayer or 
bible study by high school student groups. Hi gh school students 
require more supervision than do young adults of college age and 
( - the high school, unlike the university, is not a "public forum" 
or a self contained community. 
On request for hearing en bane Judges Bright and McMillan 
dissented primarily on the grounds that the Missouri Constitution 
is more restrictive than the First Amendment and specifically 
prohibits entanglement of church and state . . 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr's claim that this decision conflicts 
with a federal DC opinion which had previously addressed the 
issue of religious worship in a public college. Ditman v. 
Western Washington University F. Supp. (W.O. wash. 1980) (on 
appeal to theCA 9). The decision below ignore9 the pertinent 
Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases and errs because it 
requires a public university to open up its buildings and grounds 
supported and maintained by public tax monies, to regular 
religious worship services. Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 430 u.s. 
672 (1971). It also contends that the decisio~ below ignored 
state constitutional issues. Petrs distinguish this from O'Hair 
in that a mall, unlike a university, is multi-purposed and must 
be open to the public. The mall is an area, unlike a college 
campus, where any group can go and "make a statement". 
4. DISCUSSION: In my view, there is no;fEstablishment 
Clause problem with allowing a variety of religious organizations 
to use public buildings for such things as bible study. Whether 
or not an open door policy is required by the Free Exercise 
Clause is a more difficult question. 
result reached by theCA 8. 
I tend to agree with the 
--.. .. _ .......... ""'~-., · 
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The CA 2 recently decided in Brandon v. Board of Education 
of Guilderland, 49 L.W. 2355 (1980) that a school board's refusal 
to permit high school students to conduct prayer meetings on 
school premises does not violate the · Free Exercise Clause. There 
the court found that the school's rule was not restrictive and 
was supported by a compelling state interest in the state's 
' . 
de sire to avoid Establishment Clause 'problems. Moreover, "to an 
impressionable student the mere appearance of secular involvement 
in religious activities might indicate that the state has placed 
imprimatur on particular regligious creed". The Court 
distinguished this case from a university where those facilities 
have been identified as a "public forum". Thus, even if the CA 2 
is correct in Brandon, an question not free from doubt, this case 
is distinquishable. 
There are three responses, including two amicus. 
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. 1:r ._,-Justice Bbc:-mun 
~ J Jr.;t;.J 02 P:; ·1e ll 
Mr . Juotlce R~bn~ilist 
Mr. J ustice Sto•ens 
Fr om: Mr. J ustice White 
Circula t ed: 9 FEB 1981 
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In this c a se, the Univ e rsity of~uri - Kan s as City, which 
p e rmits student org a nizations to use certain university 
facilities for political, cultural, e ducational, s ocial and 
r ecreational e vents, prohibits the use of similar facilities for 
..._... ........ ,_, . ., 
the purpose of eith e r ~ligiou~hip _9~ relig~ t e aching. A 
religiously-ori e nt e d s t udent group brought suit challe nging the 
r e gulation on various constitutional grounds, including the claim 
that the r e gulation infringed the constitutional rights of its 
me mb e rs to practice their religion a nd to engage in religious 
s p e ech. The district court sustained the r e gulation, holding 
among other things, "that the university's present ban on 
religious services in its buildings is r e quired by the 
establishment clause" of the United States Constitution. Chess 
v. Widmar, 480 F.Supp. 907, 916 nvo Mo. 1979). 
The Court of Appe als for the Eighth Circuit r e versed. That 
court held that religious speech is prote cted under the First and 
~ ~---------~~---------------------
Fourteenth Amendme nts and that s ince the effe ct of the regulation 
was to s ingle out those groups involved in religious activities 
and communication, the regulation was unconstitutional b e cause it 
burd e ned the constitutional rights of the groups' members and was 
not justified by a compelling state interest in avoiding an 
establishment of religion. The court found that an open access 
-2-
rule permitting all student groups to use the facilities would 
not violate the Establishment Clause since the University could 
not be said to be promoting any one religion. Indeed, the Court 
of Appeals held, because the prohibition had the effect of 
inhibiting religion and creating an entanglement between religion 
and the University in that school officials would be called upon 
to determine what proposed events involved religious worship or 
teaching, the regulation itself violated the Establishment 
Clause. 
The First Amendment prohibits any law "respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." These two clauses, both cast in absolute terms, are in 
considerable tension, and constitutional adjudication under these 
\.__ ~
provisions requires a balanced accommodation of their competing 
values. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668-669 
(1970). Typically, Establishment Clause cases have involved 
either compelled religious training or exercises in public 
schools, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), or government aid to religious 
organizations, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). In my view, the above 
decisions do not provide clear guidance on the question presented 
in this case. Here, we are faced with a fundamentally different --------
question concerning the extent to which a state may act to assure 
that it is not using its facilities to promote religious 
activities. Even assuming that a state university could, if it 
"--...- '-------
desired, provide open access to its facilities to all groups 
-3-
- ... 
without violating the Establishment Clause, cf. Zorach, supra, 
the question remains whether a university must provide such 
access. Accordingly, the cases permitting a state to provide 
access to a public facility for a religious purpose are not 
necessarily apposite to the issue presented here. Cf. O'Hair v. 
Andrus, U.S.App.D.C. , 613 F.2d 931 (1979) (permitting the 
Pope to use government property for a religious service since 
government had a policy of open access to the facility). 
Certainly, the asserted goal of assuring the state's 
independence from any religious activity is valid. States should 
be provided some range of discretion in forwarding their 
legitimate nonentanglement interest under the Establishment 
Clause. While it may appear that permitting a religious group to 
~ use university meeting rooms does not involve much entanglement 
with religion, it may well be that a state has the constitutional 
power to make that determination for itself.l The Court of 
Appeals- determined that the state had not demonstrated a 
compelling state interest justifying the challenged prohibition. 
But no decision of this Court has explicitly determined that the 
compelling state interest test, as opposed to some lesser 
standard, is appropriate in a case involving competing First 
1 Missouri's determination to pursue the separation of church 
and state is reflected in its constitution. See, e.g., Americans 
United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720 (Mo.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1029 (1976); Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101-102 (Mo. 
1974), cert. denied sub nom. Reynolds v. Paster, 419 u.s. 1111 
(1975). It has been noted that Missouri has a long history of 
maintaining "a very high wall between church and state." 
~ Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F.Supp. 376 (W.D.Mo. 1973), aff'd, 
419 u.s. 888 (1974). 
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Amendment values. Thus, this case poses a difficult and 
important question concerning the relationship between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 
Review is also warranted because lower state and federal 
courts have reached divergent results involving similar claims by 
~~---------------~-----~---------------~------------
religious groups against state rules involving educational 
---------~~------_, _____________________ __________ 
institutions. Compare Brandon v. Board of Education, F.2d 
(CA2 Nov.l7, 1980) (upholding high school officials' refusal to 
permit use of school building for religious groups); Hunt v. 
Board of Education , 321 F.Supp. 1263 (SD W.Va. 1971) (upholding 
high school regulation prohib.i ting use of school building for 
religious pu~poses) ;2 Dittman v. Western Washington University, 
~ 
F.Supp. , No. 79-1189V (W.D. Wash. 1980), appeal docketed, 
No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding university rule charging 
religious-oriented groups 
\ 
for rooms while providing such 
facilities free to nonreligious student groups) with Keegan v. 
University of Delaware, 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 934 (1976) (rejecting university's attempt to enjoin 
religious group from conducting services in the dormitory). 
Given that a conflict exists on an important and difficult 
question of constitutional law, I would would grant the writ of 
certiorari. 
2 The issues involved in Brandon and Hunt concerned high 
schools. The Court of Appeals in this case distinguished those 
cases on this ground, finding that a university is an open forum 
thus limiting any restraints on First Amendment values which 
might be otherwise possible. While this distinction may have 
some legitimacy, and indeed may ultimately control this case, the 
state's interest in separation of church and state is equally 
valid in both contexts. 
CHAMBE RS OF 
-JUSTICE w .. . -.1. BRENNAN, -JR. 
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11 Justice Brennan would grant the 
petition for certiorari. 11 
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Mr. Justice White 
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2nd DRAFT Recirculr,ted : 
SlJl>REME OQVBT OF THE UNITE:O S'fA'fES 
GARY E. WIDMAR ET AL, v. CLARK VINCENT ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 8()-.{i8!l. Decided February -, 1981 
JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
In this case, the University of Missouri-Kansas City, which 
permits student organizations to use certain university facili-
ties for political , cultural, educational, social and recreational 
events, prohibits the use of similar facilities for the purpose 
of either religious worship or religious teaching. A religiously-
oriented student group brought suit challenging the regulation 
on various constitutional grounds, including the claim that the 
regulation infringed the constitutional rights of its members 
to practice their religion and to engage in religious speech. 
The District Court sustained the regulation, holding among 
other things, "that the university's present ban on religious 
services in its buildings is required by the establishment 
clause" of the United States Constitution. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907, 916 (WD Mo. 1979). 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
That court held that religious speech is protected under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments and that since the effect 
of the regulation was to single out those groups involved in 
religious activities and communication, the regulation was un-
constitutional because it burdened the constitutional rights of 
the groups' members and was not justified by a compelling 
state interest in avoiding an establishment of religion. The 
court found that an open access rule permitting all student 
groups to use the facilities would not violate the Establish-
ment Clause since the University could not be said to be 
promoting any one religion . Indeed, the Court of Appeals 
held, because the prohibition had the effect of inhibiting reli-
gion and creating an entanglement between religion and the 
17 FEB 198'\ 
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University in that school officials would be called upon to 
d<' termine what proposed events involved religious worship or 
teaching, the regulation itself violated the Establishment 
Clause. 
The First Amendment prohibits any law 11respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." These two clauses, both case in absolute terms, are 
in considerable tension, and constitutional adjudication under 
these provisions requires a balanced accommodation of their 
competing values. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 
66 t 668-669 (1970). Typically, Establishment Clause cases 
lw.ve involved either compelled religious training or exercises 
in nublic schools, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); 
Ewrrl v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), or government aid to 
reli2:ious organizations, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 
(1 071); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In my 
view, the above decisions do not provide clear guidance on the 
qurstion presented in this case. Here, we are faced with a 
fundamentally different question concerning the extent to 
which a State may act to assure that it is not using its facili-
ties to promote religious activities. Even assuming that a 
stntc university could , if it desired, provide open access to its 
fn rilities to all groups without violating the Establishment 
Clause, cf. Zorach, supra, the question remains whether a 
university must provide such access. Accordingly, the cases 
permitting a State to provide access to a public facility for a 
religious purpose are not necessarily apposite to the issue 
presented here. Cf. O'Hair v. Andrus, - U. S. App. D. C. 
-, 613 F. 2d 931 (1979) (permitting the Pope to use govern-
ment property for a religious service since government had a 
·policy of open access to the facility). 
Certainly, the asserted goal of assuring the State's inde-
pendence from any religious activity is valid. States should 
be provided some range of discretion in forwarding their legit-
imate nonentanglement interest under the Establishment 
Clause. While it may appear that permitting a religious· 
group to use university meeting rooms does not involve much 
ent~ngtement wit.h re~igion ,. it may welt be that a State hM 
.-
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the constitutional power to make that determination for it-
self.l The Court of Appeals determined that the State had 
not demonstrated a compelling state interest justifying the 
challenged prohibition. But no decision of this Court has 
explicitly determined that the compelling state interest test, 
as opposed to some lesser standard, is appropriate in a case 
involving competing First Amendment values. Thus, this 
case poses a difficult and important question concerning the 
relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Review is also warranted because lower state and federal 
courts have reached divergent results involving similar claim" 
by relig;ious groups against state rules involving educational 
institutions. Compare Brandon v. Board of Education, -
F. 2c1 - · (CA2 Nov. 17, 1980) (upholding high school officials' 
refusal to permit use of school building for religious l!'rouns): 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD W. Va. 
1971) (upholding high school regulation prohibiting use of 
school building for religious purposes); 2 Dittman v. Western 
Washinqton University, - F. Supp. -. No. 79-11~9V 
(WD Wash. 1980). appeal docketed, No. 80-3120 (CA9 1980) 
(upholding universitv rule charging religious-oriented groups 
for rooms while providing such facilities free to nomeligious 
student groups) with Keegan v. University of Delaware, 349 
1 Missouri's determination to pursue the separation of church and state 
i::; rPflected in its constitution. See, e. g., Ameri~ans United v. Rogo.rs, 538 
S. W. 2d 711, 720 (Mo.), cert. deniE'd, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) ; Paster v. 
Tussey, 512 S. W. 2d 97, 101- 102 (Mo. 1974) , cert. denied sub nom. 
Reynolds v. Paster, 419 U. S. 1111 (1!:175) . It has been noted that Mis-
souri has a long histo ry of mainta ining "a very high wall between rhur~h 
a.nd state." Luetkemeyer v . kaufmann, 364 F. Supp . 376 (WD Mo. 
1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. SSS (1974). 
2 The is.;;ues involved in Brandon and Hunt concerned high schools. 
The Court of Appeals in this case distinguished t.hose cases on this ground, 
finding that a university is an open forum thus limiting any restraints on 
Firs1 Amendment values which m:ght be otherwise possible. While this 
distinction may have tiOme lPgitimacy, and indeed may ultimately control 
this casE', the state's interest in separation of church and state is equally 
n.Jirl in both contexts . 
WIDMAR v. VINCENT 
A. 2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U. S. 934 (1976) (re-
jecting university's attempt to enjoin religious group from 
conducting services in the dormitory). 
Given that a conflict exists on an important and difficult 
question of constitutional law, I would grant the writ of 
certiorari. 
JusTICE BRENNAN would grant the petition for certiorari. l 
To: 1' l ~ ' ll.UL cJ u., vLV\.::~ 
Hr. ,hl." c I C' J 8 r ,)fl'1an 
Hr. T11 ) G GJ ~·: W':::'t 
Mr . JL, ,t- ('8 },i !. 1!1' 11 
;rue-'; ... Ll·.,hJ'm 
.J u.::; ']:to Iv·iGll 
.h13 ' 
'· . -~ n 1. 1 1l1lst 
Mr. Ju._,~ 08 s ·t.J\' ..... nfJ 
From: Mr . J ,st1ce Wnite 
Circulaton:-----------
3rd DRAFT l 9 rEB 198~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STArfFHrcuhted: 
GARY E. WIDMAR ET A.L, v. CLARK VINCENT ET A.L. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 80-689. Decided February -, 1981 
JusTICE WHITE, with whom JusTICE PowELL joins,\ 
dissenting. 
In this case, the University of Missouri-Kansas City, which 
permits student organizations to use certain university facili-
ties for political, cultural, educational, social and recreational 
events, prohibits the use of similar facilities for the purpose 
of either religious worship or religious teaching. A religiously-
oriented student group brought suit challenging the regulation 
on various constitutional grounds, including the claim that the 
regulation infringed the constitutional rights of its members 
to practice their religion and to engage in religious speech. 
The District Court sustained the regulation, holding among 
other things, "that the university's present ban on religious 
services in its buildings is required by the establishment 
clause" of the United States Constitution. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907, 916 (WD Mo. 1979). 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
That court held that religious speech is protected under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments and that since the effect 
of the regulation was to single out those groups involved in 
religious activities and communication, the regulation was un-
constitutional because it burdened the constitutional rights of 
the groups' members aii:dWas not JUstified by a compelling 
state interest in avoiding an esta61isfiment of religion. The 
court found that an open access rule permitting all student 
groups to use the facilities would not violate the Establish-
ment Clause since the University could not be said to be· 
promoting any one religion. Indeed, the Court of Appeals· 
tleid, because the prohibition' had the effect of inhibiting reli• 
I 
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gion and creating an entanglement etween religion and theb.{ 
University in that schoo o mas would be called upon to •' ~ 
determine what proposed events involved religious worship or ,- l.D 
... 
teaching, the regulation itself violated the Establishment ~...._ 
Clause. ~ ~ ,• 
The First Amendment prohibits any law "respecting an -- _ • ~ - .... }-
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise ~ ~· 
thereof." These two clauses, both case in absolute terms, are114 ~ ~· 
in ~nside~e ten~on, and constitutional adjudication under~.~ JA..A.~ 
these provisions requires a balanced accommodation of their f>:"'- ~  
co:tppetinK_,v~lues~ See Walz v. Tax Vommtsswn, 397 0. S. ~
1 
_ ~, 
664, 668-669 (1970). Typically, Establishment Clause cases ;---. ~1f---
have involved either compelled religious training or exercises ~ _ ~ ~ 
in public schools, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); vy~ .l ... ~­
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), or government aid to ~ """· l~l 
religious organizations, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 ~ ~ -
(1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In my ~ 
view, the above decisions do not provide clear guidance on the 
question presented in this case. Here, we are faced with a 
fundamentally different question concerning the extent to 
which a State may act to assure that it is not using its facili-
ties to promote religious activities. Even assuming that a 
state university could, if it desired, provide open access to its 
facilities to all groups without violating the Establishment 
Clause, cf. Zorach, supra, the question remains whether a 
university must provide such access. Accordingly, the cases 
1 permitting '~ Sta.:t.e_ to provide access to a pl.!,blic f~Yrof a 
religious purpose att not necessarily _ap~ite to the issue 
presented here. Cf. O'Hair v. Andrus, - U. S. App. D. C. 
-, 613 F . 2d 931 (1979) (permitting the Pope to use govern-
ment property for a religious service since government had a 
policy of open access to the facility). 
Certainly, the asserted goal of assuring the State's inde-
pendence from any religious activity is valid. States should 
be provided some range of discretion in forwarding their legit-
imate nonentanglement interest under the Establishment 
Clause. While it may appear that permitting a religious 
~oup to u~~ un~versity meeting rooms does not involve much 
WIDMAR v. VINCENT 3 
entauglement with religion, it may well be that a State has 
the constitut iollal power to make that determination for it-
self.l The Court of Appeals determined that the State had 
not demonstrated a compelling state intere.st justifying the 
challenged prohibition. But no decision of this Court has 
explicitly determined that the compelling state interest test, 
as opposed to some lesser standard, is appropriate in a case 
involving competing First Amendment values. Thus, this 
case poses a difficult and important question concerning the 
relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Review is also warranted because lower state and federal 
courts have reached divergent results involving similar claims 
by religious groups against state rules involving educational 
institutions. Compare Brandon v. Board of Education, - . 
F . 2d- (CA2 Nov. 17, 1980) (upholding high school officials' 
refusal to permit use of school building for religious groups); 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD W. Va, 
1971) (upholding high school regulation prohibiting use of 
school building for religious purposes); 2 Dittman v. Western 
Washington University, - F. Supp. -, No. 79-1189V 
(WD Wash. 1980). appeal docketed, No. 80-3120 (CA9 1980) 
(upholding university rule charginp; religious-oriented groups 
for rooms while providing such facilities free to nonreligious 
1 1\lh:;:>ouri's determination to pursue the separation of church and state 
is reflected in its constitution. See, e. g., Ameri~ans United v. Rogers, 538 
S. W . 2d 711 , 720 (Mo.), cert . denied, 429 U . S. 1029 (1976); Paster v. 
Tussey , 512 S. W . 2d 97 , 101- 102 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. 
R eynolds v. Paster, 419 U . S. 1111 (1975) . It has been noted that Mis-
souri has a long history of maintaining " a very high wall between rhurrh 
and state." Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F . Supp. 376 (WD Mo. 
1973), aff'd, 419 U . S. 888 (1974) . 
2 The issues involved in Brandon and Hunt concerned high schools. 
The Court of Appeals in this rase distinguished those cases on this ground, 
finding that a university is an orwn forum thus limiting any restraints on 
First AmendmPnt valur,s which might be otherwise possible. While thi~· 
distinction may have some legitimacy, and indeed may ultimately control 
this case, the sta te's interest in separation of church and state is equallY. 
ndid in both contexts . 
4 WIDMAit v. VINeENT 
student groups) with Keegan v. University of Delaware, 349 
A. 2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (re-
jecting university's attempt to enjoin religious group from 
conducting services in the dormitory). 
Given that a conflict exists on an important and difficult 
question of constitutional law, I would grant the writ of 
certiorari. 
JuSTICE BRENNAN would grant the petition for cer:tiorarir 
February 19, 1981 
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cert. 
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Dear Lewis: 
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Copies to the Conference 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
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C HAMBERS O F 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v . Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
This will confirm my joinder in your third draft cir-
culation of November 17 . 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
[note to Justice Powell only] 
P . S. I hope that Byron will see fit to eliminate his citation of 
United States v . Lee , on page 8 of his dissenting opinion , 
so that th1s case• need not be held until Lee comes down. 
, 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . 
Dear Mr. Lind: 
.§u:vum:t (Q:o-u:rl ttf tlrt 'JitttUth .§tlrltg 
~a$Jrittgtott:. IB· (Q:. zo&r'1~ 
November 21, 1981 
Enclosed please find page proofs for Polk County, No. 80-
824, and Widmar, No. 80-689. 
The Polk County proofs seem fine. A lineup is still 
unavailable. Just1ce Blackmun dissents. Justice Marshall has 
not yet joined any opinion. The other Justices have all joined 
the opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice, although he has 
joined, will also file a brief concurrence. In sum, we are 
waiting for Justice Marshall to complete the lineup. 
I have indicated two sets of changes on the Widmar proofs. 
The first occur in the first paragraph of the second page; their 
import is essentially to convey the contingency surrounding 
claims about the effects of policies that have not actually been 
implemented. The more important change involves the second 
paragraph. Substantive changes in Part III B of the opinion will 
require this section of the syllabus to be changed substantively 
as well. I have therefore included a xerox copy of part III B of 
the most recent circulated draft. 
The tentative in Widmar calls for Justice White to dissent 
and Justice Stevens to file an opinion concurring in the judgment 
of the Court. All other members are tentatively committed to 
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Novembe~ 23, 1981 
RE: 
It 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
DICK FALLON / 
~dmar 
"" The chang 
seems 




in Footnote 10, as edited by you, appears below. 
/ 
On my copy of the opinion I have also noted 
small chang~ equest~d by Justice Brennan and the Chief Justice; 
they will o to the printer with the next draft. 
you think the next c~rculation likely to be the last, it 
RIDER A, for insertion as Footnote 10, page 8: 
10. As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause 
requires the State to distinguish between "religious" speech--
speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect 
of which is to support an Establishment of Religion--and 
"nonreligious" speech--speech, undertaken or approved by the 
State, the primary effect of which is not to support an 
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the 
plain text of the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. 
-.. 
E.g., Stone v. Graham, u.s. (November 17, 1980). The -- --
dissent attempts to equate this distinction with its view of 
a1alleged constitutional difference between religious "speech" 
and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at 5 & n. 
4. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a 
foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that 
it is judicially unmanageable. 
November 27, 1981 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Widmar v. Vincent and Justice Stevens's Opinion 
Attached please find a marked draft of this much-circulated 
opinion. I have marked changes on pages 4, 5, 7, and 13. The 
only one of substance occurs on page 7, where I have suggested a 
footnote responding to Justice Stevens's opinion concurring in 
the judgment. It is attached as a "Rider" to page 7. 
My reasons for suggesting the changes are as follows: 
Page 4. Footnotes 5 and 6 have come to seem to me to be ~ 
almost "schizophrenic." Footnote 5 makes a strong statement tha~ 
students do have rights. Footnote 6 then seems to "take away" 
some of what Footnote 5 appeared to "give." In order to present 
a more coherent picture, I think it better to reflect the 
"balancing" of concerns in a single footnote. Due to the problem 
of excessive length, I have cut a substantial chunk from the 
center. 
Page 5. One footnote has been renumbered. I have suggested 
adding one phrase to clarify that the prohibition against ~ 
"content discrimination" is limited to the "public forum." As 
Justice Stevens rightly argues, the University can of course make 
'r! content discriminations in structuring courses and grading 
examinations. 
Page 7. I have suggested a footnote, attached as a Rider, 
intended as a response to Justice Stevens. You might want to 
delete the explicit reference to Justice Stevens; that seems to 
me a matter of style. Substantively, however, he has raised an 
implicit question about the scope of the holding. I think that ~ 
question should be answered. This footnote reflects an attempt ~ 
to do so. ~-
Page 13. 
 
The word "here" was added to the most recent draft ' 
at the request of Justice Brennan. Rereading the opinion, 
however, I am struck that it is jarringly redundant. The 
sentence already contains one other "here", an "in this case", 
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No. 80-689, Widmar v. Vincent 
In this case we hold that a public university, which makes 
its facilites available for the activities of all other student 
groups, may not exclude a student group wishing to engage in 
religious worship and discussion. 
This case, Widmar v. Vincent, involves the policies of the 
University of Missouri at Kansas City. The University has chosen 
to provide facilities for all student groups wishing to meet on 
campus. For a period of about four years, the University allowed 
a religious group called Cornerstone to meet in University 
facilities. In 1977, however, University officials decided that 
Cornerstone could no longer meet in the buildings available to 
all other student groups. The University took this step based on 
the group's desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. 
Eleven student members of Cornerstone sued the University in 
the federal district court, claiming a violation of their rights 
under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the suit, 
because it found that religious speech and association were not 
entitled to the same protections as other speech and association 
under the First Amendment. The court of appeals reversed this 
decision. We are in essential agreement with the court of 
appeals. 
y -
By its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University created for its students a public forum, in which all 
students had an equal right to speak and to associate. Having 
done so, the University then sought to enforce a content-based 
discrimination against religious speech and association. These 
are forms of speech and association protected by the First 
Amendment. Because of the fundamental principle that state 
regulation of speech must be content neutral, the University 
would need to present a compelling interest in order to justify 
discrimination against religious speech. 
The University argues first that allowing the use of its 
public buildings for religious worship and discussion would 
offend the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United 
States. Under the peculiar facts of this case, however--in which 
the University would not be sponsoring religious speech any more 
than the speech of other student group using university 
facilities--we cannot agree. The University also argues that it 
could not allow religious groups the same benefits as all other 
groups without providing support for religion forbidden by the 
Missouri State constitution. But the rights of the excluded 
group are protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States. This is the Supreme law of the land, which 
must in this case prevail over the state interest asserted by the 
University. 
Justice Stevens has filed a separate opinion concurring in 
the judgment of the Court. Justice White has filed a dissent. 
lfp/ss 12/05/81 80-689 Widmar ~- Vincent 
This case, here from the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, involves the validity of a regulation of the 
University of Missouri / at Kansas City. 
The university provides facilities / for all student 
groups that wish to meet on campus. More than a hundred 
such groups - including a religious group named Cornerstone 
.~ . . . db . ~- were off1c1ally recogn1ze y the un1versity. The 
~ Cornerstone group was informed that it could no longer ~e;! 
~ ~ in university buildings. The exclusion was based on a 
~~ regulation1 that prohibited the use of its buildings or grounds/ "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching". 
This suit was instituted by members of 
Cornerstone. ~leged a violation of their right,lto free 
exercise of religion;land freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
The university defended on the groun~hat use of 
its facilities for religious worship or discussion { ould 
offend the Establishment Clause of the Constitution as well 
as the Missouri Constitution. 
~; 
<]'/ ~~G ~~~ -- . ) 





The District Court dismissed the suit, agreeing 
with the university's position. The court of Appeals 
..9~~~-n,-~~ 
reversed. '1 Jt(e aree with the Court- of ~ppeals. 
we hold that religious worship and discussionJ'~re 
forms of speech and association/ protected by the First 
Amendment. A state university's regulation of speech must 
be content neutral, absent a showing of a compelling state -
interest~that justifies some discrimination. And a 
university policy of neutralit~as to the content of speech / 
)Wo~~~~sponsor~ religion/ any more than the speech of 
other student groups. 
A university's mission is education., a-ad & ur 
decision today is entirely consistent with the authority of 
a university/ to impose reasonable regulations - compatible 
with that mission - upon the use of its campus and -
facilities. In this case, however, the University created a 
public forum from which on!X religious groups were excluded. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
Justice Stevens has filed a separate opinion~ 
concurring in the judgment. Justice White has filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1981 
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P4:.Religi~ll$ ServiC~. ,;;~;~~ 
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-·• ' · '-. By Fred Baibash: . undoubtedly will fuel the c~rently 
· : ; - :· W83hlngt.On Poststarrwrller •
1 
intense debate over those earlier rul-
~, ·The Supreine Court ruled yester- ings. The lone dissenter· yesterday, 
day that public colleges and univer- Justice Byron R. White, · expressed 
sities may not prevent campus or- . . concern . that "all ' of these' ·cases' 
- ganii~tions from conducting reli- would have to be reconsidered,. 
' · gmus ' services · on campus, even · under the majority'!l reasoning yes-
though it means that · state-financed · terday. . . · 
facilitieS aie used to benefit religion. · . The court has always treated uni-
.. In an 8-to-1 decisioi1 in one of the versities differently · from grade 
m:Ost impbrtant church-state" cases or" schools, where pupils are believed to 
~ecent years, the justices struck be of an "impressionable" age. 
down a University of Missouri ban Most public universities already 
qn organized · praye~ and Bil;>le. read- · permit prayer and · religious worship 
ipg at its Kansas City campus.' · in their facilities. Had the court up-
- ~- ·Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., writ- held the Missouri ban, imposed be-
i!lg _f9r the ,majority, said that .a ban cause officials there thought a per- . 
ori religious worshig and prayer is a mis~ive policy amounted . tO state 
bah on free speech. Universities are sponsorship of religion, ·the other 
public forums, he said, and may riot schools would have been forced to · 
~rohibit ·one ·form of expression rethink their policies. That likely 
while allowing all others. 1 would have led tO objections from 
- While yesterday's decision does state legislators, and the Supreme 
not alter the ban on prayer in public Court might have found itself once 
secondary and elementary : schools again embroiled in a -major political 
iJ;nposeq by t?e ~urli, in the 1~60s, it Se'e COURT, i\."7; Col. I ' · 
~ / ;;. 
,. ... .• 
... _ , r 1 . ..... ' • 
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J;~~~~ge'B~~·, 6it R~liiiQL# $e~i;{~ ~ -' ­
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'COURT, From At ·( like its. content, he said. The unh:er- . the. content of speech on its campus . 
.. c~ntroversy. The Uni~ersity of Mis.:: sity did just that by differe'ntiatirw White, in his dissent, s~d the prop-
"' souri at Kansas City officially rec- between "religious speech" and, for osition that religious worship is no 
ognizes more than 100 student or- example, political speech. different from any other form of ex-
~-·- ganizations and ro1utinely provides '" ... Having created a forur gen- pression is "plainly wrong." _ -
- fa'dlitie8 for their use. Among those erally open to student groups, Pow- ··. "Were it right; the religion clauses 
groups was Cornerstone, a. Christian . ell said, "the university se~ks to en- . [of the First Amendment] would be . 
·.: organization that had been freely for~~ a content-based e~cltision of. \ ~~P!~ed. of ruiy ind~p~nden~ me~-
. using facilities from 1973_ to 1977. In rehg10us speech. Its exclus10nlll?' pol, mg m circumstances m whiCh reh-
. 1977, however, the university told icy violates the fundamental prind~ ·. gious practice _took the form of 
· tne group that its meetings, which · pie that a state regulation of speech : ~ speech.~ , ' , . ' 1 · . • 
1 
regularly included prayer and Bible should be content-neutral and the If the majority "were rignt that no 
., reading, would no longer' be per- · university is unable' to justify this· distinction inay be· drawn between 
' mitted. . ' . . violation under applicable ~onstitu: verbal acts of worship and other ver-
. Upiversity officials contended that tional standards." · hal acts," he said, all of the cases 
they had no choice but to ban the . The university';_ Citing · the court's . concerning religious worship ' in pub-
group. Allowing Cornerstone's activ- . 'justifications for · banning prayers in : lie institutions would have to be re\ 
· ities on the taxpayer-financed cam- ·· grade schools, had contended . that' considered. · ,! · . • 
:~ 'pus, they said, amounted to an "es- - allowing ' ,...Gornerstone's · · worship .' · Among the ·ca.Ses cited. by White ~. 
~ ( tablishm~nt" of religion, forbidden . woul~ ~ount to state r?onsorship . was one banning . ~rayer in pu?lic 
. by the Fust Amendment to the Con- of rehg1on. · .. · grade schools, a ruhng conservatives 
stitution. , •. · · Po~ell djsagreed. "An open forum are now trying to ,reverse Jhrough . · 
The students argued, :under the 'in a public university does not confer Congress, in bills stripping the 
s~dard grounds for such chal- any imprimatur of state approval on courts o( certain powers. . 
'· lenges, that th~ ban infr_inged thejr religious sects or practices," he said,~ : Jn· a footnote the majority .opinion . 
,, _right to· the free exercise· of religion. any more than allowing the Young noted that unlike grade ~ school chil-
,... ··But they also contended that reli- , ·Socialist Alliance meetings gives · oren, · "~;~niversity students aJe, of 
·:. gious worsbip was· a form of speech state approval to socialism. Any beri~ ; · course, young adults. They are less 
3
; and therefore e~titled to . the free ; efit confer~ed on religion by permit- · impressionable than younger stu-
~· speech .' protections · of_ . the First ting Cornerstone's worship is "in~i- dents and should be able to appre-
1 A!_Jlendment. ifhat has not been so . dental," Powell said, quoting a prior _> ciate that the . university's policy 'is 
' c~ear in prior.Supreme Court rulings: . court ruling that if the Con-stitution . . one of neutrality toward religion.~ . 
"~ Yesterday, upholding the 8th U.S. barred general benefits to religious Powell and church-state experts 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Widmar groups " 'a church could not be pro- , interviewed yesterday also .said that 
. us. Vi'!cent, Powell agreed 'with the tected by the police and fire depart-.. :grade schools ' have never been 'con-
,' students. · · · r ments or nave its public sidewruk sidere<l "public forums". for , ex pres; 
:, "The U~iversity of Missouri has' kept in repair.'" . 'sion ·ofpojitical view~. ·:; \ 
discriminated against student groups ~ Justice John Paul Stevens, in a · In addition, university clubs do 
, an'd speakers based on their desire to· concurring opinion, agreed that the not require supeivision by ·teachers 
' use a generally open forun{to engage ban 'Was impermissible: but he gave-r as do activities in elem~ntary and 
in 'religious worship and discuss_ion," different reasons thari Powell: The high schools. The courts have held 
Powell said. "These are forms -of university simply had no valid rea- that that supervision could create 
~peech and association protected by son for banning the group, Stevens the impression in younger children 
the First Amendment." . ' · said, and he said the majority went that they had an obligation to par-
Speech may not be regulated or too far when it said the university ticipate in praye~ or thatjthe ~chool 




New York Times, Dec. 9 1981 
' 
A UNIVERSITY CURB 1 P~~f:fJ~~::~~:=:~:J::; . of this case" by focusing almost exchi-
ON RELIGION UPSET 
i ~~~8t~~:!J ~b~~~~tg~~:~ 
· tal "establishment" of religion. 
· - - Exluslon Over SPeech Content 
· • 1 "The university has opened its faclli-
Supreme Court Backs··St·u._dent . ties for use by student groups," he con-
tinued, "and the question is whether it 
' Group,on the Right to Meet ~~t~~~~~r~:=~ because of tile 
· · "Religious worship and discussion," 
i~ a Campus Facility Justice Powell •said, "are forms of 
speech and assqciation protected by the 
' First Amendment." The Government 
I may discriminate against a type of con-By LINDA GREENHOUSE stitutionally protected speech, the opln-'-' Specla!toTheNewYorkTim• ion continued, only if it can "show that 
WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 - The Su- its regulation is necessary to serve a 
preme Court ruled today, 8 to 1, that a compelling state interest and that it is 
public unlversi~y that permits student narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 
groups to meet on campus for secular It is only at this point that the estab-
activities must also allow student reli- lishment clause properly becomes part 
gious groups to meet for worship and of the analysis, Justice Powell said. Mis- I 
religious study. sourl argued that the establishment i 
The Court struck down a regulation clause- maintaining the separation be-
adopted by the University of Missouri tween church and state- was itself the · 
that prohibited the use of university "compelling state interest" that justi-
property "for purposes of religious wor- fied the ban on religious activity. But 
·ship or religious teaching." The regula- numerous Supreme Court decisions over 
tion was challenged by an evangelical the last decade interpreting the estab-
Christian student group called Corner- lishment clause have required a more 
stone, one of more than 100 recognized precise examination. 
student organizations at the university's Associate Justice John Paul Stevens, 
Kansas City campus, that was denied while agreeing with the majority's con-
the use of a room for itS weekly Satur- elusion, did not join Justice Powell's 
day night meetings. opinion. He said that for reasons of aca-
The Court today based its ruling on demic freedom the university should 
the students' constitutional rights of have to show only a "valid" rather than 
free speech and association, rather than a "compelllng" justification for its poll-
on their right to the free ~xerCise of their cy. 
religion. Associate Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr., writing for the majority, 
said it was not necessary to decide the 
Dissent by Justice White 
Associate Justice White, in dissent, 
said the majority was "plainly wrong" 
in equating religious worship with non-
religious speech. If "no line may ever be 
drawn" between worship and other 
speech, he said, "the majority would 
have to uphold the university's right to 
offer a class enti tied 'Sunday Mass.' " 
"free exercise" Issue in light of the 
Court's free speech holding. . 
The case, arriving at the Supreme 
Court at a time of renewed political in-
terest in the relationship between reU- · 
glon and Government, attracted wide-
spread notice, with a numw of major . 
religious organizations filing briefs. The 
dissent was by Justice Byron R. White. 
No Change on Prayer Issue 
Justice Powell emphasized that "the' 
basis for our decision is narrow." The 
ruling, applying only to voluntary reli-
gious practices at state-supported uni-
versities, indicates no change in the 
Court's view that the Constitution bars 
officially sponsored prayer in the public 
schools. . · 
The decision is significant, neverthe-
less, in that it provides what may be the 
- Court's clearest explanation so far of 
how religious observance fits within the 
free speech guarantees of the First 
Amendment . . 
The university had defended Its policy 
on the ground that the Constitution re-
quired a prohibition against any reli-
gious activity on campus. To facilitate 
student religious practice in any way 
the university said, would be to give reu: 
gion the "symbolic approval" of the 
State of Missouri and to breach the con-
stitutionally required separation be-
tween church and state 
Instead, Justice White said, the Court 
should have examined the burden that 
the university's policy placed on the stu-
dents' ability to practice their religion. 
Noting that the students could have met 
"about a block and a half" from the 
campus, Justice White concluded that 
the burden was "minimal" and that the 
policy should have been upheld. 
The decision, Widmar v. Vincent, No. 
80-689, upheld a decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. . 
Another Federal appeals court, the 
Second Circuit, in New York, last year 
reached an opposite conclusion in a 
similar case, upholding the refusal by 
the board of education in Guilderland, 
N.Y., to allow public school students to 
hold voluntary religious meetings on 
school grounds before the start of the 
school day. The students have asked the 
Justices to hear their appeal. The Su-
preme Court has · applied different 
standards to college students and 
younger students in past religion cases 
and may announce soon whether It will 




'George F . . Will 
\ 
Confused About Relig~o~ .. ' 
The Constitution has emerged without new all religious. worship comes under tqe protection 
wounds from another brush with the Supreme of ·free , speech, wha~ additional purpose is · 
Court. This is especially gratifying because the served by the constitutional guarantee. of "free 
case concerned an issue about which the court exercise" of religion? The protection of fre«; 
·· has been 'and remains especially confused: the speech should be suffiCient. · · · · 
"establishment" of religion. ' · ' Furthermore, last term the' oourt held that 
,;· · The court has held, 8-1, that the Upiversity posting the Ten Commandments in a classroom 
' of Missouri, Kansas City, erred when it promul- constitutes "es'tablishment" of religion. Clearly 
gated a regulation prohibi~ing the use of univer- the court then thought the content of religious 
. sity property for "religious worship or religious_ communication could justify discrimination 
teaching." A student religious group S\.led, . against it. . . 
'claiming violation of First Amendment rights of Justice John Paul Stevens, although joining the 
freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. majority, argues that the court~s particular ap-
Klower court held that the university was right proach to analysis of this question Ulldermines 
in thinking that the regulation was not only per- the academic freedom of public universities. "A 
missible but mandatory because of the constitu- university," he says, "legitimately may regard 
tional ban on "establishment" of religion. some subjects.as more relevant to its ~ucational 
Onward . the Christians soldiered, to an !IP: mission than others." If two groups r~uest the 
peals court, yvhich held for tJlem. It rUleq that use of the only suitable facility at a particular 
the regulation constituted unconstitutional dis'- time, one for frivolity, the other for rehearsing 
crimination against a· category of speech-re,i- "Hamlet," the First Amendm.ent does not require 
'· gious speech-because of its content. The that the room be reserved for the group that 
fo~ces of Darkness pressed on to the Supreme ' asked first. The university could prefer the con-
. Court, but Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., an agent . tent of one form of expression over the other. 
'·• of Light if ever there. was one, spok~ for the ma- The intellectual tangles and potential problems 
> jority in sustaining the appeals court and the tpat White and Stevens note are unintend~ re-
religious group. . · ' . . . . suits of unnecessary complexity woven by the 
, . He employed the cumbersome, not to say roco- . court since it abandoned the correct construction 
·oo, criteria the court has . 'constructed to test of the Establishment Clause. Properly construed, 
!.. ;..hether a state practice offends the Establishment it requires the state to be neutral between religion . 
Clau8e: does the practice have a secular purpooe? and irreligio~-with the predictable and often in-
Does its primary .effect neither enhance nor inhibit tended effect of enhancing the latter. . 
religion? Does it footer excessive state entangle- It is the court's fault that the university was 
rpent with religion? Powell concluded that univer- confused about what the Establishment Clause re-
sity openness toward religious groups would serve quires. It is the uriiversij;y's fault that the univer-
. the secular plll"})OOe of, and have the primary effect. sity argued that providing a forum for the religious 
·of, enhancing intellectual exchange, with negligible . group would undermine its secular purpooe Of 
"entrulgiement." . , . . · . providing a forum for the exchange of ideas. The . 
. . The fact 'that the court ~id not say a univer- university may be terminally confused about vari-
• sity can prohibit ieligioUs "worship" but not .' ous impOrtant ideas, including the idea of a univer-
religioils "diScussion" may indicate that pru- . sity. ' -
dence is tempering the court's recent appetite . . :The sort of people who favor proscribing reli-
for constitutional hair-splitting. .The dissenting gious groups probably would unhesitatingly favor ' 
.' justice, J3yron White, suggests such a distinc- campus hospitality for groups advocating com~ 
tion, but Powell calls .it "judicially unmanage- munism, homosexuality, ·astrology. even supply-
able." · side economics. But the court has so muddled the 
White argues that a· university may, without nation's mind concerning the Establishment 
violating the Establishment Cl~use; permit .its Clause, the university felt a constitutional duty to 
pz:operty to be wied for religious purposes, but _ drive off campus a group whose interest is the 
that the clause dries not stipulate what the state religion that is a wellspring from which the nation 
is required ,to ,do. And he asks, interestingly: if · and its Constitution derive. 
i 
December 30, 1981 
~0-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Byron and John: 
I enclose copy of a let,ter of December 23 from r.~arc n. 
Stern, "of counsel" on the amicus brief file~ In this case 
by the American Jewish Congress. Mr. ~tern is correct in 
the sense my citat5on of ~rannon in footnote 13 noes not 
supoort, without some quafifi.catton, the text of the note. 
The same is true of the citation in the same note of Hunt. 
Accorc'Hnqly, I propose simPlY to omit bot11 citations, 
leaving the substance ot the note as written. I have 
discussed thiA with qenry Lind and he agrees. 
We ~enied cert in Brandon at our Oecember 14 
Conference. ~hat case \nvolven serious "entanglement" 
problems an~ I continue to think denial of cert there was 
clearly the correct disposition. 
I brinq this to your attentton as ~yron dissented in 
Widmar and John wrote a concurrinq opinion. ! am not 
5othering the other Justi.ces, as I cannot imagine that they 






JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
J5U;Jtrttm <!fcuri of Hrt ~tlt ~bdts 
Jlas4ingt~ ~. Q1. 2llfi'l-~ 
January 21, 1982 
Re: No.80-1396, Brandon v. Board of Education 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
The cert list for the February 19 Conference includes a 
petition for rehearing in No. 80-1396, Brandon v. Board of 
Education. As noted in the petition, this case is 
rnischaracterized in Footnote 13 of the Slip Opinion in No. 
80-689, Widmar v. Vincent. 
When this error carne to my attention, I arranged with 
Henry Lind to have the reference to this case omitted from 
the Widmar opinion that will be printed in the u.s. Reports. 
I also advised Byron and John--the two Justices who had not 
joined the Court opinion in Widmar. As reflected in my 
letter to them of December 30th (copy enclosed) , the 
inadvertent inaccuracy in Widmar does not--in my opinion--
affect our earlier denial of cert in Brandon. 
Brandon involves serious "entanglement" problems not 
implicated in Widmar, including those raised by the 
requirement of New York law that student religious meetings 
in school facilities would require faculty supervision. See 
635 F.2d, at 979. The difference in maturity between high 
school and college students also provides a distinguishing 
factor. See Widmar, slip op. at 10 n.l4~ Brandon, 635 F.2d, 
at 978, 980. 
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Note from Justice Rehnquist: 
Lewis -
I agree with your draft in Widmar v. Vincent with 
the possible exception of the "overbreadth" analysis. As to 
the "overbreadth" analysis as to the Mo. constitutional 
provision justification as a "compelling interest" to 
justify an exclusion. Isn't the supremacy clause enough? 
~R 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
~UVftutt <l}ltltd ttf tqt ~uittb ~taft.tr 
Jla,gfti:ugt.on, ~. <!}. 2ll~'!~ 
November 3, 1981 
No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Please join me in the proposed opinion. It is 
handled very well. I have several minor suggestions which I 
would ask you to consider. 
On page 6 of the draft it states "We agree that 
the University has a compelling interest in complying with 
its constitutional obligations." This statement may be 
unnecessarily broad, since it implies that compliance with 
any constitutional provision constitutes a compelling ~~~ 
interest for disobeying any other provision. While this may 
in fact be true, the Court might want to leave itself more 
room to maneuver in future cases. The statement could be 
easily dropped from this opinion and the following sentence 
reworded: "We disagree with the University's conclusion 
that . . . " 
Footnote 13 on page 9 might mention the 
University's argument that the students themselves seemed to 
admit that holding meetings on campus influences other 
students' perceptions. For example, this language could be 1 ~ . J.,-added to the end of the footnote (no new paragraph) : The ~ ~~ 
University argues that the Cornerstone students themselves 
admitted in affidavits that "[s)tudents know that if C 
something is on campus, then it is a student organization, .A~~~ 
and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a Y~' 
meeting." Similarly, the students claimed that meeting off 
campus "tends to make students think that there is something 
'wrong' with us." Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, 
Joint Appendix at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 1977). In light of the 
large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt 
students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. And 
in any case, the University has a less restrictive 
2. 
alternative available if it wishes to remove any inference 
of State sponsorship: It may disseminate statements 
disavowing endorsement of any particular campus meetings. 
In fact, the University's student handbook already notes ~ 
that the University's name will not "be identified in any 
way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions f ~ 
of any organization or its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Studen 
Handbook, at 25. 
Finally, I am somewhat concerned about the 
citation to Luetkemeyer in footnote 16, page 10. The 
parenthetical explanat1on could imply that this Court found 
the State had a compelling interest in complying with its 
own constitution. In fact, this Court summarily affirmed a 
lower court opinion to that effect. This Court, therefore, 
either could have agreed with the finding of a compelling 
interest or could have concluded that the state's practice 
infringed no constitutionally protected right. To avoid 
this problem, I would replace the parenthetical explanation 
with a phrase like this: See Luetkemeyer .•. (1974), in 
which the district court found Missouri had a compelling 
interest in compliance with its own constitution. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Cbpies to the Cbnfe.rence 
November 4, 1981 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Responses to Widmar draft 
Five Chambers have now entered formal or informal responses 
to Widmar. I would recommend awaiting further response before 
re-circulating, but I wanted to alert you to the current status 
as I understand it. 
Justice White has indicated that he will dissent. 
Justice Rehnquist has communicated, directly to you and 
again through his clerk. He dislikes the "overbreadth" analysis 
of Section III B. He would rely entirely on the Supremacy Clause 
to dismiss the University's argument under its state 
constitution. I would strongly hesitate to make the change 
requested. I think it is true that the Supremacy Clause elevates 
First Amendment "rights" above the State's interest. The problem 
is one of circularity in argument: The question is whether there 
are First Amendment rights here; and the answer to this question 
requires a balancing of the free speech "interests" of the 
respondents against the State's "interest" in compliance with its 
constitution. In other words, I think that direct reliance on the 
Supremacy Clause--without allowing some consideration of the 
state's "interest"--would be entirely conclusory and therefore 
unpersuasive. 
Justice O'Connor has "joined." She asks three changes. Two 
are entirely stylistic, and I would recommend that they be made 
(even though one will make for a decidedly "un-lean" footnote} . 
The third request--the first presented in her memo--asks deletion 
of a sentence on page six: "We agree that the University has a 
compelling interest in complying with its constitutional 
obligations." She seems to concede that the sentence is "true," 
but objects that it is misleadingly "broad." I do not agree. In 
addition, deletion of the sentence would leave it unclear why the 
opinion even bothers to inquire whether the State's 
constitutional obligation is implicated--i.e., why it even 
bothers with the Establishment Clause analysis. I would 
therefore reject this suggestion, on which Justice O'Connor does 
not seem to insist. I gather she will be satisfied if the other 
changes are included in the next circulation. 
Justice Brennan has asked for the addition of one sentence 
to footnote 12. In effect, it reserves the possibility that 
provision of a public forum, under some situation that he does 
not specify, might possbly violate the Establishment Clause. 
This proposal is slightly puzzling and slightly troubling. A 
sentence on page 10 already seems to reserve this possibility: 
"At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's public forum, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the 
forum's primary effect... This sentence immediately follows 
Footnote 14. If Justice Brennan's sentence were to be accepted, 
this would be the more logical place to put it. But then it 
would be redundant. It would also conflict with a suggestion by 
Justice Blackmun, see infra, that the implication of the quoted 
sentence ( 11 At least in the absence •.. } should be weakened. 
Justice Blackmun, according to his clerk, would like to see 
the addition of a sentence to Note 12: 11 Because we decide this 
regulation is an infringement on respondent's free speech and 
association interests, we need not decide the extent to which it 
might infringe their Free Exercise rights... I have no objection 
to this, except that its tone is inconsonant with Justice 
Brennan's proposed amendment. This problem could be solved if 
Justice Brennan's sentence were put in Footnote 14~ but there it 
would much strengthen the implication that, in a proper case, a 
public forum might offend the Establishment Clause. And Justice 
Blackmun's second substantive request is for the substitution of 
(unspecified} language weakening this implication. 
It is hard for me to guess the strength of Justice 
Blackmun's concern. His clerk said that he generally liked the 
opinion and admired the way it 11 walks the tightrope ... He also 
made several trivial suggestions, which can easily be 
accommodated in a recirculation. These may mollify him. 
For the time being, I have no strong intuition how to 
proceed. If you think a prompt recirculation desirable to try to 
11 lock in 11 Justices Brennan and Blackmun, I would tentatively 
suggest that an altered version of both their suggestions should 
be included in footnote 12, where they both wanted their 
amendments to appear. The end of the paragraph would then read 
as follows (with changes underscored): 
"Here the University's forum is already available to other 
groups, and respondents' claim to use that forum does not--as in 
Brandon or Hunt--rest solely on rights claimed under the Free 
Exercise Clause. Respondents' claim also implicates First 
Amendment rights of speech and association, and it is on the 
bases of speech and association rights that we decide this case. 
Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to 
which Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged 
University regulation. Neither do we reach the difficult 
questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free 
Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular case, 
conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause." 
The first of the underscored sentences would be for Justice 
Blackmun, the second for Justice Brennan. I reiterate that any 
recirculation should include a number of trivial suggestions 
offered by Justice Blackmun, which might also help to win his 
vote. 
CHAMBERS OF 
,jnprtntt <qottrt 4lf tift ~tb .jtaftl\' 
~Jtingtttn, ~. <q. 2llgt'!~ 
J U S T ICE BYRON R . W HIT E 
November 4, 1981 
Re: 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis, 
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CHAMBERS OF ' 
..JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR . November 4, 1981 
RE: No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
My hope was that you might be willing to add a 
sentence at the end of footnote 12 on page 8 along 
the following lines: 
11 This is not to say that governmental 
sanction of the use of such rights for 
religious worship at a public forum may 
not in other circumstances violate the 
Establishment Clause. 11 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
November 5, 1981 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Justice White's Dissent in Widmar v. Vincent 
"The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech 
generally protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First 
Amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. If "religious worship" were protected "speech," the 
dissent reasons, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any 
independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice 
took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, post, at 4. This 
argument is both novel and difficult to comprehend. The dissent 
does not deny that speech about religion is speech is entitled to 
the general protections of the First Amendment. See id., at 3 & 
n.l. It does not argue that descriptions of religious 
experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it repudiate 
last Term's decision in Krishna, which assumed that religious 
appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, 
the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of 
religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new --------- -- ._ ---- __,... 
class of religious "speech acts," see dissenting opinion at 5, 
Worship, like pornography, is then said to 
the protection of the "free speech" clause of the 
------------------------- --First Amendment. Perhaps Justice White "knows it when he sees 
it." We find at least three difficulties with his attempted 
distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction 
has intelligible content. There is no indication when "singing 
hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," id., 
at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading"--all 
apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject 
matter--and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction could be made intelligible, 
it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial 
competence. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 u.s. 67, 70 (1953). 
Merely to draw the distinction would require the university--and 
ultimately the courts--to inquire into the significance of 
various words and practices to different religious faiths. Such 
an inquiry would tend inevitably to entangle the State with 
religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the 
distinction on which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently 
wishes to to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. 
See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. But it gives no reason why 
the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the 
Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra, 
than for religious worship by persons already converted. It is 
far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter 
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last Term's decision in Krishna,kwhich assumed that religious 
appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, 
the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of 
religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new 
class of religious "speech ac t(sj ," ~issenting opinion? at 5, 
comprising "worship." There are at least three difficulties with 
this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction 
has intelligible content. There is no indication when "singing 
hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," id., 
at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading"--all 
apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject 
matter--and become unprotected "worship." o1 I 
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it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial 
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religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E.~. , 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the 
distinction on which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently 
wishes to ~ preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. 
See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. But it gives no reason why 
the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the 
Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra, 
than for religious worship by persons already converted. It is 
far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter 








JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
,§u:p:untt tqtturlttf flrt %TIUb ~f:a:ttg 
· ~rurJri:n-g:Ltn. gi. tq. 20&tJ.l.~ 
November 5, 1981 





cc: The Conference 
jiu.pumt <!foud of tqt 'Jllttittb jitlrlts 
11Ja:gfrington. tfl. <!f. 2ll.;tJ-t.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
November 5, 1981 
Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~mu~~ttrl~f~t~b~mug 
.,ra,g!p:ngt~n, J. ~· 20P:~~ 
November 5, 1981 





cc: The Conference 
November 5, 1981 
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your note of November 4. 
I also have word from Harry that he would like a 
sentence added to note 12 along the following lines: 
"Because we decide this regulation is an 
infringement on respondents' free speech and 
association interests , we need not decide the 
extent to which it might infringe their free 
exercise rights." 
I have no objection to saying this. Yet, because 
of the difference in tone, 1 propose' to blend your 
suggestion and Harry's into the following language to be 
added at the end of note 12: 
"Accordingly, we need not inquire into 
the extent, if any, to which Free Exercise 
interests are infringed by the challenged 
University regulation . Neither do we reach 
the difficult questions that would arise if 
State accommodation of Free Exercise and Free 
Speech rights should, in a o~rticular case, 
conflict with the prohibi tbrYrs of the 
Establishment Clause." 
As you spoke to me first, I will make this change 
and recirculate if it meets with your approval. I think it 
is prudent to 1eave both of these questions wide open, 
without inviting marginal litigation. 




November 5, 1981 
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Bill: 
This refers to the little note you sent me on the 
bench in which you inquired whether the Supremacy Clause 
alone does not justify dismissing the University's argument 
under its state constitution. 
I hesitate to rely solely on that Clause, although 
I agree - of course - that it elevates First Amendment 
rights above the state's interest. But the question before 
us is whether there are First Amendment rights upon which 
respondents may rely:--The answer to this question requires 
a weighing - as I see it - of the asserted free speech and 
assembly interests of the respondents against the state's 
interest in complying with its constitution. 
I would prefer to leave SIII-B substantially as I 
have drafted it, as it seems more persuasive and less 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
;inpumt <IJomt qf tlf~ ~nitih ;ibrlts 
:.r•ltittghtn. ~. OJ. 2.0.;t'l~ 
November 5, 1981 
Re: 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
For two reasons I am reluctant to join the court's 
opinion. First, I do not believe that it is correct to 
characterize the University's school activity program 
as a "public forum," as that concept was developed in 
Hague v. CIO, 307 u.s. 496, 515. The facilities are 
available to students; by hypothesis, the public is 
excluded. The relationship between a university and 
its student body is sufficiently different from the 
relationship between the sovereign and the citizenry to 
make it inappropriate to consider the public forum 
concept equally applicable to both. 
Second, the characterization of the exclusion of 
religious groups as based on the content of their 
speech is, in my judgment, somewhat imprecise. The 
University's regulation is content neutral in the sense 
that it evidences no hostility to, or disagreement 
with, the point of view of any particular speaker. It 
excludes a certain category of subject matter from the 
student activity program; like the exclusion of 
political advertisements from buses, in one sense the 
exclusion is content-neutral and in another sense it is 
content-based. 
The distinction is of some importance because 
school facilities are often in short supply. In 
allocating such facilities university administrators 
may reasonably conclude that some subjects are more 
relevant than others to campus life or to the 
particular academic objectives of the school. In this 
context, the notion that they must support their 
judgments by reference to "a compelling state interest" 
seems too strict to me. 
-2-
Even if I cannot join your opinion, I intend to 
concur in the Court's judgment. In this case, there is 
no question about the availability of adequate 
facilities. Student participation in Cornerstone 
meetings is entirely voluntary. No danger of apparent 
University sponsorship of a religion is disclosed by 
the record. Since the University's only justification 
for the exclusion--its fear of violating the 
Establishment Clause--is without merit, as you 
demonstrate, and since no other significant 
justification has been advanced, the regulation must 
fall for it unquestionably does inhibit the students' 
right to speak and to associate freely. 
I am not sure you will want to (or be able to) 
accommodate my concerns, but I thought you would want 





Copies to the Conference 
lfp/sn 1.1/05/81 Rider ~, p. 6 (Widmar) 
We agree that the interest of the University i.n complylng 
with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as 
compelling. It i!oes not follow, however, that ~n "equal 
access" policy wouJ.d b~ incomoat ibte \-T). th this Court's 
Establishment Clause cases. 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Justice Stevens's Widmanr Views 
If you wish to respond to Justice Stevens's communication of 
yesterday, I think you might consider speaking directly to what 
seems to be his underlying concern--namely, that the Court should 
~
not make it too difficult for the University to allocate scarce 
facilities to their best educational use. He seems worried that 
the "public forum" notion restricts the University's capacity to 
make choices of this kind. Quite the contrary is true. In the 
first place, the opinion clearly recognizes that the University 
campus could never be an open forum--even for its students--in 
the classic sense. This is the point of the Footnote 6, quoting 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 u.s. 503, 
506 (1969): First Amendment rights must be analyzed in light of 
the special characteristics so the school environment." Perhaps 
more important, the invocation of "public forum" jurisprudence 
explains the source of the students' rights. By creating a forum 
generally open t ;-all student groups, the University has 
implicitly conceded that there is no scarcity problem at the 
present time. It has thus implicitly conceded the right of the 
religious groups to share equally in tqe forum, absent some 
compelling reason to keep them out. This kind of analysis is 
entirely neutral about the University's obligations in a case 
where there was no open forum--most notably in a case in which 
there was a need to allocate scarce classroom of other facilities 
to their best educational use. By not grounding the students' 
access rights in an open-forum model, Justice Stevens may 
implicitly require the University to bear the same burden of 
jusitifying exclusions in a case of scarcity as in a case of 
resources ample to accommodate all. The draft opinion places the 
decision on the narrowest possible ground. Given the 
complexities of the subject matter, this is the best course. 
November 5, 1981 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Justice White's Dissent in Widmar v. Vincent 
Justice White has now circulated his dissent. It relies 
principally bn an argument that "religious worship" is not 
"speech" protected generally by the "free speech" guarantee of 
the First Amendment. Its protection, if any, must come from the 
"Free Exercise Clause." This is a direct intellectual challenge 
to the theory of the draft opinion, and I think it should be met. 
Very tentatively, I would recommend the following rider, to be 
added as a footnote on page 5. It would follow the sentence: 
"These are forms of speech and association protected by the First 
Amendment." 
"The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech 
generally protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First 
Amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. If "religious worship" were protected "speech," the 
dissent reasons, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any 
independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice 
took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, post, at 4. This 
0v-t '"'~ 
/\. argument, is.. bo-th r:mv,el and diffi<Ju.J..t to eemp~. The dissent 
does not deny that speech about religion is speech~ entitled to 
the general protections of the First Amendment. See id., at 3 & 
n.l. It does not argue that descriptions of religious 
experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it repudiate 
last Term's decision in Krishna, which assumed that religious 
appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, 
the dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of 
religious speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new 
class of religious "speech acts," see dissenting opinion at 5, 
comprisipg "worship." There are at least three difficulties with 
this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction 
has intelligible content. 
\ . 
There is no indication when "singing 
hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," id., 
at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading"--all 
apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious subject 
matter--and become unprotected "worship." t );..~ ~l, t~ 
~ ax..-a.-r< ~ /. ~ " J 
Second, even if the distinction · · telli~ le, 
it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial 
-1-D 
competence~ Rhode Island, 345 u.s. 67, 70 (1953). 
Merely to draw the distinction would require the university--and 
ultimately the courts--to inquire into the significance of 
~ J'f..( .; 4 ·~1"').-~~ 
ve~iOUG words and practices to dif erent religious faithsA Such~· 
~ inquir~ould tend inevitably to entangle the State with 
religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the 
distinction on which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently 
wishes t~ preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. 
See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. But it gives no reason why 
the Establishment Clause, or any other provision of the 
Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra, 
than for religious worship by persons already converted. It is 
far from clear that the State gives greater support in the latter 
case than in the former. 
November 6, 1981 
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear John: 
~hank you for your letter. Although, as you 
suggest, I do not think I can accommodate your concerns bv 
revisions of the draft opinion, I share the foll.m'linq 
thoughts on what seems to be your principal concern: 
namely, that a university should be able, without 
interference, to allocate scarce facilities to their best 
educational use. 
~y opinion clearly recognizes that a university 
campus is not an open forum in the classic sense, even for 
its students. In footnote 6, after a quote from Tinker, ~y 
draft says: 
"A university ojffers in significant respects 
from oublic forums such as streets or parks 
or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this 
Court have never denied its authority to 
impose reasonable regulations compatible with 
that mission upon the use of its campus and 
fac1.1itJes." 
In this case, as you agree, there is no "scarcity 
problem". Rather, the uni. v~rsity has created a forum open 
to a11 100 or more of its student qroupR. The only reason 
assigned by it for excluding this religious group is the 
Establish~ent Clause - not that the speech of the religious 
group would be incompatible wtth the E~>ducational ah'ts of the 
university. 
I believe the opinion rests on the narrowest 
ground consistent with our cases. I agree fully that the 
area is one of i.nherent complexities, but my opi.nion leaves 
a university administration with substantially the freedom 
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[November-, 1981] 
Jus~  dissenting. 
In af ming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the ma-
jority rejects petititoners' argument that the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution prohibits the use of university 
buildings for religious purposes. A state university may 
permit its property to be used for purely religious services 
without violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
With this I agree. See Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 813 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 661 (Opinion of WHITE, J.); The 
Establishment Clause, however, sets limits only on what the 
State may do with respect to religious organizations; it does 
not establish what the State is required to do. I have long 
argued that Establishment Clause limits on state action 
which incidentally aids religion are not as strict as the Court 
has held. The step from the permissible to the necessary, 
however, is a long one. In my view, just as there is room 
under the Religion Clauses for state policies that may have 
some beneficial effect on religion, there is also room for state 
policies that may incidentally burden religion. In other 
words, I believe the states to be a good deal freer to formu-
late policies that affect religion in divergent ways than does 
the majority. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 
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will inevitably lead to those contradictions and tensions be-
tween the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses warned 
against by Justice Stewart in Sherbert v. Verner, !d., at 416. 
The university regulation at issue here provides in perti-
nent part: 
"No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious 
worship or religious teaching by either student or non-
student groups. Student congregations of local 
churches or of recognized denominations or sects, al-
though not technically recognized campus groups, may 
use the facilities . . . under the same regulations that ap-
ply to recognized campus organizations, provided that no 
University facilities may be used for purposes of reli-
gious worship or religious teaching." 
Although there may be instances in which it would be diffi-
cult to determine whether a religious group used university 
facilities for "worship" or "religious teaching," rather than for 
secular ends, this is not such a case. The regulation was ap-
plied to respondents' religious group, Cornerstone, only after 
the group explicitly informed the University that it sought 
access to the facilities for the purpose of offering prayer, 
singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical prin-
ciples. Cornerstone described their meetings as follows: 
"Although these meetings would not appear to a casual ob-
server to correspond precisely to a traditional worship ser-
vice, there is no doubt that worship is an important part of 
the general atmosphere." J. A., at 34. 1 The issue here is 
1 Cornerstone was denied access to university facilities because it in-
tended to use those facilities for regular religious services in which "wor-
ship is an important part of the general atmosphere." There is no issue 
here as to the application of the regulation to "religious teaching." Reach-
ing this issue is particularly inappropriate in this case because nothing in 
the record indicates how the University has interpreted the phrase "reli-
gious teaching" or even whether it has ever been applied to activity that 
0$0689D-5-NOV-81-DICK 
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only whether the University regulation as applied and inter-
preted in this case is impermissible under the federal Con-
stitution. If it is impermissible, it is because it runs afoul of 
either the Free Speech or the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment. 
A large part of respondents' argument, accepted by the 
court below and implicitly accepted by the majority, is 
founded on the proposition that because religious worship 
uses speech, it is protected by the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment. 2 Not only is it protected, they argue, 
but religious worship qua speech is not different from any 
was not clearly "religious worship." The District Court noted that plain-
tiffs did not contend that they were "limited, in any way, from holding on-
campus meetings that do not include religious worship services." J. A., at 
38. At oral argument, counsel for the University indicated that the regu-
lation would not bar discussion of biblical texts under circumstances that 
did not constitute "religious worship." Transcript of Oral Argument, at 9. 
The sole question in this case involves application of the regulation to pro-
hibit regular religious worship services in university buildings. 
2 Given that the majority's entire argument turns on this description of 
religious services as speech, it is surprising that the majority assumes this 
proposition to require no argument. The majority assumes the conclusion 
by describing the University's action as discriminating against "speakers 
based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion." 
Supra, at 5. As noted above, it is not at all clear that the University has 
or intends to discriminate against "religious discussion"-as a preliminary 
matter, it is not even clear what the majority means by "religious discus-
sion" or how it entered the case. That religious worship is a form of 
speech, the majority takes to have been established by three cases. 
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.-- U. S. 
- (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New 
York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). None of these cases stand for this proposition. 
Heffron and Saia involved the communication of religious views to a non-
religious, public audience. Talk about religion and about religious beliefs, 
however, is not the same as religious services of worship. Niemotko was 
an equal protection challenge to a discriminatory denial of one religious 
group's access to a public park. The Court specifically stated that it was 
not addressing the question of whether the state could uniformly deny all 
religious groups access to public parks. 340 U. S. at 272. 
0$0689D-5-NOV -81-D I CK 
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other variety of protected speech as a matter of constitu-
tional principle. I believe that this proposition is plainly 
wrong. Were it right, the Religion Clauses would be emp-
tied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which 
religious practice took the form of speech. 
Just last term, the Court found it sufficiently obvious that 
the Establishment Clause prohibited a state from posting a 
copy of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall that a 
statute requiring such a posting was summarily struck down. 
Stone v. Graham, --U. S.-- (Nov. 17, 1980). That case 
necessarily presumed that the state could not ignore the reli-
gious content of the written message, nor was it permitted to 
treat that content as it would, or must treat, other-secu-
lar-messages under the First Amendment's protection of 
speech. Similarly, the Court's decisions prohibiting prayer 
in the public schools rest on a content based distinction be-
tween varieties of speech: as a speech act, apart from its con-
tent, a prayer is indistinguishable from a biology lesson. 
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); School District of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). Op-
eration of the Free Exercise Clause is equally dependent, in 
certain circumstances, on recognition of a content based dis-
tinction between religious and secular speech. Thus, in 
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), the Court struck 
down, as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, a state re-
quirement that made a declaration of belief in God a condition 
of state employment. A declaration is again a speech act, 
but it was the content of the speech that brought the case 
within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 
There may be instances in which a state's attempt to disen-
tangle itself from religious worship would intrude upon secu-
lar speech about religion. In such a case, the state's action 
would be subject to challenge under the Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment. This is not such a case. This case 
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accomplished through speech does not add anything to re-
spondents' argument. That argument must rely upon the 
claim that the state's action impermissibly interferes with the 
free exercise of respondents' religious practices. Although 
this is a close question, I conclude that it does not. 
Plausible analogies on either side suggest themselves. 
Respondents argue, and the majority agrees, that by permit-
ting any student group to use its facilities for communicative 
purposes other than religious worship, the University has 
created a "public forum." Supra, at 4. With ample sup-
port, they argue that the state may not make content based 
distinctions as to what groups may use, or what messages 
may be conveyed in, such a forum. See Police Department 
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 
536. The right of the religious to nondiscriminatory access 
to the public forum is well established. See Niemotko v. 
Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 
319 U. S. 105 (1943). Moreover, it is clear that there are 
bounds beyond which the University could not go in enforc-
ing its regulation: I don't suppose it could prevent student's 
from saying grace before meals in the school cafeteria, or pre-
vent distribution of religious literature on campus. 3 
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that allowing use of 
their facilities for religious worship is constitutionally indis-
tinguishable from directly subsidizing such religious services: 
It would "[fund] a specifically religious activity in an other-
wise substantially secular setting." Hunt v. McNair, 413 
U. S. 734, 743 (1934). They argue that the fact that secular 
student groups are entitled to the in-kind subsidy at issue 
3 There are obvious limits on the scope of this analogy. I know of no 
precedent holding that simply because a public forum is open to all kinds of 
speech-including speech about religion-it must be open to regular reli-
gious worship services as well. I doubt that the state need stand by and 
allow its public forum to become a church for any religious sect that 
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here does not establish that a religious group is entitled to 
the same subsidy. They could convincingly argue, for exam-
ple, that a state University that pays for basketballs for the 
basketball team is not thereby required to pay for bibles for a 
group like Cornerstone. 4 
A third analogy suggests itself, one that falls between 
these two extremes. There are a variety of state policies 
which incidentally benefit religion that this Court has upheld 
without implying that they were constitutionally required of 
the state. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 
(1968) (state loan of texbooks to parochial school students); 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (release of students 
from public schools, during school hours, to perform religious 
activities away from the school grounds); Everson v. Board 
of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (state provision of transpor-
tation to parochial school students). Provision of university 
facilities on a uniform basis to all student groups is not very 
different from provision of text books or transporation. 
From this perspective the issue is not whether the state 
must, or must not, open its facilities to religious worship; 
rather, it is whether the state may choose not to do so. 
Each of these analogies is persuasive. Because they lead 
to different results, however, they are of limited help in 
reaching a decision here. They also demonstrate the diffi-
culty in reconciling the various interests expressed in the Re-
ligion Clauses. In my view, therefore, resolution of this case 
is best achieved by returning to first principles. This re-
quires an assessment of the burden on respondents' ability 
freely to exercise their religious beliefs and practices and of 
the state's interest in enforcing its regulation. 
'There are, of course, limits to this subsidy argument. Sherbert, 
supra, and Thomas, supra, demonstrate that in certain circumstances the 
state may be required to "subsidize," at least indirectly, religious prac-
tices, under circumstances in which it does not and need not subsidize simi-
lar behavior founded on secular motives. 
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Respondents complain that compliance with the regulation 
would require them to meet "about a block and a half" from 
campus under conditions less comfortable than those previ-
ously available on campus. 5 I view this burden on free exer-
cise as minimal. Because the burden is minimal, the state 
need do no more than demonstrate that the regulation fur-
ther somes permissible state end. The state's interest in 
avoiding claims that it is financing or otherwise supporting 
religious worship-in maintaining a definitive separation be-
tween church and state-is such an end. That the state 
truly does mean to act toward this end is amply supported by 
the treatment of religion in the state constitution. 6 Thus, I 
believe the interest of the state is sufficiently strong to jus-
tify the imposition of the minimal burden on respondents' 
ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs. See United 
States v. Lee,-- U. S. --(No. 80--767) 
On these facts, therefore, I cannot find that the application 
of the regulation to prevent Cornerstone from holding reli-
gious worship services in university facilities violates the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. I would not hold as the 
majority does that if a university permits students and others 
to use its property for secular purposes, it must also furnish 
facilities to religious groups for the purposes of worship and 
the practice of their religion. Accordingly, I would reverse 
the judgement of the Court of Appeals. 
5 Respondents also complain that the university action has made their 
religious message less attractive by suggesting that it is not appropriate 
fare for the college campus. I give no weight to this because it is in-
distinguisable from an argument that respondents are entitled to the ap-
pearance of an endorsement of their beliefs and practices from the 
university. 
6 Since 1820, the Missouri Constitution has contained provisions requir-
ing a separation of church and state. The Missouri Supreme Court has 
held that the state constituional provisions are "not only more explict but 
more restrictive than the Establishment Clause of the United States Con-
stitution." Paster v. Tussey, 512 S. W. 2d 97 (1974). 
November 6, 1qa1 
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your join, and also for your 
suggestions. 
In the second draft that t am circulatinq today, I 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
,jnvrttttt <!Jottrf cf t4t 'Juittb' ,jtatt.&' 
'Jla#ftingtcu. ~. <It. 2llbi~" 
November 7, 1981 
No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
The revised draft of the referenced case 
incorporates various amendments which are completely 
satisfactory as far as I am concerned, and which improve 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
,ju.puntt ~omt of t4t ~~ ,jbdtg 
JfasJringhtn. ~. ~· 20~~~ 
November 7, 1981 
Re: o. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree with virtually everything in the draft but, I have 
trouble with your conclusion in Part IIIB, that we need not 
decide whether the relevant provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution constitute a compel ing state interest outweighing 
an abridgment of the First Amendment rights to free speech and 
association. You reach this conclusion by sugqestinq that the 
regulation here is overbroad, since it proh ' bits religious 
"teaching" as wel.l as religious "worship." Religious teaching is 
a form of "worship" and there is no explanat'on, however, why 
religious teaching should receive greater First Amendment 
protection than religious worship, or why infringement of the 
latter is more easiJy iustif'ed by the state constitutional 
provisions relied on by petitioners . Are not your distinctions 
rather close to those you correctly criticize the dissent for 
making, see page 5 n.7. 
I would feel more comfortable with a straightforward 
conclusion that Missouri's interest in maintaining the separation 
of church and state, to the extent it is even impJicated here, 
cannot serve as the iustification for significant infringement of 






MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
DICK FALLON 
November 9, 1981 
The Chief Justice's Response to Widmar 
If I understand his memorandum correctly, the Chief Justice 
has advanced a preference very similar to that expressed by 
Justice Rehnquist: He would like to see the rejection of the 
University's interest under the State constitution put directly 
on Supremacy grounds, without resort to an overbreadth analysis. 
He also makes the nice point that the "overbreadth" analysis 
assumes a distinction between "religious worship" and "religious 
teaching"--a distinction that the opinion attacks in its response 
to the dissent. I think that the language of the opinion could 
be re-cast in order to avoid any appearance of internal 
inconsistency. But it may also be worth considering some 
to accommodate the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. 
In offering an earlier recommondation against accommodating 
Justice Rehnquist, I was animated by two concerns. First, I 
thought it preferable to preserve the possiblity of "balancing"~ 
I would be reluctant to hold that a State constitutional 
interest--no matter how strong--could never outweigh a federal 
constitutional interest--no matter how marginally implicated--in 
a particular case. Second, I thought it desirable to keep this 
decision on the narrowest possible ground, without needing to 
construe the Missouri constitution. 
Based on further reflection, I believe that both concerns 
could be satisfied by substitution of some careful language, 
along the lines of the following, beginning at the top of page 
12. (I repeat one sentence from page 12, in order to show the 
continuity): 
It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the 
Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived from its own 
constitution, could ever outweigh free speeech interests 
protected by the First Amendment. We limit our holding to the 
case before us. 
First Amendment ~~~ are entitled to t~ 
constitutional solicitude. Our cases require the most exacting 
scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech 
on the basis of its content. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 
455 (1980) ~ Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408 u.s. 92 (1972). In this 
constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State 
interest asserted here--an interest in achieving greater 
separation of church and State than is already ensured under the 
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution--as sufficiently 
"compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against 
religious speech. 
--
If you think it worthwhile to pursue changes along these 
lines, you might want to consider raising the matter first with 
Justice O'Connor, who had also expressed concerns--though very 
different ones--about this section of the opinion. She was eager 
to avoid making any unnecessary law in this very difficult area. 
Because of the narrowness of the language I have suggested, I 
think it quite possible that she would be willing to go along. I 
would be happy to sound her clerk--and possibly Justice 
Blackmun's as well--if you would like me to do so. In 
conclusion, I would add only that I do not mean in this 
memorandum to "promote" the changes I have mentioned. I am 
essentially satisfied with the opinion as it stands. On the 
other hand, I appreciate the importance of getting a Court. And 
I find the suggested language substantively unobjectionable. 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hJtuutt ~ourl ltf tlf~ ~nitt~ .jtat.tg 
._Mqhtgtott. !l. ~· 2llp'!~ 
Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v . Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
November , 1981 
Please join me in your recirculation of November 6. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.jnpumt <q:~ d tqt ~tb ,jtatts 
jiufringhm. ~. <¢. 2ll.;t'1~ . 
November 9, 1981 
Re: No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for responding to the note I sent you on 
the bench asking whether you might see fit to change some 
of your emphasis on "overbreadth." Your response that 
you believe such an analysis to be the narrowest way of 
disposing of the University's State Constitution claim 
does not, at least at the present time, persuade me. 
Because I am uneasy about any extension of the overbreadth 
doctrine, I think for the present I will simply see how 





-~~~---~------------:;;QJu:pT~U~\:pJ:u:n: u rqr ~:n:u:nr ;;t9!CIU" 
····: ··: .. :~ 
._as!ringfott. ~· cg. 20c?'~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
November 9, 1981 
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Bill, Harry and Sandra: 
Both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief have been 
concerned about what they perceive to be the "emphasis" in 
Part III-B of my opinion on "overbreadth" analysis. Bill 
has advised me today that at least for the present, he 
cannot join the opinion. 
I would like to accommodate Bill and the Chief. 
Indeed, I may need one of them for a Court. I enclose a 
draft of language to be added on p. 12, if this meets with 
your approval. 
I do not think this addition would affect in any 







Proposed Substitute Language for the ' Text in 
Widmar v. Vincent, No. 80-689, beg~nning at the top of page 12: 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy 
of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing 
; to gather · to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would 
offend the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine 
how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also 
unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 
a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever 
outweigh free speeech interests protected by the First Amendment. 
We limit our holding to the case before us. 
First Amendment rights are entitled to special 
constitutional solicitude. Our cases require the most exacting 
scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech 
on the basis of its content. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 u.s. 
455 (1980): Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408 u.s. 92 (1972). In this 
constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State 
interest asserted here--an interest in achieving greater 
separation of church and State than is already ensured under the 
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution--as sufficiently 
"compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against 
religious speech. 
November 9, 1981 
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Bill, Harry and Sandra: 
Both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief have been 
concerned about what they perceive to be the "emphasis" in 
Part III-B of my opinion on "overbreadth" analvC3is. Bill 
has advised me today that at least for the present, he 
cannot join the opinion. 
I would like to accommodate Bill and the Chief. 
Indeed, I may need one of them for a rourt. I enclose a 
draft of language to be added on p. 12, if this meets with 
your approval. 
I do not think thir:.; addition would affect in any 








JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
~uvrtm.t Qfltltd cf tqt ~ittb ~taft.s­
'Jht,glt'btgton, ~. <If. 2.llgt~~ 
November 10, 1981 
No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
The proposed new language to be added on 
page 12 of your draft in the referenced case meets with 
my approval. 
Justice Powell 





JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§u:prtmt <!Jttu.rt ttf tqt 'J!lnit.t~ .§twa 
'maaqingtttn. ;!8. <!J. 2ll~J!~ / 
November 12, 1981 
Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 11/13/81 Rider A, Widmar 
WIDA SALLY-POW 
Add a new footnote 9A at the end of the first paragraph on 
page 8: 
9A. It is, of course, sometimes necessary to 
distinguish between "religious" and "non-religious" speech, 
but not where the state has created a public forum for 
general use. The dissent cites ~ Stone v. Graham, 
~ 
U.S. , (November 17, 1980) I ~~an example of this 
distinction. The state had posted the Ten Commandments on 
the walls of grade school classrooms, implying state 
approval of the Commandments' religious basis. The 
dissent's hypotheticals of "class[es] entitled 'Sunday Mass' 
and 'The History of the Catholic Church'" are irrelevant to 
this case. The dissent blurs the critical distinction 
between a state university itself acting to further a 
2. 
religion or its establishment, and the case before us where 
the university itself - having established an open forum for 
student groups - acts to deny speech therein by otherwise 
qualified student religious groups. 
Widmar RIDER 
This is a proposed footnote 9A, to be added at the end of 
the first paragraph on page 8. It is intended to answer the 
second draft of Justice White's dissent. 
we do not deny, as the dissent suggests we do, see dissenting 
opinion, post, at 4-5, that these cases sometimes require the 
State to distinguish between "religious" and "non-religious" 
speech. Clearly we relied on such a distinction in last Term's 
decision in Stone v. Graham, U.S. (November 17, 1980), 
in which we held that the State could not post the Ten 
Commandments on the wall of a gradeschool classroom. Because 
such posting might imply state approval of the Commandments' 
religious basis, the challenged policy offended the Establishment 
Clause. The dissent offers a contrary account of Stone. It 
would apparently explain the decision be reference to a 
distinction between "religious speech" and "religious worship"--a 
distinction that it terms necessary if the Court is not to 
authorize the University to offer a class entitled "Sunday Mass." 
See dissenting opinion, post, at 5. We find this distinction as 
unnecessary as it is generally unhelpful, see note 7, supra. The 
Establishment Clause would of course bar such a class if it 
connoted state sponsorship of religion or otherwise implied 
approval of the Mass's religious content. No distinction between 
"speech" and "worship" is needed to explain why this is so. The 
Establishment Clause bars state action--in the form of speech as 
much as any other--that is intended to advance religion. It does 
not require an inquiry into when speech constitutes worship. 
The Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish 
between speech, undertaken or approved by the State, that 
supports an Establishment of Religion and speech, undertaken 
or approved by the state, that does not support an Establishment 
of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain textBx 
of the Constitution . It is followed in our cases. The dissent 
attempts to use this distinction , which is constitutionally 
required , as ~ the basis for a distinction between ~ligious 
II \ l 
'' speech" and religious worship. It is our position that this 
latter distinction lacks a foundation in either the eonstitution 
;:.. 
or in our cases , and that it is judicially unmanageable 
----,....---------~------z;rra::..:nynt:grlTlt, 2:f!. ~· 2U§J.f 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN November 16, 1981 
Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lev1is: 
This is in response to your note of November 9 with its pro-
posed draft of language to be added on page 12 of your opinion for 
this case. 
Thurgood has now joined you, so you have a Court. Of course, 
if you can accommodate both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief, you will 
have a larger Court. 
I must confess , however, that your proposed new language 
leaves me mildly uncomfortable. I suspect this is because it 
serves to emphasize even more a difficulty I had with your 
original opinion but which I did not express -- that the opinion 
never really acknowledges the existence of respondents' Free 
Exercise interest. Its entire emphasis has been, and continues to 
be, on Free Speech interests. 
In an effort not to be merely obstructionist, I could go along 
if the second paragraph of your proposed addition were changed to 
read as follows: 
and 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are 
entitled to special constitutional solicitude . Our cases 
have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which 
a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its 
content. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); 
Police Dept. v. Moseley , 408 U.S. 92 (1972). On the other 
hand, the State interest asserted here -- in achieving 
greater separation of church and Sta~e than~en­
sured under the Establishment Clause of thMederal ~C6n-
s ·on -- is inherently limited by the Free Exercise 
Clause In this constitutional context, we are unabl 
to recognize interes as suf 1c1ently "compelling " to 
justify conten -based discrimination against respondents' 
religious speech . 
I would hope that this change would be acceptable to the Chief 
to Bill Rehnquist . If it is, you have a substantial Court. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan J~ 
Justice O'Connor ~ 
\ l..., 
wt-1 I .. 
Proposed Substitute Language for the Text in 
Widmar v. Vincent, No. 80-689, beginning at the top of page 12: 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy 
of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing 
to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would 
offend the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine 
how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also 
unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 
a state interest, derived from it~ own constitution, could ever 
outweigh free speeech interests protected by the First Amendment. 
We limit our holding to the case before us. 
Our cases 
which a State 
See, 
455 (1980); Police Dept. v. Mosele 
Establishment of the Federal 
justify 
;'-'--~~ 
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 
u.s. 92 (1972). In this 
to recognize the State 
achieving greater 




TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: DICK FALLON 
RE: Widmar v. Vincent 
Justice Blackmun has now offered a draft of "acceptable" 
language for Part IIIB of the opinion (page 12). It is attached, 
together with a copy of the language circulated by this Chambers. 
I would recommend only two small changes in Justice Blackmnu's 
draft, both of which I have marked onto the attached copy. The 
first reiterates the Free Speech element of the case in 
conjunction with the Free Exercise reference that Justice 
Blackmun requests. I think this change necessary to prevent the 
opinion from becoming "schizophrenic." Written essentially on a 
"free speech" basis, it can sensibly add, but not substitute, a 
"free exercise" reference at the very end. The second suggested 
change is entirely stylistic. 
Also attached is a redrafted Rider, answering the dissent. 
It is intended for insertion at the end of the first paragraph on 
page 8. This redrafted Rider essentially "tracks" what you 
drafted in response to my original suggestion. 
Add a new footnote 9A at the end of the first paragraph on page 
8: 
9A. As the dissent argues, it is sometimes necessary to 
distinguish between "religious" and "nonreligious" speech. See, 
e.g., Stone v. Graham, u.s. (November 17, 1980). But 
our cases have never required the State to distinguish between 
religious and nonreligious speech by private speakers in a public 
forum. The dissent's hypotheticals of classes entitled "Sunday 
Mass" and "The History of the Catholic Church" are irrelevant to 
this case. By relying on them, the dissent blurs the critical 
distinction between a state university itself acting to further a 
religion or its establishment, and the case before us, in which 
the university has created a public forum for use by private 
speakers. 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hFtutt Qfcurl ~ t4~ ~nitt~ ~htt.tg 
Jfrudri:ttgbm. ~. <!f. 20.?'!-$ 
Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
November 16, 1981 
This is in response to your note of November 9 with its pro-
posed draft of language to be added on page 12 of your opinion for 
this case. 
Thurgood has now joined you, so you have a Court. Of course, 
if you can accommodate both Bill Rehnquist and the Chief, you will 
have a larger Court. 
I must confess, however, that your proposed new language 
leaves me mildly uncomfortable. I suspect this is because it 
serves to emphasize even more a difficulty I had with your 
original opinion but which I did not express -- that the opinion 
never really acknowledges the existence of respondents' Free 
Exercise interest. Its entire emphasis has been, and continues to 
be, on Free Speech interests. 
In an effort not to be merely obstructionist, I could go along 
if the second paragraph of your proposed addition were changed to 
read as follows: 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are 
entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases 
have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which 
a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its 
content. See,~, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); 
Police Dept. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). On the other 
hand, the State interest asserted here -- in achieving 
greater separation of church and State than is already en-
sured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution -- is inherently limited by the Free Exercise 
ause In this constitutional context, we are unable 
to recognize ~ 1n eres as su 1c1en y compelling" to 
justify content-based discrimination against respondents' 
religious speech. 
I would hope that this change would be acceptable to the Chief 
and to Bill Rehnquist. If it is, you have a substantial Court. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 






THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
,iu.pr.nnt QI!lltrl of tqt ,-nitt~ .itatig 
._rudtinghtn. ~. <!}. 2llc?,.~ 
November 16, 1981 
Re: No. 80-689 - Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
In light of the problems in the Princeton case, does 
the second sentence, first full paragraph on page 5, need 
something to "save" the Princeton point? You might wish 
to add something like "with respect to persons having a right 




JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.Sn:prmtt C!Janrlaf tfrt ~b .Statt.s 
:Jifufri:nghnt. ~. C!J. 2llbi'!~ 
November 17, 1981 
RE: No. 80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Lewis: 
I have already joined you in the above and of course 
continue to. May I suggest one thought about your recir-
culation of November 17? At page 12, fourth and third 
lines from the bottom, would you mind changing 11 inhereiJ,llY 




November 17, 1981 
80-689 Widmar v. Vincent 
Dear Chief and Bill: 
I have tried, in my 3rd draft circulated herewith, 
to meet your concerns with respect to reliance on 
overbreadth. See page 12. 
I have cleared the new language with several of 
the Justices who had joined it earlier. 




This case presents the question whether a University, 
which has made its facilities available for the activities of 
all other registered student groups, may close the facilities 
to registered student groups wishing to engage in religious 







Analytical Approach of the Memorandum 
Reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit answered 
this question in the negative. The University, it concluded, 
could not justify its discriminatory treatment of religious 
speech. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals impresses me as 
thoroughly persuasive. For this reason, this memorandum is 
written in somewhat unusual form. In the first section I 
summarize the court of appeals' opinion. But I also also try 
to clarify the court's implicit assumptions and to defend them 
against alternative analytical approaches. This seemed to me 
to be the approach most likely to avoid repetitiveness. The 
second section of the memorandum is then devoted to 
consideration of the arguments of the parties. Arguments are 
first explored, then critiqued. 
In view of the approach that I have taken, I should 
describe at the outset the two ways in which this case can be 
viewed. 
(1) The Court of Appeals saw this as a "public forum" 
case. The University had created a public forum. Having done 
so, it could not exclude speech, based on its religious 
content, without a compelling justification. The State can 
provide none on the facts of this case. For reasons that will 
become clear, I think that the facts make this the sounder 
approach. 
(2) The University sees this as a "Religion Clauses" case. 
On one side lies the "Free Exercise" interest of the student 
religious groups; on the other side lies the State 1 s 
,,, 
~ . 
"Establishment Clause" interest in avoiding entanglement. If 
' the case is seen this way, it is important that the students 
could practice their religion elsewhere. The State's 
"Establishment Clause" interest may therefore be the more 
weighty. 
I. THE REASONING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: EQUAL ACCESS TO A 
PUBLIC FORUM 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned from the premise that the 
University of Missouri had created a limited public forum. 
This may have been a voluntary step, which the University bore 
no obligation to take. 1 In taking it, however, the University 
1 It is the University's policy toyermit reco~nized 
student groups to use the stuaent center and certa1n other 
facilities for their meeE1ngs, rectures, programs, and other 
events. Each student is required to pay an activity fee--$41 per 
semester during 1978-1979--to defray maintenance and janitorial 
costs. From 1973-1977, the appellant Cornerstone conducted 
regular weekly meetings within Un1vers1ty facilfties. It was and 
remains a registered student organization. In 1977, however, the 
University halted Cornerstone's use of University buildings as ~-
the site for its meetings. It did so pursuant to University ~~~~ 
R~ation 4.0314.0107, which provides in pertinent part: "No ~--. 
Univeristy buildings - or grounds (except chapels as herein 
provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or 
religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups." The 
Regulation explained that "The general prohibition against use of 
University buildings and grounds for religious worship or 
religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of the 
Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State." 
Without explanation of the constitutional justification for 
the distinction, the Regulation continued that "No regulations 
shall be interpreted to foro1d tne offereng of prayer or other 
appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in 
University facilities." The next regulation provided that 
"Regular chapels established ~n1v~s1ty grounds may be used 
for religious services ..•• " Reg. 4.0314.0108. 
'*· 
assumed the burden of justifying the exclusion of any 
particular kind of speech. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 48 
U.S.L.W. 4756, 4758 (1980), quoting Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("Once a forum is opened up to assembly 
or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others 
from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to 
say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based 
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to 
content alone."). There is no doubt that religious speech is 
protected by the First Amendment. 2 
-I-n-~-e-r--t-o--m-a-~ religious speech for exclusion, the 
State must therefore advance some important if not compelling ~ 
interest. See, e.g., Carey, supra, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4858 (only a 
compelling interest could justify content-based distinction)~ 
~ealy v. James, 408 u.s. 169, 184 (1972) ("heavy burden" rests 
on college to justify denial of facilities to SDS) .3 
2The court cited Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 u.s. 67 
(1953) (city may not exclude certa1n kinds of religious speech 
fro~'ts parks) and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
This ourt implicitly reiterated this principle only last Term. 
See Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, iA 
Inc., 49 USLW 4762, 4764 (1981) ("The State does not dispute that IYf"-"~ 
the oral and written dissemination of the Krishnas' religious 
views and doctrines ~protec ted 6 tne First 
Amendment.") (citations omitted). 
3Justice White's proposed dissent from a denial of cert in 
this case, in which you had planned to concur, argued that "no ~ 
decision of this Court has explicitly determined that the 
compelling state interest test, as opposed to some lesser 
standard, is appropriate in a case involving competing First 
Amendment values." The "competing value" that he had in mind was 
the State's interest in avoiding "entanglement" of the sort 
contemplated by the Establishment clause. Strictly speaking, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
!::>. 
Here the State claims a compelling interest in avoiding 
..,_. ----~--
entnglement with religion. Provision of State facilities as a 
place of worship, the State argues, would entail financial and 
other support of religion. It was financial support of this 
kind that the Court proscribed in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
u.s. 672 (1971). Although the Tilton Court upheld financial 
aid to a sec tar ian institution, the State argues that it was 
careful to circumscribe the license that it granted. Congress 
had provided that federally-subsidized buildings must not be 
used for sec tar ian or religious worship for a period of 20 
years. The Court held that this was not enough. "If, at the 
end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a 
chapel or otherwise used to promote religious uses, the 
original federal grant will in part have the [constitutionally 
t 
c 
impermissible] effect of advancing religion." Tilton, the 
State argues, thus stands for the proposition that State funds 
Justice White would appear to be correct that this Court has not 
explicitly stated the standard to be applied. But it is not 
apparent that this is a legally powerful fact. 
Justice White's draft appeared to concede that the 
university had created a public forum. See Draft Dissent at 3 
n.2. And his opinion in Heffron, supra, clearly recognized that 
religious speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. This 
seems to me to be conclusive. The cases establish that only a 
compelling state interest will justify a content-basfid 
restriction on free speech in a public forum. Cf. vHeffron, 49 
USLW at 4764 ("A major criterion of a valied time, place, and 
manner restriction is that the restriction 'may not be based upon 
either the content or the subject matter of the speech.'"). If 
so, the real question in the case is: At what point--if any--does 
the State's interest in avoiding entanglement with religion 
become sufficiently compelling to exclude religious speech from a 
public forum? 
b. 
may not be used to provide buildings for use by religious 
organizations. 
The District Court had found Ti 1 ton to be controlling. 
But the Eighth Circuit held that it was not. Tilton had 
contemplated the possibility that a sectarian institution might 
actually convert federally funded buildings into chapels or 
otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. The case 
had actually upheld the validity of federal building grants, 
subject only to the condition that the buildings not be used 
primarily for religious worship. Tilton was therefore 
significantly different on its facts. It did not control. 
Not being governed by Tilton, the State assistance 
contemplated in this case must be assessed under a settled 
three-part test, reiterated by this Court as recently as 
~
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 
444 u.s. 646, 653 (1980). "First, the [governmental regulation] 
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances not 
inhibits religion ***· , finally, the [regulation] must not 
foster 1 an excessive government entanglement with religion. 1 " 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612-613 (1971), quoting Walz 
v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). 
In this case two prongs of the test were admittedly not 
problematic. The district court had held that a policy 
permitting religious speech in University facilities would (1) 
have a neutral purpose and (3) would avoid "entanglement" with 
religion. The district court had concluded, however, that such 
I • 
a policy would fail the test's second prong: that it would (2) 
' 
have the "primary effect" of advancing religion. The court of 
appeals therefore addressed itself mainly to this prong of the 
test. It reasoned as follows: 
"We cannot agree •.. that such a policy would have the 
------------------------primary effect of advancing religion. Rather, it would have 
~,the primary effect of advancing the University's admitted 
~·-' n ' secular purpose--to develop students' 'social and cultural 
~ awareness as well as their intellectual curiosity.' It would 
~ v- simply permit students to put their religious ideas and 
~ · ~ practices in competition with the ideas and practices of other 
~'~roups, religious or secular. It would no more commit the 
~;AA/university, its administration or its faculty to religious 
~~goals than they are now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance, the 
Young Democrats of the Women's Union." 
This paragraph ably summarizes the reasoning of the Eighth 
Circuit. It also illuminates the Eighth Circuit's disagreement 
with the district court; and it does much to clarify the 
essential point of disagreement among the parties in this 
Court. As framed by the Eighth Circuit, the question was one 
of "equal access." The court had reasoned from the outset that 
the University had created a public forum. 4 Under standard ------
4This reasoning provides an implict answer to the argument/ 
that the "primary effect" of opening the buildings would be to 
advance religion. The "open forum" policy was adopted not to 
promote religion, but to encourage student fellowship and the ~ 
Footnote continued on next page. ~ 
o. 
First Amendment analysis, the burden therefore rested on those 
' 
who wished to treat religious speech as constitutionally 
exceptional. 
The district court, by contrast, began from a "Religion 
Clauses" perspective. In its view, the case needed to be 
analyzed as a conflict--requiring a balancing resolution--
between the competing interests of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses. Expressed another way, the district 
court assumed a special difficulty about providing facilities 
to a religious group, and its analysis flowed from that worry. 
In my judgment the Eighth Circuit adopted much the better 
mode of analysis. In the first place, its analysis--unlike 
that of the district court--attaches significance to the fact 
that the State has created a public forum in which content 
censorship is presumptively proscribed. When the case is 
free exchange of ideas. It is the effect of this entire policy 
that must be assessed, not the extension of this policy to 
religious groups and speakers. Once the forum was opened, 
religious speakers could not be excluded due to the content of 
their speech. But the primary effect of creating the forum was 
not to promote religion, any more than it was to promote the 
views of other speakers who might utilize the forum that the 
University provided. 
Because a 2ublic forum already exists, this case is 
fundamentally un1r1ke Srandon v. Boara of· Education, 635 F.2d 971 
(CA2 1980) and other cases in which schools have denied the 
requests of student groups to provide a forum in order to permit 
them to practice their rights under the Free Exercise clause. 
That is a different case--the one imagined by Justice White in 
which the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses are arguably 
brought into direct conflict. Here, 90 sgecial Erivileges ~re 
sou ht for religious speakers under the Free Exercise clause. 
Tne rgume 1s re 1gious speakers may not be denied that 
which is already available to speakers of all other kinds. 
.. 
':J • 
analyzed as a conflict of Free Exercise and Establishment 
- ' 
concerns, the separate First Amendment concern for avoidance of 
content-based restrictions simply falls out of the picture. 
Yet this factor is crucial, as can be seen from a 
comparison with some of the cases to which this one (Widmar) 
has been analogized. For example, in his proposed dissent from 
a denial of cert, Justice White argued that "lower state and 
federal courts have reached divergent results involving similar 
claims by religious groups against state rules involving 
educational institutions." He cited Brandon v. Board of 
t~ ' Education, supra, and Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 
~ ~ 1263 (SD w. va. 1971) as cases in which courts had upheld 
~ · ~ ~.AJ: ~ools' refusals to permit the use of public school facilities 
~~- " y{/ 
for religious purposes. But those cases--in which students 
tpt:'~ imed a Free Exercise right to have the school open its 
~ ~ facilities to them, though not necessarily to other groups--are 
p:
~ · ~ significantly different from this one. In Brandon and Hunt the 
tl • 
schools had not created public forums. The schools had not 
chosen to provide their facilities to independently organized 
student groups. Against this background, the students asked 
the schools to take an affirmative step on behalf of their 
organizations alone. When such a demand is made--and justified 
by an appeal to Free Exercise rights--a tension with 
Establishment concerns does arise. Religious speakers ask 
special benefits from the State, so that they can practice 
their religion. But that is not this case. As Judge Kaufman 
recognized in his opinion in Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980, the 
10. 
student religious group here sought merely to share in the 
benefits accorded to all other student groups--to avoid 
discrimination based on what they wished to say at their 
meetings. Judge Kaufman thus had no difficulty in reconciling 
his Brandon decision with the result in this case: "The 
facilities of a university :Rave ~ been identifed as a 
'public forum,' where religious speech and association cannot 
be prohibited." id. That was not so in the case of the high 
school classroom, and the difference was dispositive. 
There is a second reason why the "public forum" analysis - ----should be preferred to the "Religion Clauses" approach of the 
district court. Unless it is assumed prima facie that 
religious groups and religious speech are entitled to the same 
protection as other speech, every government action that 
affects a religious organization--no matter how remotely--must 
be suspect under the Establishment Clause. Consider the 
example of a public park, in which sundry orators routinely . ~--------~--
speak from the stumps of State-owned trees. Could the State 
exclude only those speakers who wished to speak on religious 
topics? Indeed, must it do so, under the Establishment Clause? 
If the burden is to justify a policy of allowing 
religious speakers--if the assumed norm is one in which the 
right to speak belongs to everyone but religious speakers-- it 
is clear that the effect of extending the policy to include 
religious speech will always be to advance religion. This is 
why Professor Tribe describes as "metaphysical" the effort to 
distinguish and apply the "primary effect," see Regan, supra, 
11. 
44 U.S. at 6 53 and the "direct and immediate effect" standard 
of Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 783 
n.39 (1973). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 840 
(1978). Yet virtually no one--apparently not even the 
University of Missouri--would defend the constitutionality of 
excluding religious speech from the streets and parks. 
In Widmar, for example, the University struggles to 
distinguish O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (CADC 1979). In that 
case the court considered a challenge to the use of the 
National Mall for the celebration of Mass by Pope John Paul II. 
Noting that the Free Exercise Clause actually compels 
"government to make some accomodation to religious realities 
and needs," Judge Leventhal's thoughtful opinion held that ---------'------.. 
"equal access to a public facility generally open to the 
public" represented the only workable principle. Id. at 935. 
In attempting to distinguish O'Hair, the University attaches 
constitutional relevance to the distinction between a public 
park and a public building. It is true that there may 
sometimes be differences between a public building and the 
public streets and parks. These outdoor facilities have 
"immemorially been held in trust for use by the public and ... 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions." Heffron, 
supra, 49 USLW at 4765, quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 u.s. 496, 515 
(1939). But restrictions based on the nature of the public 
forum have traditionally rested on the "State's interest in 
protecting the safety and convenience of persons using a public 
12. 
forum," Heffron, supra, 49 USLW at 4765, not on an interest in 
censoring the content of what is said, see Carey, supra, 48 
USLW at 95-96 ("Once a forum is opened up to assembly or 
speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others 
from assembling or speaking on the basis fo what they intend to 
say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based 
on content alone, and they may not be justified by reference to 
content alone.") .5 
Based on the foregoing arguments, I would conclude that 
the provision of equal access to religious speakers--at least 
in the absence of powerful evidence of State intent to advance 
religion--does not offend the Establishment Clause. The 
Establishment Clause thus fails to justify the claim of a 
compelling constitutional interest in denying this benefit--
which is available to all others--to those who would use it for 
religious speech.6 
5The University also seems to advance a second argument 
for distinguishing between public parks on the one hand and 
public buildings on the other. The use of a building is 
different, the University says, because of the greater financial 
cost. This too is unpersuasive. It may generally cost more to 
provide access to a building than access to parkland, but this is 
only a contingent accident. In O'Hair the government spent more 
than $128,000 for services rendered out-of-doors during the papal 
mass. 
6cf. Heffron, supra ("These nonreligious organizations 
seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal 
to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread 
their views ..•• If Rule 6.05 is an invalid restriction on the 
activities of [the Krishnas], it is no more valid with respect to 
the other social, political or charitable organizations •.•• "). 
13. 
Three other arguments for upholding the University's 
restrictive rule are not treated so well in the opinion of the ____., 
Eighth Circuit. Nonetheless, they merit serious discussion. 
argues that the tradition of 
it to special latitude in 
~~ First, the University 
·~· (academic freedom entitles 
~?establishing its own rules. Further, this Court has noted that 
fYV impressionable minds should not be encouraged to see the 
State's imprimatur on religious activities. See, e.g., Roemer 
v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750, 764 (1976). But 
these arguments are two-edged in the context of this case. It 
is the University's mission to provide a free market of ideas, 
in which all points of view are included. If there is anywhere 
where content-censorship is abhorrent, it is in the context of 
a University. This is also an answer to the concern about the 
State's imprimatur. College students are presumably mature 
enough to benefit from exposure to a broad range of ideas. 
Unlike children in primary and even secondary schools, they 
should be able to see that the University does not sanction the 
ideas of all those who use its facilities--not those of a 
religious group any more than those of the SDS. 
The second argument is based on State law. Dissenting 
from a denial of a petition for rehearing en bane, two judges 
argued that the Missouri State Constitution created a 
compelling interest in denying State support to religious 
speech. The Missouri constitution provides that "no money 
shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or 
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination." Art. 
14. 
I, § 7. According to the dissenting opinion, "The Missouri 
courts have long interpreted these provisions to be more 
restrictive than the first amendment to the United States 
constitution in prohibiting expenditures of public funds in a 
manner tending to erode an absolute separation of church and 
state." Moreover, the challenged University regulation stated 
in terms that "The general prohibition against use of 
University buildings and grounds for religious worship or 
religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of the 
Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the 
State •..• " 
There are various difficulties in evaluating this 
argument. First, it is far from clear how the Missouri courts 
would apply the Missouri constitution in this case. The State 
itself is not a party to the case; the Attorney General has not 
filed an amicus brief. Moreover, the Missouri Supreme 
Court's most recent relevant decision upheld a program of 
tuition grants to students attending private colleges, 
including those with sectarian affiliations. American 
University v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, cert. denied, 429 u.s. 
1029 (1976). Based on this opinion, it is at least uncertain 
that an "equal access" policy would offend the state 
constitution. On the other hand, the Rogers opinion rests 
heavily on the notion that the grants go to the students, not 
the colleges. And it also argues for deference to the 
legislature, while reaffirming earlier opinions that do strike 
15. 
down legislation that would not offend the federal 
constitution. 
Leaving the question of what the law of Missouri is, there 
~ ~ is a related question whether a Missouri policy of separation, 
~stricter than the federal constitutional requirement, could 
~r qualify as a compelling state interest in a constitutional 
balancing test. In Leutkemeyer, et al. v. Kaufmann, et al, 364 
F.Supp. 376, 386 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974), 
the district court held that it could, but only in certain 
instances. The Eighth Circuit treated these concerns only in a 
footnote, No. 7, which must be regarded as ambiguous. But the 
footnote appears to hold that the State interest in separation 
is not compelling in the factual setting of this case, and that 
it does not seem to have been regarded as compelling even by 
the University itself. As the court noted, "The regulation at 
issue specifically states that the ban on the use of University 
facilities for religious worship or teaching is not to be 
interpreted 'to forbid the offering of prayer or other 
appropriate recognition at public functions held in University 
facilities.'" A further University regulation provides that 
"Regular chapels established on University grounds may be used 
for religious services but not for regular recurring services 
of any groups. Special rules and procedures shall be 
established for each such chapel by the Chancellor." 
These regulations belie the claim that the University sees 
! a compelling State interest in maintaining the kind of "strict" separation of church and State that it purports to defend in 
16. 
this Court. Cf. Carey, supra, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4758 (statute's 
over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness undermines claim 
that it can be justified by reference to asserted State 
interest) . Under the circumstances, it seems preferable to 
avoid the hard questions of Missouri and federal constitutional 
~ 
law that would otherwise arise. Accordingly, I would hold that 
the regulation in issue is under inclusive; that it does not 
effectively serve the alleged State interest in rigid 
separation of church and state; and that it therefore cannot be 
justified on that basis. 
Alternatively, I believe that the issue could be met as 
follows: It is at least unclear that the Missouri Supreme 
Court would hold that the state constitution forbids the 
extension of equal protection to religious teaching and 
worship. Even if it did, the state interest would not be 
compelling in this case. The extent of state support would be 
de minimis; there would be no "entanglement"; there would be no 
imprimatur of State approval here--or at any rate substantially 
less than than occurs through the maintenance of University 
saying of prayers at public ceremonies. chapels and the 
I tt;. '-s 5' ~ The other 
istinguish 
argument deserving consideration would attempt 
between religious speech and religious worship. 7 
L 
7Judge Kauffman invoked this distinction in his opinion in 
Brandon, supra. Specifically, he suggested that it was 
constitutionally significant that the high school students sought 
use of a classroom for purposes of religious worship, rather than 
speech about religious topics. See 635 F.2d at 978. 
17. 
(The University regulation here at issue purported to exclude 
"religious worship or religious teaching."} On this view, 
religious "speech" would enjoy traditional First Amendment 
protection; religious worship could be excluded under the 
Establishment Clause. This distinction possesses some 
intuitive plausibility. On the surface, it might appear to 
express both the constitutional respect for speech and the 
constitutional wariness of entanglement with particular forms 
of worship. But such a distinction would involve the 
government in the task of defining what was and was not 
"worship." 8 "The administration of such a test would [itself] 
impermisibly entangle government and religion." O'Hair v. 
Andrus, supra, 613 F.2d at 936. This proposed solution thus 
fails. Surely the Constitution does not require the State to 
make choices that entangle it with religion in this way. 
II. OTHER ARGUMENTS: THE BRIEFS 
A. Petitioners 
1. Arguments 
8 In Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 u.s. 67, 70 (1953}, the 
Court struck down an ordinance that would have required a 
distinction between religious services that were and those that 
were not permissible in a public park. The Court held: 
"It is no business of courts to say that what is a religious 
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the 
protection of the First Amendment ••.• To call the words which one 
minister speaks to his congregation a sermon, immune from 
regulation, and the words of another minister an address, subject 
to regultion, is merely an indirect way of preferring one 
religion over another." 
18. 
Appearing in this Court as the petitioner, the University 
of Missouri contends most adamantly that permitting 
religious use of Univeristy facilities would have the "primary 
effect" of advancing religion. The "primary effect" test, it 
says, forbids any governmental action with a "substantial 
religious impact." Brief at 17. Here it sees such an impact 
arising through financial support and an "aura of implied 
approval." 
Petitioners also advance a subtle and sophisticated 
~~------------------------
The constitution, they assert, 
recognizes "religion." But 
constitutional concerns implicating religion must be assessed 
in the context of the "Establishment Clause." It is important 
to begin any analysis from this perspective. It is mistaken to 
begin with a free-speech, public-forum model, in which 
distinctions based on content bear a heavy burden of 
justification. To do so inevitably assigns the "Establishment 
Clause" a secondary importance, where the constitution intended 
it at least to have parity. 
Petitioners also claim that Missouri has a special state 
interest in barring public expenditures for the benefit of 
religion. They argue, finally, that the University is not a 
traditional public forum; application of that concept is 
therefore inappropriate. 
A strong amicus brief by the B'Nai B'rith in essence 
reasserts the claim that "religious speech" is not "speech" in 
19. 
the usual sense. Government interaction with religion falls 
into three categories: the proscribed, the mandated, and the 
permissible. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
Here, no one's rights to the free exercise of religion have 
been violated. The claim, instead, is that the government is 
obliged to take affirmative steps in the aid of religion. (It 
is assumed throughout that no free-speech right of equal access 
to a public forum is implicated~ this is another way of saying 
that "speech" and "religion" are separate constitutional 
concepts.) Analysis can stop at this point. No affirmative 
reason exists why aid must be provided. Even assuming that some 
reason does exist, the State's interest in maintaining 
separation would override it. 
The American Jewish Congress also argues that this is 
essentially , ·"an "Establishment Clause" case. The First 
Amendement requires a distinction between sectarian and non-
sectarian speech. Free speech doctrines do not apply to the 
former in the way that they do to the latter. 
2. Analysis 
Petitioners' most powerful argument is, in essence, that 
~ 
"religious speech" is not "speech." In justification they -----------point to the structure of the constitution, which at least in 
some sections--notably the Establishment Clause--treats 
religion as a concern distinct from others. To regard 
"religious speech" as "speech," they reason, is to ignore this 
implicit distinction~ worse, it is to risk the very 
20. 
entanglement with religion th t the Establishment Clause was 
intended to prevent. 
There are two object'ons to this argument. The first is 
linguistic: It is odd not to treat "religious speech" as 
"speech. "~ou:d a municipality forbid prayer in a public park? q s 
@ could it ban conversations about religious subjects? Perhaps 
under some circumstances it could. If so, however, it should 
surely have to meet a heavy burden of justification, not merely 
explain that it was withholding support for religion. 
The second objection is practical. Government could not 
make the distinction between "religious ~ch" and "non----- --
religious speech" without involving itself deeply in religious 
questions. There would be repeated arguments over definitions. 
The line suggested would therefore lead to increased 
entanglement in religion--the very result that the 
Establishment Clause was meant to foreclose. 
B. Respondents 
1. Arguments 
Respondents argue that the government cannot regulate 
speech on the basis of content. Equality of access to a public 
forum does not violate the Establishment Clause. The State 
does not place its imprimatur on religious speech in a public 
forum. It fosters a climate of lively intellectual exchange, 
in which the State has a neutral interest. 
Amici argue that the University is inherently infused with 
First Amendment concerns about the vitality of free exchange in 
ideas. The State interest in limiting speech is virtually 
21. 
nonexistent there. This case is unlike cases in which the 
State has exposed elementary school children to religious 
matter. The State imprimatur is absent here; the elements of 
voluntarism and maturity are greater. Many of the classic free 
speech and public forum cases have involved religious 
expression. Maintenance of an open and accessible public forum 
is not an establishment of religion. 
The regents of the University of California note that 
they, and presumably many other college administrations, open 
their buildings equally to religious and non-religious speech. 
They argue that their policy does not offend the Establishment 
Clause. 
2. Analysis 
Respondents and amici characterize this as a free-speech, 
public-forum case. Petitioners see it as essentially an 
Establishment Clause case. This brings the University of 
California regents to view this Court as facing a choice 
between the two. For the reasons stated above, I would analyze 
I I 
this case within a public-forum model. It should be pointed 
out, however, that different cases would call for different 
analyses. The State is under no obligation to create a public 
forum. It need not open every public building to public use. 
When it moves, however, it must move even-handedly. Absent 
weighty justification, the State may not differentiate among 
~ speeches or speakers on the basis of content. 
III. SUMMARY 
22. 
1. This case is different from one in which religious 
speakers ask the State to provide them with special benefits 
~
needed if they are to "exercise" their religion. The question 
here involves discrimination against religious speech. Having 
voluntarily created a public forum, the University of Missouri 
could not exclude religious speech without demonstrating a 
compelling justification for its attempt at content regulation. 
J 
2. 
' grant religious speakers equal access to a p~blic forum. 
The Establishment Clause does not forbid the State to 
It 
therefore fails to provide a justification for the University's 
regulation. 
3. The State's interest in avoiding entanglement, which 
is broadly defined by the State constitution also, also fails 
to justify the regulation attempted here. The regulation was 
impermissibly underinclusive: the University permits prayers at 
its public functions and it maintains chapels for use by 
religious congregations. 
4. The decision of the Court of Appeals should therefore 
be affirmed. 
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CHAMBERS DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80--689 
GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CLARK 
VINCENT, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[October -, 1981] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
1 The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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80--689---0 PINION 
2 WIDMAR v. VINCENT 
ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
- There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the religious character 
of Cornerstone's meetings. The District Court found that University offi-
cials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University 
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of 
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 910. 
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Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. I d., 
at 1315-1320. The Establishment Clause does not bar a pol-
icy of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and 
speakers of all kinds. According to the Court of Appeals, 
the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to advance 
religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of develop-
ing students' "'social and cultural awareness as well as [their] 
• Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
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intellectual curiosity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the Uni-
versity bulletin's description of the student activities pro-
gram, reprinted in id., at 1312, n. 1). 
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, 
we now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating the meetings of regis-
tered student groups, the University has created for its stu-
dents a quasi-public forum. 5 Having done so, the Univer-
sity assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and 
exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. The Con-
stitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a 
public forum, even if it was not required to create the forum 
in the first place. See, e. g., City of M adision Joint School 
District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State 
may conduct business in private session, "where the State 
has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclu-
sions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (be-
cause municipal theater was a public forum, city could not 
exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safe-
guards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
5 The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
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Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. 6 Our cases leave no doubt that the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association reach state uni-
versity campuses with undiminished force. See, e. g., Healy 
v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shel-
ton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
6 This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the ca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." !d., at 181-182. We have therefore held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. !d., at 181, 
184. 
On the other hand, First Amendment rights must of course be analyzed 
"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Tin-
ker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). 
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as 
streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is edu-
cation, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to im-
pose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of 
its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus 
must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents 
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In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public 
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended 
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of 
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464--465 
(1980). 7 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the 
University has a compelling interest in complying with its 
constitutional obligations. But we disagree with its conclu-
sion that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with 
this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold 
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can 
'See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] 
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See also Com-
mittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 773 
(1973). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid 
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court con-
9 The University's secular purpose is to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. It does not undermine this purpose that some 
groups will use the forum to engage in religious speech. We do not under-
stand petitioners to argue that a State could-much less that it must-ex-
clude religious speech from the streets or from the parks that it maintains 
as public forums. Yet the State's purpose remains as secular when the 
forum is a room within a government building, see City of Madison Joint 
School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 
U. S. 167 (1976) (meeting room); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975) (municipal theatre), as when it involves the 
streets or the parks, see Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972) 
(outdoor picketing); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) (streets and other 
public places). 
This case is therefore quite different from those in which this Court has 
invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction 
by religious groups, but not by others. See McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). The Establishment Clause does not require, 
but actually forbids, State hostility toward religion. See Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 312 (1952). 
10 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
0$0689--DICK-28-0CT-81 
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eluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause.'2 The Uni-
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F. 
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to 
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Court relied primarily on the decision of 
this Court in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this 
Court upheld the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges 
for secular purposes. Although Congress had provided that federally sub-
sidized buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 
years, the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 
20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
I d., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
12 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
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versity has opened its facilities to student groups, and the 
question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the 
content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 
(1972). In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary 
effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, 
would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratc Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317.'3 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. It is for this reason that we have declined petitioners' invitation to 
couch our discussion in terms of respondents' rights under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 
13 University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups UMKC. The provision of benefits to so 
broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular 
effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 240-241 
(1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, 
413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the Establish-
ment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to reli-
gious groups, "a church could not be protected by the police 
and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in re-
pair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education v. 
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At least in the ab-
sence of empirical evidence that religious groups will domi-
nate UMKC's open forum, we therefore agree with the Court 
of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the 
forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 16 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). 
1
' This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
15 See, e.g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
16 See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 
419 U. S. 88 (1974) (finding State has compelling interest in compliance 
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icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even 
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would 
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridg-
ment of protected rights of speech and association. See, 
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this 
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against re-
ligious speech and association fails on grounds of 
overinclusiveness. 
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to 
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is 
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no com-
pelling State interest-which would be congnizable under the 
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teach-
ing'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, in-
formal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in 
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free 
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the 
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations). 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
with its own constitution). 
17 U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
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manner regulations. 18 We also affirm the continuing valid-
ity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189 
(1972), that recognize a University's right to exclude even 
First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus 
rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other 
students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based 
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy vio-
lates the fundamental principle that the State should be con-
tent-neutrality, and the University is unable to justify this 
violation under applicable constitutional standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
18 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
--- Jt/ /fl 
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JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (197~1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
1 The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri.J 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students .. . participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). /\ Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
~ "4.0314.0107 o University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
/ held in University facilities .... 
~ "4.0314.0108 egular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the religious character 
of Cornerstone's meetings. The District Court found that University offi-
cials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University 
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of 
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 910. 
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Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on / 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to t/ 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918:J 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu- / 
lation as a content-based discrimination against religiouSII'_..~ 
speech, for which it could find no com ellin · ification. 
at 1315-1320. sta shment Clause does not bar a pol-
icy of e ual access, in which facilities are open to groups and 
pea ers of a 1 n s. According to the Court of Appeals, 
the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to advance 
religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of develop-
ing students' "'social and cultural awareness as well as [their] 
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
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intellectual curiosity."' !d., at 1317 (quoting from the Uni-
versity bulletin's description of the student activities pro-
gram, reprinted in id., at 1312, n. 1). 
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, 
we now affirm. -- the University has created a 
forum generally~pen for use by 
II -+l,~i student groups. 
Through its policy of accommodating.,. meetings.>~~~·;s;;~..:...------­
ti:r:QQ it1alQQRt g::r:ea~s, tfl:e UH:h'ePsity :Ras ePeatee i'el' its sto""'-
.QeH:ts a EtHasi f)1alBlie FeP\ifH:.,... Having done so, the Univer-
sity assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and 
exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. The Con-
stitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a 
public forum~ even if it was not required to create the £ ,/' 
in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madis"on Joint School 
District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State 
may conduct business in private session, "where the State 
has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement," exclu-
sions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (be-
cause municipal theater was a public forum, city could not 
exclude a production without satisfying constitutional safe-
guards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
S. ----------------------------~ is Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the ca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration faculty mem-
bers, and ot?er s~udents." Id., at ~81-182. We[hav~ther~fo~held that 
students enJOY First Amendment nghts of speech and associatiOn on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 
184. 
--..1-
~The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
''Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
( f="~D.J-~ ~f;~a,.~J e>"'l flo.,~ S) 
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e}(~.,ol - .J.o -k,c. 
C.O\Wlft.t.SC-5 o.f 
.sf"'~ '-"""'; yUSI .... iCS. 
does not exempt its actions from constitu-
--.... I-o-na..,.--sc-ru--,..I,_n....;y""". Our cases leave no doubt that the First 
I 
'I 
Amendment rights of speech and association :r-~!&-t~~lflll~ 
\tePsity etl:mfHisee with 1:l:Haimiftishea feFee. See, e. g., Healy 
v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shel-
ton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
Although a univers~ty may create a forum with, / 
rna n y of the aseo&E~a~e!'t'Et'fre~'!:i:-la!l"~r-ee-tl:1!e t'ln~re~~~e~s -,gg.,f;if;...:.' ~· p~ta~8~1~iee-ii~E!-'fy ;r. 
see note s
11 
supra , our cases have recognized that 
• ••••rilli•First Amendment rights must be analyzed 
"in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Tin-
ker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). 
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as 
streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is edu-
cation, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to im-
pose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of 
its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus 
must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents 
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In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public 
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended 
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of 
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. l\_See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 7 /). ~. 
------~.e.D r-
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the 
University has a compelling interest in complying with its 
constitutional obligations. But we disagree with its conclu-
sion that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with 
this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold 
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can 
7 See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
0$0689-DICK-28-0CT-81 
Committee for Public Education v. 
Regan ,' 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980) , 
.Boerner v. Maryland Public Work~Bd. , 
426 u.s. 736, 748 (1976). 
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pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] 
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See~~""""..,--­
?M~~~~ j01 Public EJ;ucativn v. NtJq rtist, 418 U. S. 'i'56, 118 
-fl9'i9). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid 
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court con-
It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in 
which students can exchange ideas . The University argues that 
use of the forum for religious speech would undermine this 
secular aim . But by creating a forum t he University does not 
thereby 
there . 
endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired 
~~~L 
Undoubtedly many ideas are a'~AQ~ in the forum with 
which the University desires no association . 
Because this case involves a forum already made 
generally ' available to student groups , it differs from those 
cases in which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting 
school facilities to be used for instruction by religious groups , 
~but not by others . See , e\g ., McCollum v . Board of Education , 
T" ~~~,-
333 u.s . 203 (1948) . In those cases the school may~ sai~to 
sponsor the views of the speaker . 
10 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious tea~ing." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
0$0689--DICK-28-0CT-81 
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eluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a reli · 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. e Uni-
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F. 
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to 
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
11 In finding that an "equal access" polic~ bave the ~mary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Co~d primarily on .; · · · i 
•••••Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this 
Court upheld the grant of federal finan i assistance to sectarian colleges 
for secular purposes., t ough Congress had provi e a e era y su -
sidized buildings coul not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 
years, the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 
20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
I d., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
12 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 8~1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
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versity has opened its facilities to student groups, and the 
question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the 
' • ~~of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 
, \_.!.7'" (1A~72~ In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary 
effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, 
would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
\i)- for a Uemocra\t Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. '3 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. li ifl fep 'hie r eal!On !JhM ·,\ e he o e eleclineel !'tlii1iBR91'8' iJwi!Je4!ien !Je ,_.JL--
eetteft oat disce~ssioR iR t&PJR8 sf I es}'etuient:i' ri~Rts under the FFee E1te1 • 
eiee Olattee• ..,___ 
13 University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
0$0689-DICK-28-0CT-81 
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
~ous as well as reli · speakers; there are over 100 recog-
mze s u ent groups UMKC. The provision of benefits to so 
broad a spectrum o groups is an important index of secular 
effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 240-241 
(1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, 
413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the Establish-
ment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to reli-
gious groups, "a church could not be protected by the police 
and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in re-
pair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education v. 
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At least in the ab-
sence of empirical evidence that religious ou will domi-
nate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the 
forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 16 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). 
14 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
15 See, ~.b., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), ceJ. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613--014 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
16 See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 
419 U. S. 88 (1974) (finding State has compelling interest in compliance 
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icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even 
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would 
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridg-
ment of protected rights of speech and association. See, 
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this 
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against re-
ligious speech and association fails on grounds of 
overinclusiveness. 
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to 
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is 
therefore substantially overbroad. We ca.~n.:,im~a~·n!Se~~~­
pelling State interest-which would be co gmzable under the 
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teach-
ing'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, in-
formal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in 
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free 
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the 
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations). 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
with its own constitution). 
17 U. S. Const. , Art. VI, § 2. 
/ 
. ~lokw-~ 
Nor do we a~stion the right of the University to make academic 
· dgments)~QblE -4lew to allocate scarce resources--"to determine for 
itself on academic grounds who may teach what may be 
0$0689-DICK-28-0CT-8 taught how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted 
to study." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 , 263 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurr~ g in the judgment) ; 
e£- ~ 
Ll"'tiv .. o-f C'~J, y, qkke 
12 WI MAR v. VINCENT q 3S Lt S ;1. ~ ') . ,::.·.,qi/"J~ UJ-t. . . . <''~1ro)' .. e:. J 6 '~- 31s 
~anner regulatwns. 18 · n~amrm the contmumg valid- ~api.,jo.., o-t ~we#) 
1ty of cases, e. g., Healy v. la\nes, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189 ::r .... ..... . .u _ , ] ""''f" --..>tC ,..,(\ ,..-.,~ 
(1972), that recognize a University's right to exclude even d . ~ .fv ~ 
First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus e.c '..s' D)., 0 ~ 
rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other C.o ..... r+ " 
students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based 
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary polic vi -
l e fundamental principle that ou be con-
tent-neutra , and the University is unable to justify this 
violation under applicable constitutional standards. 




8 See, e)g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nat&-e of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictatp-the • 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable,(' "). ( q Uot ~ng 
Wri~ht, The Constitution on the Campqs,'22 Vand. L. 
102 ' 1042 (1969). 
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The University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state university, makes its 
facilities generally available for the activities of registered student 
groups. A registered student religious group that had previously re-
ceived permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities was in-
formed that it could no longer do so because of a University regulation 
prohibiting the use of University buildings or grounds "for purposes of 
religious worship or religious teaching." Members of the group then 
brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the regulation vio-
lated, inter alia, their rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of 
speech under the First Amendment. The District Court upheld the 
regulation as being not only justified, but required, by the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed, 
viewing the regulation as a content-based discrimination against reli-
gious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification, and hold-
ing that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, 
in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kind. 
Held: The University's exclusionary policy violates the fundamental princi-
ple that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral. 
Pp. 4-13. 
(a) Having created a forum generally open for use by student groups, 
the University, in order to justify discriminatory exclusion from such 
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, must 
satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions; 
i. e., it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 
Pp. 4-7. 
(b) Although the University's interest in complying with its constitu-
tional obligations under the Establishment Clause may be characterized 
as compelling, an "equal access" policy would not be incompatable with 
that Clause. A policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can 
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Syllabus 
pass the following three-pronged test: (1) It has a secular legislative pur-
pose; (2) its principal or primary effect would be neither to advance nor 
to inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement with religion." Here, it is conceded that an "equal ac-
cess" policy would meet the first and third prongs of the test. In the 
context of this case and in the absence of any evidence that religious 
groups will dominate the University's forum, the advancement of reli-
gion would not be the forum's "primary effect." An "equal access" pol-
icy would therefore satisfy the test's second prong as well. Pp. 7-11. 
(c) The State's interest in achieving greater separation of church and 
State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause is not suf-
ficiently "compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against re-
ligious speech of the student group in question. Pp. 11-13. 
635 F. 2d 1310, affirmed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER, C. J., 
and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., 
joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. 
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-689 
GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CLARK 
VINCENT, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[October -, 1981] 
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussfon. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (197~1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
' The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
' Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
va..."ious denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
.... 
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
8 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the religious character 
of Cornerstone's meetings. The District Court found that University offi-
cials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University 
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of 
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 910. 
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. Id., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F . 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
Id. , at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. ld., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' ld., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
id., at 1312, n. 1). 
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, 
we now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. 5 Having done so, the University assumed an 
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under 
applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a 
State to enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, 6 even 
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the ca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 
184. 
6 The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteris-
tics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines lnde-
0$0689G, 10/31181, rev. Wilma 
80-689-0PINION 
WIDMAR v. VINCENT 5 
if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. 
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in 
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for di-
rect citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of 
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a 
public forum, city could not exclude a production without sat-
isfying constitutional safeguards applicable to pnor 
restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the 
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public fo-
rums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
grounds or buildings. 
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In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public 
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended 
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of 
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 7 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States.8 We agree that the 
University has a compelling interest in complying with its 
constitutional obligations. But we disagree with its conclu-
sion that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with 
this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold 
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can 
pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] 
7 See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Canst., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Committee 
for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653 (1980); 
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 
(1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid 
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court con-
cluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11 
'It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
10 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F. 
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to 
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities to student groups, and the ques-
tion is whether it can now exclude groups because of the con-
tent of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 
(1972). 12 In this context we are unpersuaded that the pri-
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness , Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
12 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F . 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 8(}..1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does no~as in Brandon or Hunfr-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. 
0$0689G, 10/31181, rev. Wilma 
80--689-0PINION 
WIDMAR v. VINCENT 9 
mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 13 
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
13 University students are, of course, young adults·. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 68fr686 (1971). 
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fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 16 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student' groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
14 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
16 See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
16 See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F . Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 
419 U. S. 88 (1974) (finding State has compelling interest in compliance 
with its own constitution). 
" U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
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speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even 
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would 
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridg-
ment of protected rights of speech and association. See, 
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this 
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against 
religious speech and association· fails on grounds of over-
inclusiveness. 
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to 
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is 
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no com-
pelling State interest-which would be cognizable under the 
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teach-
ing'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, in-
formal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in 
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free 
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the 
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations). 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations. 18 Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources-"to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New 
'
8 See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). 
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Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we also af-
firm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's 
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate 
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based 
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy vio-
lates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of 
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is un-
able to justify this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
pr~ ~c... • ,..__,_ ~, t.. CJ...·; c;; 
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GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CLARK 
VINCENT, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[October -, 1981] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas fl /.f.~O'-'~ '-' + \.,c 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi- · -• '- ol 
(Atl\jy~rSI~'f t'l"'-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. c1 
~~:m~~·~~·~-~· ~i85oii~!Pl9'11~17f1ot!l!e"'l'~~i!=etiiirftete;=-f,rc&.-l. +-i .., ~ ly 0.. pet' ov~ 
ef Oomel"8t9A/il'li JAolllltiA~r District Court found that University offi-
cials had never "authorized a student organization to utilize a University 
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of 
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 910. 
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
Cor"' ers.f.o,_,~ 0 ')') 
~ce.+i ..,~s loe.fo('c.. h , 
+'-\e. 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
Id., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. I d., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
id., at 1312, n. 1). 
E~~entiaHy fap t:Re Peasons statid h~r the Court ef Appeals, .Sl.-
'ft lwk now affirm. 
::: II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. 5 Having done so, the University assumed an 
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under 
applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a 
State to enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, 6 even 
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the ca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." ld., at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 
184. 
6 The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteris-
tics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines lnde-
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if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. 
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in 
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for di-
rect citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of 
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U. S. 546, 555--559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a 
public forum, city could not exclude a production without sat-
isfying constitutional safeguards applicable to pnor 
restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the 
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli- S . 
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech '1\ ~ 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious- ~7 ~ ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, liJ ... :JY~ 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).~ 7" / 
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public fo-
rums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
grounds or buildings. 
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In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public .--
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended 
speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of 
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 7 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to . !f. 
other groups without violating the Establishment ause of ·~ fer:;#-'f ;.., 
the Constitution of the United States. 8 U-"•.J1t: t w·.~ if$' Co""f Y',.., . 
l=fflm_~H_'f;f-mt:nr. -etTJm. !peHir~w;e;~~9tMr-H~m~~F~tll=':tJ,:/ c 
0
"' s+; -1-r..t · 0 """"I o 1o l ·~q-
G9astltY:tloRal e6hgatiOIIS'! - +t' .., s. """' '/ loc.. 
~a tfiat aa "equal access" peliey vteald be incumpatiOle With c.:"",..C\c. +~ ri a~ol a.S t 
t~is Cet1rt's Establishment Clause eases. Those cases hold c.o...., fell i ,..,~. .I.+ olo'~ ...,o 
that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can -fool low, )\o"'cv~r., 'fi.,"t 
pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] ~..., _ _''e'1CA. ... t ~u~~s" 
. po l• c. y f-4>c&A.\ ol . IC)C. • 
mco.....,~+i bit: w•+"l +1-t 1 S 
7 See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972): Co~,...J. 's E.s+"'"' I is a..,"'YYt'>1 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial ofrecognitio 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Committee 
for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653 (1980); 
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 
(1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would avoid 
entanglement with religion. 10 But the District Court con-
cluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 11 
9 It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
10 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F. 
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to 
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities to student groups, and the ques-
tion is whether it can now exclude groups because of the con-
tent of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 
(1972). 12 In this context we are unpersuaded that the pri-
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld·-,.· 
/'the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
12 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
cas:J 
~cordi~; we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to ) ... [..Oo ,_, 0+-
which Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challengedy ,~f,c.,~~) 
University regulation. Neither do we reach the difficult~ 
questions that would arise if State accommodation of Free~ -
Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular case, _ ~ 
........ . ..· v 
conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.~~ 
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mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 13 . -----
____.; Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. .f"/\J c~t b/, 
'" University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 13 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-686 (1971). - ---------- :::L..,.s~.-+ rnDfkrlct 
~ro""' ~s~rr 
® 
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fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 14 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
. ort for religion, 15 the University claims a compelling interest 
,~ in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
\ r ) ~onstitution. 16 /< The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icif of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 17 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
14 This Court has similarly rejected "the recUITent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
1
• See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
16 Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, O. .J ( t 
419 . 8. 88 (1974) . . ' ' ' ~ IS 7f"'l q OUt" 
· · ~ · -1o&.4"'~ H(.Uo<4ri ~"'D( o.. C.C?....,f< IIi_...,., ·, ""'t~ rf' s + i "1 
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speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even 
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would 
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridg-
ment of protected rights of speech and association. See, 
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this 
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against 
religious speech and association fails on grounds of over-
inclusiveness. 
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to 
"religious teaching" as well as "religious worship." It is 
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no com-
pelling State interest-which would be cognizable under the 
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teach-
ing'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, in-
formal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in 
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free 
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the 
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations). 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations. 18 Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New 
'
8 See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' "). 
(quoting Wright , The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). 
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Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we also af-
firm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 18&-189 (1972), that recognize a University's 
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate 
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based 
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy vio-
lates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of 
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is un-
able to justify this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
~ .. - -.e 
~niversity argues that the Cornerstone students themselves 
admitted in affidavits that "[s]tudents know that if 
something is on campus, then it is a student organization, 
and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a 
meeting." 5i~iJarly, tbQ 9~~~~A~S el~iwed that mgp~iR~ aif 
C-aH\:f?MS "Lends ~e mahe ot1::1deR~s ~'RiAli tab at there i Iii some thing 
V
lwrong' with tl~.,_ Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, 
~ Joint Appendi~at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 1977). In light of the 
large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt 
students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
supporL.1rQTILtQ~Lm~re f~ct_ __ qf .. g__~iil!lPl,!.S meet !ng place. ~ad 
~ fass, !he University's student handbook already notes 
that the ~niversity's name will not "be identified in any 
way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions 
of any organization or its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80--689 
GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL. , PETITIONERS v. CLARK 
VINCENT, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[October -, 1981] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
' The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University infonned the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups.. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings / 
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting 
include(d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, 
supra, at 910. 
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. !d., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. !d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
!d., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. !d., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social 
· and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' !d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
0$0689G, 11/5/81, rev. DICK 
80-689-0PINION 
4 WIDMAR v. VINCENT 
description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
id., at 1312, n. 1). 
We now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. 5 Having done so, the University assumed an 
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under 
applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a 
State to enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, 6 even 
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the ca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 
184. 
'The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteris-
tics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.'' Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
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if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. 
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in 
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for di-
rect citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of 
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U. S. 546, 55~59 (1975) (because municipal theater was a 
public forum, city could not exclude a production without sat-
isfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior 
restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the 
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public fo-
rums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
grounds or buildings. 
7 The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally I 
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's in-
tended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the 
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. 
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a com-
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. lf"religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the 
First Amendment. See id., at 3 and n. 1. It does not argue that descrip-
tions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it re-
pudiate last Term's decision in Krishna, supra, which assumed that reli-
gious appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the 
dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious 
speech explicitly protected by our cases and a new class of religious 
"speech act[s]," dissenting opinion, at 5, comprising "worship." There are 
at least three difficulties with this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible 
content. There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture, 
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2-3, cease to be "singing, teaching, 
and reading'' -all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious sub-
ject matter-and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is 
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to adminis-
ter. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw 
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to 
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious 
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries 
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner for-
bidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668 
(1970). 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on 
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vi-
tality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. 
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Krishma, supra, than for 
religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that 
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. See Carey v. Broum, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980).8 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] 
the State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former. 
8 See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which .. . may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
9 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, would have a secular purpose 10 and would avoid 
entanglement with religion. u But the District Court con-
cluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 12 
10 It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
11 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F. 
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to 
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
12 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities to student groups, and the ques-
tion is whether it can now exclude groups because of the con-
tent of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 
(1972). '3 In this context we are unpersuaded that the pri-
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
13 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 97~976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunf,-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which ! 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
tion. Neither do we reach the difficult questions that would arise if State 
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mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 14 
accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a par- / 
ticular case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
14 University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that 
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tu-
dents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organiza-
tion, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." 
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, how-
ever, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's 
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 17 
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student j 
Handbook, at 25. 
15 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
16 See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-Q14 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
17 See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the 
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The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, detennine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 18 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. Even 
if a State's interest were compelling, its regulations would 
have to protect that interest without unnecessary abridg-
ment of protected rights of speech and association. See, 
e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 489 (1960). Measured against this 
standard, the University's policy of discrimination against 
religious speech and association fails on grounds of over-
inclusiveness. 
The University regulation challenged in this case applies to 
"religious teaching'' as well as "religious worship." It is 
therefore substantially overbroad. We can imagine no com-
pelling State interest-which would be cognizable under the 
Supremacy Clause-in banning all types of religious "teach-
ing'' in an otherwise-open forum, including, for example, in-
formal conversational "instruction." As we have noted in 
the past, "[b]road prophylactic rules in an area of free 
expresion are fatal. Precision of regulation must be the 
touchstone." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (omitting citations). 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undennines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with \ 
its own constitution. 
'
8 U. S. Const., Art. VI , § 2. 
t • 
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manner regulations. 19 Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire , 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we also af-
firm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's 
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate 
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-based 
exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy vio-
lates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of 
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is un-
able to justify this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
19 See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
(''The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable."'). 
(quoting Wright , The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978--1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
' The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings 
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting 
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, 
supra, at 910. 
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. !d., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. !d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
!d., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. I d., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' !d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
id., at 1312, n. 1). 
We now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
-
"versity has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent gro . Having done so, the Universityfa'~sumed an (~••'( 
obligation to justify its discrimiiJations and exclusions under ~:::r·rt L ~~ 
applicable constitutional norms.5 The Constitution forbids a _/_ ""' -rv 
State to enforce certain exclusions from a J*lrruznr,seven o~ 
[' pJo''' j 
5 This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas. " ' Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, theca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would bel limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." !d. , at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. !d., at 181, 
184. 
• The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteris-
tics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Inde- .--
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
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if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. 
See, e. g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 
175 and n. 8. (1976) (although a State may conduct business in 
private session, "where the State has opened a forum for di-
rect citizen involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of 
justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a 
public forum, city could not exclude a production without sat-
isfying constitutional safeguards applicable to prior 
restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the 
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public fo-
rums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
grounds or buildings. 
7 The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally 
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's in-
tended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the 
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. 
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a com-
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about reli 'on is speech entitled to the general protections of the 
· ment. See t . , a and n. 1. It does not argue that descrip-
tions of religious experiences fai to qualify as "speech." Nor does it re-
pudiate last Term's decision in · , supra, w 1c assume t at reli-
gious appeals to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the 
dissent seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious 
s eech ex licitl rotected b ~ases and a new class of religious 
"speec act[s]," dissenting opinion, at comprising "worship." There are 
at least three difficulties with this dis mction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible 
content. There is no indication when ;:~;~ns, read~ng s~ripture. ~ 
and teaching biblical principles," id., at se to be "singmg, e ­
and reading''-all apparently forms of "spe~," despite their religious sub-
ject matter-and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is 
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to adminis-
ter. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island , 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw 
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to 
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious 
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries 
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner for-
bidden by our cases. E. g. , Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668 
(1970). 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on 
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vi-
tality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. 
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Jfir@8liM e;Supra, than tor 
religious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that 
) 
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 8 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional~ 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] 
the State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former. 
8 See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
9 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of A . peals held that an 
open-forum policv../iilcluding nondiscrimma nn~ s re i-
gious speec~d have a secular purpose 10 and would avoid 
entanglement with religion. 11 But the District Court con-
cluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"Rrimary effect" of advancing religion. 12 
10 It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
11 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F. 
2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to 
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
12 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
9A. As the dissent argues, it is sometimes necessary to 
distinguish between "religious" and "nonreligious" speech. See, 
~·Stone v. Graham, u.s. (November 17, 1980). But 
our cases have never required the State to distinguish between 
religious and nonreligious speech by private speakers in a public 
forum. The dissent's hypotheticals of classes entitled "Sunday 
Mass" and "The History of the Catholic Church" are irrelevant to 
this case. By relying on them, the dissent blurs the critical 
distinction between a state university itself acting to further a 
religion or its establishment, and the case before us, in which 
the university has created a public forum for use by private 
speakers. 
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities ~t gt oaps, and file ques-
tion is whether it can now exc ude groups because of the con-
tent of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 
(1972). 13 In this context we are unpersuaded that the pri-
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
rTligious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
Sl\ Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
13 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does no~as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
tion. N oith" do wo ""'h tho ~ qu.,tions that would ariso if State 
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mary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 14 
accommodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a par-
ticular case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
"University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that 
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tu-
dents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organiza-
tion, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." 
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, how-
ever, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's 
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240--241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 17 
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25. 
·~ This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
'
6 See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
17 See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the 
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The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 18 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. r-~+~:;;;.=~'=1 W~ j.·"""":t- o L.l.r 
if a ~tate's inieFest v,re:pe eoml'elling, it~ regt:IlatioJ:li woutd.o ~olot i ""j -h> ti-,L 
itave to protect that ist8r8it w:itl:.leHt HRRQS8ssary al3rielg ..>- c. .,.,5~ lot?+or.e. 4 ~ • 
..ment of pt otected t igfitE~ of ~:peeeh arHi assoeisiion. ~filii ,>- L--------
~. Carey v. Bmwn, 447 u. g, 4:86, 466 (lQgO); ghflltgqq, ~ 
'Pttcker, ~04 U. ~. 4?9, 4go (10€i0), Mlilaiwre€l agaiast thjs..)--
:5tandard, the Univet sity's f.H~ligy of discrimiaa.ties ~gain~ .....>--" 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with 
its own constitution. 
18 U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are 
entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases 
have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which 
a State undertakes iGto regulate speech on the basis of its 
content. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); 
?olice Dept. v. Mos ley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). On the other 
hand, the State interest asserted here -- in achieving 
greater separation of church and State than is already en-
sured under the Establishment Clause· of the Federal Con-
stitution -- is inherently limited by the Free Exercise 
Clause} In this constitutional context, we are unabl 
to recognize H1At interest as suffic1ently "compelling" to 
justify conten{-based discrimination against respondents' 
religious speech. 
' 
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manner regulations. 19 Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach_,what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of~al. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we a -
firm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 
II 408 U. S. 169, 18&-189 (1972), that recognize a University's 
~ftl\ ff"c:t 1 °f'"' right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate 
S. ~ J...t. ""k reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
-\o ~o\A~; opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
--------:~T;.;h~e~b~asis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
the University seeks to enforce a content-based 
exclusion o eligious speech. Its exclusionary policy vio-
lates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of 
speech should be content-neutral, and the University is un-
able to justify this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
19 See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). 
/ 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri atKan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
1 The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit f'Jed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use . of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings 
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting 
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, 
supra, at 910. 
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. !d., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
91~916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. !d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
!d., at 131~1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. !d., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' /d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
id., at 1312, n. 1). 
We now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. Having done so, the University has assumed 
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions 
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution 
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum 
generally open to the public, 6 even if it was not required to 
s This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, theca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would bel limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. I d., at 181, 
184. 
6 The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteris-
tics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
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create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madi-
son Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (al-
though a State may conduct business in private session, 
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen in-
volvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public 
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying 
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. Our cases leave no doubt that the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the 
campuses of state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a 
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public 
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
grounds or buildings. 
' The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally 
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's in-
tended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the 
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. 
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a com-
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the 
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 1. It does not argue that de- I 
scriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it 
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for { 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals 
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent 
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explic-
itly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s]," dis-
senting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three diffi-
culties with this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible 
content. There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture, 
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching, 
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious sub-
ject matter-and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is 
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to adminis-
ter. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw 
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to 
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious 
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries 
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner for-
bidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668 
(1970). 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on 
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vi-
tality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. 
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
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pelting state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980).8 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the 
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former. 
8 See also Healy v. James , 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
'"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 4~6 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, 10 would have a secular purpose 11 and would 
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court 
10 As the dissent argues, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish be-
tween "religious" and "nonreligious" speech. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 
-- U. S. --(November 17, 1980). But our cases have never required 
the State to distinguish between religious and nonreligious speech by pri-
vate speakers in a public forum. The dissent's hypotheticals of classes en-
titled "Sunday Mass" and "The History of the Catholic Church" are irrele-
vant to this case. By relying on them, the dissent blurs the critical 
distinction between a state university itself acting to further a religion or 
its establishment, and the case before us, in which the university has cre-
ated a public forum for use by private speakers. 
11 It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g. , McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
12 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of ''religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
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concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 13 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and j 
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of 
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 
169 (1972). 14 In this context we are unpersuaded that the 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law§ 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need 
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
•• In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
14 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
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primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 15 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
tion. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accom- \ 
modation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular 
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
15 University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 16 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that 
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tu-
dents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organiza-
tion, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." 
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, how-
ever, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's 
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25. 
18 This Court has similarly rejected ''the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
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port for religion, 17 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 18 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 19 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We 
limit our holding to the case before us. 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are en-
titled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have re-
quired the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State 
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. 
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. 
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other haz:1d, the State 
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of 
church and State than is already ensured under the Estab-
lishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is inherently 
limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the 
Free Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, 
we are unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently 
17 See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
18 See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the 
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with 
its own constitution. 
19 U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
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"compelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against \ 
respondents' religious speech. 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations. 20 Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
announcing the decision of the Court). Finally, we affirm I 
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right 
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate rea-
sonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks\ 
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its 
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a 
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the 
University is unable to justify this violation under applicable 
constitutional standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed . 
., See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
(''The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty ::stuueHt~ ... participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings 
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting 
include(d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, 
supra, at 910. 
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
91~916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
Id., at 131~1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' /d., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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id., at 1312, n. 1). 
We now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. Having done so, the University has assumed 
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions 
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution 
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum 
generally open to the public, 6 even if it was not required to 
• This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas."' Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the ca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 
184. 
6 The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteris-
tics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
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create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madi-
son Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (al-
though a State may conduct business in private session, 
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen in-
volvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public 
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying 
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be 
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of 
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public 
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
grounds or buildings. 
7 The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally 
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's in-
tended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the 
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. 
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a com-
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If"religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the 
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 1. It does not argue that de-
scriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it 
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals 
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent 
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explic-
itly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s)," dis-
senting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three diffi-
culties with this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible 
content. There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture, 
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching, 
and reading'' -all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious sub-
ject matter-and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is 
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to adminis-
ter. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw 
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to 
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious 
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries 
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner for-
bidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668 
(1970). 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on 
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vi-
tality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. 
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 8 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the 
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former. 
8 See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
9 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the [policy] 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, 10 would have a secular purpose 11 and would 
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court 
10 As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the 
State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Estab-
lishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an 
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of 
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham, 
--U. S. --(November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this 
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between re-
ligious "speech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at 
5 and n. 4. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a 
foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially 
unmanageable. 
11 It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
12 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb 
80-B89-0PINION 
WIDMAR v. VINCENT 9 
concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 13 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and 
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of 
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need 
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
'
8 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
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169 (1972). 14 In this context we are unpersuaded that the 
primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
14 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 97~976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
tion. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accom-
modation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular 
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
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any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 15 
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 16 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
15 University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685--686 (1971). The University argues that 
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tu-
dents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organiza-
tion, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." 
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, how-
ever, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's 
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25. 
16 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
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be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 17 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 18 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 19 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We 
limit our holding to the case before us. 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are en-
titled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have re-
quired the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State 
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. 
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. 
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State 
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of 
17 See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harjst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
'
8 See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the 
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with 
its own constitution. 
••u. S. Const., Art. VI, §2. 
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church and State than is already ensured under the Estab-
lishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited here 
by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free 
Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are 
unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "com-
pelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against re-
spondents' religious speech. 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations. 20 Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm 
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right 
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate rea-
sonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks 
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its 
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a 
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the 
'" See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' "). 
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). 
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University is unable to justify this violation under applicable 
constitutional standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, · 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 8 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings 
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting 
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, 
supra, at 910. 
' Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915--916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA81980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
Id., at 1315--1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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id., at 1312, n. 1). 
We now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. Having done so, the University has assumed 
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions 
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution 
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum 
generally open to the public, 6 even if it was not required to 
5 This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "The college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, theca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 
184. 
6 The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, first ex-
pressed in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
"Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and time out of mind, have been 
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places 
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens." 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u. s. 536 (1965). 
Although a university may create a forum with many of the characteris-
tics of streets and public places, see n. 5, supra, our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
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create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madi-
son Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (al-
though a State may conduct business in private session, 
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen in-
volvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public 
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying 
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be l 
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of 
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage in reli-
gious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 
(1948). 7 In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public 
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
grounds or buildings. 
7 The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally 
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's in-
tended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the 
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. 
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a com-
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the 
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 1. It does not argue that de-
scriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it 
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals 
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent 
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explic-
itly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s]," dis-
senting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three diffi-
culties with this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible 
content. There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture, 
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching, 
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious sub-
ject matter-and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is 
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to adminis-
ter. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw 
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to 
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious 
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries 
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner for-
bidden by our cases. E . g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668 
(1970). 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on 
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vi-
tality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. 
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 8 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 9 We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the 
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former. 
8 See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
9 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, 10 would have a secular purpose 11 and would 
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court 
'
0 As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the 
State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Estab-
lishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an 
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of 
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham, 
--U. S. --(November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this 
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between re-
ligious "speech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at 
5 and n. 4. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a 
foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially 
unmanageable. 
11 It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
12 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
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concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 13 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and 
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of 
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion,." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 
F . 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need 
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
13 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers .to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
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169 (1972). 14 In this context we are unpersuaded that the 
primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
14 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
tion. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accom-
modation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular 
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
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any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. '5 
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980).'6 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
16 University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The University argues that 
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tu-
dents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organiza-
tion, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." 
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, how-
ever, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's 
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25. 
16 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair , 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
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be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 17 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 18 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 19 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We 
limit our holding to the case before us. 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are en-
titled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have re-
quired the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State 
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. 
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. 
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State 
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of 
"See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S. W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
18 See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F . Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the 
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with 
its own constitution. 
19 U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
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church and State than is already ensured under the Estab-
lishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited here 
by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free 
Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are 
unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "com-
pelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against re-
spondents' religious speech. 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations. 20 Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources--"to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm J 
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right 
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate rea-
sonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks 
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its 
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a 
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the 
20 See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
1042 (1969). 
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University is unable to justify this violation under applicable 
constitutional standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
To~ The ht f Jut~ t. 
Justice Brt'nnan 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
1 The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty studeuL:s ... participate actively in CurnersLone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb 
80--689-0PINION 
2 WIDMAR v. VINCENT 
ever, the University informed the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings 
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting 
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, 
supra, at 910. 
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
91&-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA81980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
Id., at 131&-1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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id., at 1312, n. 1). 
We now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. Having done so, the University has assumed 
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions 
./under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution 
v forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum 
generally open to the public, ~ven if it was not required to 
See.. ~e."'e.~"'lll ~c\,·ce. 
Oep+. V· tfos /e.1 , "'dB 
U. • ~ . 9 ;t (l q ') '-.) j £o.x.. 
V. J....o,, .. Jsc'""~"' ) J')? 
5 This Court has reco · the campus of a public universit~ as-
sesses many o the characteristics of a pu 1c orum "The college c ass-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, theca-
pacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate ... [would be] limited by denial of access to the cus-
tomary media for communicating with the administration, faculty mem-
bers, and other students." Id., at 181-182. We therefore have held that 
students enjoy First Amendment rights of speech and association on the 
campus, and that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facili-
ties for meetings and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. !d., at 181, 
l-{. 5 . S3v (_ '~"s) .. 
..fl,e.. s "..,e 4--1..., e J 
\,owf.ver 7 
184 
6 The concept of a "public forum" rests on the recognition, 
pre in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939), that 
L--=*~~~~!!!~ml=f"mli~IR<m;r~J:DT=fj.;=~~t<our cases have recognized 
that First Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere 
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create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madi-
son Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (al-
though a State may conduct business in private session, 
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen in-
volvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public 
forum, city could not exclude a production without satism· pg__~!!!!JII!!!!!!!I' 
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be 
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of 
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. / 
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School ~ 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364Al' ; 
u.s. 479, 487 (1960). v 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against se C\. ~et1u~lly 
groups and speakers based on their desire to engage m re - 4 ~ 
gious worship and discussion. These are orms of speech ...._o_,f'-t:-'1 _____ ,....., 
and association protected by the First Amendment. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 
340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 
[F/'1 \,tflC,l ----n(1"""'9,..,48~~n order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a 
'(U'''-'M 
to that view. A university differs in significant respects from public 
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's 
mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied its au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon 
the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its 
nds or buildings. 
he dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally 
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public forum based on the religious content of a group's in-
tended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the 
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. 
It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a com-
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. lf"religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about religion is speech entitled to th ral rotections o 
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. It does not argue that de-
scriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it 
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals 
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent 
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explic-
itly protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech act[s]," dis-
senting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three diffi-
culties with this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible 
content. There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture, 
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching, 
and reading'' -all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious sub-
ject matter-and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is 
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to adminis-
ter. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw 
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to 
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious 
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries 
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner for-
bidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668 
(1970). 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on 
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vi-
tality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. 
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb 
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pelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 8... 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States.\ We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the 
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former. 
/ See also Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rei;~ts on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
/ "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const. , Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech,o~e would have a secular purposeM" and would 
avoid entanglement with religion. 12 But the District Court 
~s the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the 
State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Estab-
lishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an 
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of 
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham, 
--U. S. --(November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this 
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between re-
li 'ous "s eech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at 
a n. 1 We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a 
oundation m either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially 
unmanageable. 
/ It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
JYWe agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
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concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion.~ 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and 
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of 
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law§ 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need 
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
f"31n finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
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169 (1972)./ In this context we are unpersuaded that the 
primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
~This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, andre-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not--as in Brandon or Hunt--rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
tion. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accom-
modation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular 
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
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any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v .J 1 LJ... "' 
Widmar, supra, at 1317~ '{!..;V 
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public {( /~ .:· ./ 
Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980r.w- At ~
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
~niversity students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 681H>86 (1971). The University argues that 
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tu-
dents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organiza-
tion, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." 
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, how-
ever, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's 
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25 . 
......-wThis Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb 
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be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion;rrthe University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution~ 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause,~ a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We 
limit our holding to the case before us. 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are en-
titled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have re-
quired the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State 
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. 
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. 
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State 
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of 
/""See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
)"See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), affd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the 
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with 
its own constitution. 
/ u. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
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church and State than is already ensured under the Estab-
lishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited ~ 
by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free 
Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are 
unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "com-
pelling'' to justify content-based discrimination against re-
spondents' religious speech. 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations.-eo- Nor do we question the right of the 
University to make acad c w best to al-
locate scarce resource "to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, hoi, ij:, shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study.~eezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL ., f 
announcing the judgment of the Court). Finally, we affirm 
the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 
U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's right 
to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate rea-
sonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks 
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its 
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a 
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the 
~ee, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
10~2 (1969). 
;JO 1~ In his opinion concurring in the j udgmenJ J ust i ce 
~evens expresses concern that use of the terms "compelling 
state interest" and "public forum" may "undermine the 
academic freedom of public universities". As the text above 
makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See also n. 5, 
ante , at p. 4. ~~r os~0~~ i :'2r m i !co1~;~t19 "'::e t!:~ee .~~'JL""+-
cf ~ "f~bt.e. -fe""'"" c....-e"~ lo1 +k.t- (A"'\vtf' ' ~)' ifs~J(. 
0$0689G, 11-24-81, rev. Drb 
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University is unable to justify this violation under applicable 
constitutional standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, -7 
Affirmed. 
Proposed Substitute Language for the Text in 
Widmar v. Vincent, No. 80-689, beginning at the top of page 12: 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy 
of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing 
to gather to engage in religious and non-religious speech, would 
offend the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine 
how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also 
unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 
a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever 
outweigh free speeech interests protected by the First Amendment. 
We limit our holding to the case before us. 
First Amendment rights are entitled to special 
constitutional solicitude. Our cases require the most exacting 
scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech 
on the basis of its content. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 u.s. 
455 (1980); Police Dept. v. MosJley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In this 
constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State 
interest asserted here--an interest in achieving greater 
separation of church and State than is already ensured under the 
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution--as sufficiently 
"compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against 
religious speech. 
'1, ;--, Jl 1 I 3 
~ oc-1- V\ o -4- l' s ; l ,., '-4- INl lo < r < c( 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80--689 
GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CLARK VINCENT, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[December-, 1981] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (197~1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
1 The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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ever, the University informed· the group that it could no 
longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was 
based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 
1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or 
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching." 3 
Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, 
brought suit to challenge the regulation in Federal District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri. 4 They alleged 
Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(WD Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms 
and in the student center. These meeting were open to the public and at-
tracted up to 125 students. A typical Cornerstone meeting included 
prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3 The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as 
herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohi-
bition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship 
or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any 
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offer-
ing of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions 
held in University facilities .... 
"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be 
used for religious services but not for recurring services of any groups. 
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each chapel by the 
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to 
any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of Missouri at Kansas 
City. The nearest University chapel is at the Columbia campus, approxi-
mately 125 miles east of UMKC. 
Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone meetings 
before 1977, the District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of the meeting 
include[d] religious worship or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, 
supra, at 910. 
'Clark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, the named plaintiff 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
Id., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' " 'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
description of the student activities program, reprinted in 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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id., at 1312, n. 1). 
We now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by stu-
dent groups. Having done so, the University has assumed 
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions 
under applicable constitutional norms. 5 The Constitution 
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum 
generally open to the public, even if it was not required to 
create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., City of Madi-
son Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment 
5 This Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at 
least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public 
forum. See generally, Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. J 
Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). ''The college classroom with its sur-
rounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas.'" Healy v. 
James, 408 U. S. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or 
individual ''to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate 
... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary media for com-
municating with the administration, faculty members, and other students." 
/d., at 181-182. We therefore have held that students enjoy First Amend-
ment rights of speech and association on the campus, and that the "denial 
[to :particular groups] of use of campus facilities for meetings and other ap-
propriate purposes" must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate 
to any form of prior restraint. /d., at 181, 184. 0 P" \ $ ~ i 0 Y1 
At the same time, however, our cases have recognized that First 
Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics 
of the school environment.'' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). We continue to adhere to that view. 
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as 
streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is edu-
cation, and decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to im-
pose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of 
its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus 
must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents 
alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or 
buildings. 
80-U89-0PINION 
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Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (al-
though a State may conduct business in private session, 
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen in-
volvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public 
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying 
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be 
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of 
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a t 
generally open forum to engage in religious worship and dis- f.. 
cussion. These are forms of speech and association pro-
tected by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Heffron v. In-
ternational Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 
2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); 
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 6 In order to justify 
6 The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally 
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the 
First Amendment. See id., at 2--;3 and n. 2. It does not argue that de-
scriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech." Nor does it 
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discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the re-
ligious content of a group's intended speech, the University 
must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to 
content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 
447 u. s. 455, 461, 464-465 (1980). 7 
repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, which assumed that religious appeals 
to nonbelievers constituted protected "speech." Rather, the dissent 
seems to attempt a distinction between the kinds of religious speech explic-
itly protected by our cases and a new Class of religious "speech act[s]," dis-
senting opinion, at 4, comprising "worship." There are at least three diffi-
culties with this distinction. 
First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has intelligible 
content. There is no indication when "singing hymns, reading scripture, 
and teaching biblical principles," id., at 2, cease to be "singing, teaching, 
and reading''-all apparently forms of "speech," despite their religious sub-
ject matter-and become unprotected "worship." 
Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is 
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to adminis-
ter. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 70 (1953). Merely to draw 
the distinction would require the university-and ultimately the courts-to 
inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious 
faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries 
would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner for-
bidden by our cases. E. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668 
(1970). 
Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the distinction on 
which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently wishes to preserve the vi-
tality of the Establishment Clause. See dissenting opinion, post, at 4. 
But it gives no reason why the Establishment Clause, or any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, would require different treatment for religious 
speech designed to win religious converts, see Heffron, supra, than for re-
ligious worship by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the 
State gives greater support in the latter case than in the former. 
7 See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial of recognition 
was a form of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range 
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III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
of associational activities described above. While a college has a legiti-
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which ... may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, 9 would have a secular purpose 10 and would 
avoid entanglement with religion. 11 But the District Court 
concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. 12 
1 As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the 
State to distinguish between ''religious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an Estab-
lishment of Religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or 
approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support an 
Establishment of Religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of 
the Constitution. It is followed in our cases. E. g., Stone v. Graham, 
-- U. S. -- (November 17, 1980). The dissent attempts to equate this 
distinction with its view of an alleged constitutional difference between re-
ligious "speech" and religious "worship." See dissenting opinion, post, at 
5 and n. 6. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent lacks a 
foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and that it is judicially 
unmanageable. 
10 It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which stu-
dents can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the forum 
for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But by creating a 
forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the par-
ticular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many views are advocated in the 
forum with which the University desires no association. 
Because this case involves a forum already made generally available to 
student groups, it differs from those cases in which this Court has invali-
dated statutes permitting school facilities to be used for instruction by reli-
gious groups, but not by others. See, e. g., McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In those cases the school may appear to 
sponsor the views of the speaker. 
11 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would risk 
greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion of "religious 
worship and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which words and 
activites fall within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone 
could prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 
F. 2d 931, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law § 14-16 (1978). There would also be a continuing need 
to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
12 In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary effect 
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and 
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of 
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169 (1972). 13 In this context we are unpersuaded that the 
of advancing religion, the District Court in this case relied primarily on 
Tilwn v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilwn the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have aclmowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
13 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, and re-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
8()....U89-0PINION 
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primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of dis-
course, would be to advance religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely 
effects. It is possible-perhaps even foreseeable-that reli-
gious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. 
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's 
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
771 (1973); see, e. g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 
U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1972); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open 
forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of 
our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not confer 
any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or prac-
tices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a pol-
icy "would no more commit the University ... to religious 
goals," than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students 
for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or 
any other group eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. 
Widmar, supra, at 1317. 14 
tion. Neither do we reach the questions that would arise if State accom-
modation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular 
case, conflict with the prohibition of the Establishment Clause. 
,. University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that 
the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685--686 (1971). The University argues that 
the Cornerstone students themselves admitted in affidavits that "[s]tu-
dents know that if something is on campus, then it is a student organiza-
tion, and they are more likely to feel comfortable attending a meeting." 
Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, Joint Appendix, at 18, 19 (Sept. 29, 
1977). In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, how-
ever, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University 
support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's 
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not "be 
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 17 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25. 
15 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
16 See, e. g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613--614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
17 See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 88 (1974), the 
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The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general pol-
icy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-reli-
gious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need 
not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would de-
cide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide 
whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 18 a state interest, de-
rived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free 
speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We 
limit our holding to the case before us. 
On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are en-
titled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have re-
quired the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State 
undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. 
See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. 
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). On the other hand, the State 
interest asserted here-in achieving greater separation of 
church and State than is already ensured under the Estab-
lishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-is limited by I o ""' 1 .s s i o vt 
the Fre~ Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech 
Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are unable 
to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "compelling'' 
to justify content-based discrimination against respondents' 
religious speech. 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity 
of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and 
manner regulations. 19 Nor do we question the right of the 
District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in compliance with 
its own constitution. 
18 U. S. Const., Art. VI, § 2. 
19 See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972). 
("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are reasonable."'). 
(quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 
80--689-0PINION 
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University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on aca- I 
demic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it 
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of Pow-
ELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 20 Finally, f 
we affinn the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. 
James, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a Uni-
versity's right to exclude even First Amendment activities 
that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially inter-
fere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an 
education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks 
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its 
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a 
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the 
University is unable to justify this violation under applicable 
constitutional standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
1042 (1969). 
20 In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post, at 1, JUSTICE STE-
VENS expresses concern that use of the tenns "compelling state interest" 
and "public forum" may "undermine the academic freedom of public univer-
sities". As the text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See 
also n. 5, ante, at p. 4. Our holding is limited to the context of a public 
forum created by the University itself. 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See 
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
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The University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state university, makes its 
facilities generally available for the activities of registered student 
groups. A registered student religious group that had previously re-
ceived permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities was in-
formed that it could no longer do so because of a University regulation 
prohibiting the use of University buildings or grounds "for purposes of 
religious worship or religious teaching." Members of the group then 
brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the regulation vio-
lated, inter alia, their rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of 
speech under the First Amendment. The District Court upheld the 
regulation as being not only justified, but required, by the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed, 
viewing the regulation as a content-based discrimination against reli-
gious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification, and hold-
ing that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, 
in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kind. 
Held: The University's exclusionary policy violates the fundamental princi-
ple that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral. 
Pp. 4-13. 
(a) Having created a forum generally open for use by student groups, 
the University, in order to justify discriminatory exclusion from such 
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, must 
satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions; 
i. e., it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 
Pp. 4-7. 
(b) Although the University's interest in complying with its constitu-
tional obligations under the Establishment Clause may be characterized 
as compelling, an "equal access" policy would not be incompatable with 
that Clause. A policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States ReJlOrtS. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-689 
GARY E. WIDMAR, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CLARK VINCENT ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[December 8, 1981] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
This case presents the question whether a state university, 
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities 
of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a reg-
istered student group desiring to use the facilities for reli-
gious worship and religious discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kan-
sas City 1 to encourage the activities of student organiza-
tions. The University officially recognizes over 100 student 
groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the 
meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an ac-
tivity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help defray the 
costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named 
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to 
conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 1977, how-
'The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four cam-
puses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State of Missouri. 
2 Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students from 
various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 
1977, "perhaps twenty students ... participate actively in Cornerstone 
and form the backbone of the campus organization." Affidavit of Florian 
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that the University's discrimination against religious activity 
and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of reli-
gion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (WD Mo. 1979). It found the regulation not 
only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the 
State could not provide facilities for religious use without giv-
ing prohibited support to an institution of religion. I d., at 
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the 
University could not discriminate against religious speech on 
the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to 
less protection than other types of expression. I d., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F. 2d 1310 (CA8 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regu-
lation as a content-based discrimination against religious 
speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. 
Id., at 1315-1320. The Court held that the Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. Id., at 1317. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to 
further the neutral purpose of developing students' "'social 
and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curios-
ity."' Id., at 1317 (quoting from the University bulletin's 
in the action in the District Court, were among the students who initiated 
the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the University's Board 
of Curators. 
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son Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167, 175 and n. 8. (1976) (al-
though a State may conduct business in private session, 
"where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen in-
volvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 
555-559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public 
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying 
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it describes 
as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for 
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be 
there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of 
state universities. See, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
u. s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated against 
student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a 
generally open forum to engage in religious worship and dis-
cussion. These are forms of speech and association pro-
tected by the First Amendment. See, e. g., Heffron v. In-
ternational Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 
2559 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); 
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 6 In order to justify 
6 The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech generally 
protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First Amendment and the 
"equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If "religious 
worship" were protected "speech," the dissent reasons, "the Religion 
Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in 
which religious practice took the form of speech." Dissenting opinion, 
post, at 4. This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that 
speech about religion is speech entitled to the general protections of the 
First Amendment. See id., at 2-3 and n. 2. It does not argue that de-
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III 
In this case the University claims a compelling interest in 
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives 
this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the 
Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities 
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to 
other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution of the United States.8 We agree that the 
interest of the University in complying with its constitutional 
obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not 
follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be in-
compatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. 
Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establish-
ment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 
(1971). See Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 
U. S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works 
Bd., 426 U. S. 736, 748 (1976). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an 
open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli-
gious speech, 9 would have a secular purpose 10 and would 
mate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may jus-
tify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of that action." 
8 "Congress shall make no Jaw respecting an establishment of religion . 
. . . " U. S. Canst. , Arndt. 1. The Establishment Clause has been made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
9 As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the 
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The University's argument misconceives the nature of this 
case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The Univer-
sity has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and 
the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of 
the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169 (1972). 13 In this context we are unpersuaded that the 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). In Tilton this Court upheld 
the grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for secular 
purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sectarian or religious worship for 20 years, 
the Court considered this restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 
years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests the original federal grant will in part 
have the [constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." 
Id., at 683. From this statement the District Court derived the proposi-
tion that State funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings used 
by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. In Tilton the 
Court was concerned that a sectarian institution might convert federally 
funded buildings to religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the im-
primatur of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the 
State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other dis-
cussions. Cases before and after Tilton have acknowledged the right of 
religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e. g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc ., 101 
S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948). 
13 This case is different from the cases in which religious groups claim 
that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-1396; 
Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (SD W. Va. 1971). 
Here, the University's forum is already available to other groups, and re-
spondents' claim to use that forum does not-as in Brandon or Hunt-rest 
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' 
claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech and association, 
and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide the 
case. Accordingly, we need not inquire into the extent, if any, to which 
Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University regula-
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Second, the forum is available to a broad class of non-reli-
gious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recog-
nized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to 
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secu-
lar effect. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 
24~241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra, 413 U. S., at 756, 781-782 and n. 38 (1973). If the 
Establishment Clause barred the extension of general bene-
fits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by 
the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U. S. 736, 747 
(1976) (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 658, n. 6 (1980). 15 At 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious 
groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not 
be the forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than 
the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect State sup-
port for religion, 16 the University claims a compelling interest 
in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri 
Constitution. 17 
identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opin-
ions of any organization of its members." 1980-1981 UMKC Student 
Handbook, at 25. 
15 This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent argument that all aid 
[to parochial schools] is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 u. s. 734, 743 (1973). 
'
6 See, e. g. , American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711, 720, (Mo.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976) (holding Missouri Constitution 
requires stricter separation of church and state than does Federal Con-
stitution); Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W. 2d 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane) 
(same). 
17 See Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 6; Art. 1, § 7; Art. 9, § 8. In Luetkemeyer v. 
Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (ED Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U. S. 888 (1974), 
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University to make academic judgments as to how best to al-
locate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on aca-
demic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it 
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring in the judgment); see Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312-313 (1978) (opinion of Pow-
ELL, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).20 Finally, 
we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., Healy v. 
James, 408 U. S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a Uni-
versity's right to exclude even First Amendment activities 
that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially inter-
fere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an 
education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a 
forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks 
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its 
exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a 
state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the 
University is unable to justify this violation under applicable 
constitutional standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, 
Affirmed. 
1042 (1969). 
20 In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post, at 1, JuSTICE STE-
VENS expresses concern that use of the terms "compelling state interest" 
and "public forum" may "undermine the academic freedom of public univer-
sities". As the text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See 
also n. 5, ante, at p. 4. Our holding is limited to the context of a public 
forum created by the University itself. 
This case presents the question whether a state 
university, which makes its facilities available for the 
activities of all other registered student groups, may 
' 
close its facilities to a registered student group ~ 




It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri 
at Kansas City1 to encourage the activities of student 
organizations. The University officially recognizes over 
90 student groups. It routinely provides University 
1The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC} 
is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an 
institution of the State of Missouri. 
/ 
2. 
facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. 
Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-
1979) to help defray the costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group 
named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission 
to conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 
1977, however, the University informed the group that it 
could no longer meet in University buildings. The 
exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board 
of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University 
buildings or grounds "for purposes o~ religious worship or 
religious teaching." 3 
2cornerstone is an organization of evangelical 
Christian students from different denominational 
backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 1977, 
"perhaps twenty students participate actively in 
Cornerstone and form the backbone of the campus 
organization." Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, 
Sept. 29., 1977, quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 
907, 911 (W.D. Mo. 1979). Prior to their termination by 
the University, on- 1\ campus meetings were held in 
classrooms and in the Student Center. Open to the public, 
they sometimes attracted up to 125 students. It is not 
disputed that a typical Cornerstone meeting in University 
facilities would include the offereing of prayer, the 
singing of hymns, the sharing of personal religious views, 
and commentary on the Bible. 
3The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds 
(except chapels as herein provided) may be used 
for purposes of religious worship of religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups 
The general prohibition against use of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Eleven students at the University, all members of 
Corners~o~~~.Jrought suit to challenge the regulation in 
 ~r ~ W'.J~r"' /J,J-1--'r'ct 
the fedet~ ~istrict !our~ They alleged that the 
~niversity's discrimination against religious activity and ,. -
discussion violated their rights to free exercise of 
religion, to equal protection, and to freedom of speech 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
University buildings and grounds for religious 
worship or religious teaching is a policy 
required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the 
State and is not open to any other construction. 
No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid 
the offering of prayer or other appropriate 
recognition of religion at public functions held 
in University facilities •... 
4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on 
University grounds may be used for religious 
services but not for recurring services of any 
groups. Special rules and procedures shall be 
established for each chapel by the Chancellor. 
It is specifically directed that no advantage 
shall be given to any religious group." 
In spite of the regulation's reference to chapels, 
there is no chapel on the campus of the University of 
Missouri at Kansas City. The nearest University chapel is 
at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of 
UMKC. -
Before 1977 University officials had not been aware 
of the religious character of the activities at 
Cornerstone meetings. The District Court found that 
University officials had never "authorized a student 
organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of 
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious 
teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, 480 F. Supp. at 910. 
4c1ark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, 
the name plaintiff in the action in the district court, 
were among the students who initiated the action on 
October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the 
University's Board of Curators. 
../ 
4. 
Constitution of the United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the l istrict ,... 
..-
G ourt upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
.-::>-
480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979). It found the regulation 
not only justified, but required, by the Establishment 
Clause of the federal constitution. Id. at 916. Under 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1972), the ~ourt --
reasoned, the State could not provide facilities for 
religious use without giving prohibited support to an 
institution of religion. The District court rejected the -..... 
argument that the University could not discriminate 
against religious speech on the basis of its content. It 
found religious speech entitled to less protection than 
other types of expression. Id. at 918. 
~~~I..M.~ 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Chess v. Widmar, 635 
" ,-.... ,/ F . 2d 1310 ( CA 8 19 8 0 ) . 
'--
Rejecting the analysis of the 
~istrict G:>urt, it viewed the University regulation as a 
-, ~ 
content-based discrimination against religious speech, for 
which it could find no compelling justification. Id. at 
1313-1316. The Establishment Clause did not bar a policy 
of equal access, in which facilities were opened to groups 
5. 





Q ppeals, the "primary effect" of such a policy would not 
'l 
be to advance religion, but rather to further the neutral 
purpose of developing students' "social and cultural 
awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity." Id. 
at 1317. 
Essentially for the reasons stated by the c;ourt of 
appeals, we now affirm. -.... 
-
II. 
Through its policy of accommodating the meetings of ··~~ 
{V ;;;:: registered student groups, the University has created for 
~ ~J.L •' 
.1-4 ,.- i t,s students a quasi-public for urn. See Police oe12t • v. 
~~~oseley, 408 u.s. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 u.s. 
crJ..~· 
6 y ,)'\ ] 36 (1965) ; see also HasUe v. CIO, 307 u.s. 496 (1939) • 5 
~-/' 
~ -----------yc 5The concept of a "public forum" 
~ ~ recognition, first expressed in Hague v. 





vv· JMt ~ I~~ :~:~~v~~eythheav:i i!~em~~ iasli~ee;:en a~~llairnk\r~=~ 
t~ ~t / ~ for the use of the public and time out of mind, 
~ have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
.. 
6. 
The University may have assumed voluntarily the function 
of providing rooms for student rneetings. 6 But, by doing 
Such centers for discourse are ~ly affected with 
First Amendment concerns of the highest order. t:TU1nder 
the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First 
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a 
public forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, 
but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or 
more controversial views. And it may not select which 
-..-.--.~--issues are worth debating in public facilities." Police 
../ 
Department v. Moseley, 408 u.s. 92, 96 (1972). It is 
characteristic of a "pure" public forum that it is equally 
open to all members of the public. "Once a forum is opened 
up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may 
t hibi t others from assembling or speaking on the 
b what they have to say." Id. 
campus of a public university possesses many of 
the characteristic elements of a public forum. "The 
college classroom, with its surrounding environs, is 
peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas.'" Healy v. James, 
408 u.s. 169, 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a 
group or individual "to participate in the intellectual 
give and take of campus debate .•• [would be] limited by 
denial of access to the customary media for communicating 
with the administration, faculty members, and other 
students." Id. at 181-182. We have therefore held that 
students en]Oy First Amendment rights of speech and 
association on the campus, and that the "denial of use of 
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate 
purposes" must be subjected to the level of scrutiny 
appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id. at 181, 
184; cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conra~420 u.s. 
546, 558 (}97 5)~ of / a~cess \to rnu~icipal th~fterv 
rna~· ntained~~s ~/ putlic ~orurn, \ constitu~es . "priof 
re tra · ,.,.t" an t ~tefore/bears "heavy pre~umpt~~/against 
it c nstitu ional validity") (citations orn1tted). 
On the other hand, our cases have never denied a 
university's capacity to impose regulations required to 
preserve the tranquility that its mission requires. We 
have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of 
its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free 
access to all of its grounds or all of its buildings. 
First Amendment rights must always be applied "in light of 
the special characteristics of the ..• environment in the 
particular place." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, 393 u.s. 503, 506 (1969). 
6The Uni ver si ty' s obligations may well be different 
for its grounds and its buildings. "The nature of a 
place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations to time, place, and manner that are 
reasonable.'" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s. 104, 
116 (1972). It is settled, however, that the tonstitution 
may bar the State from enforcing exclusions f lbrn a public 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
so, it undertook an obligation to justify its 
discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms. The Univeristy's institutional 
mission, which it describes as providing a "secular 
education" to its students, Brief at 44, does not exempt 
its actions from constitutional scrutiny. Our cases leave 
no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and 
association reach university campuses with 
undiminished force. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 
{1972); see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 {1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
u.s. 479, 487 {1960). 
Here the Univeristy of Missouri has sought to 
discriminate against groups and speakers based on their 
desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. 
forum that it has created, even though it was not required 
to create the forum ·in the first place. See City of 
Madision Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public 
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 u.s. 167, 175 & n.8. 
{1976) {although State could conduct business in private 
session, "where the State has opened a forum for direct 
citizen involvement," exclusions bear Si heavy burden of 
justification); cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad, supra {having established municipal theater as a 
public forum, city could not exclude production ei "Hair" 
without satisfying constitutional safeguards applicable to 
prior restraints). 
8. 
These are forms of speech and association protected by the 
First Amendment. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 u.s. --
558 (1948) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) ; 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 u.s. 449, 460-461 (1958); Heffron v. 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559, 2563 (1981). Thus, in order to justify 
discr iminat~ exclusion from a public forum based on the 
J\ 
religious content of a group's intended speech, the 
~~-
University wotlld ~gQda--ee~ satisfy the 
"\ 
standard of 
review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It would 
need to show that its regulation was necessary to serve a 
compelling State interest and that it was narrowly 
~ 
tailer~d to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 u.s. 
455, 465 (1980) ; see also Schenck v. United States, 249 
u.s. 47 (1919). 7 
III. 
7cf. Healy v. James, supra, 408 u.s. at 184: 
It is to be rememebered that the effect of the 
College's denial of recognition was a form of 
prior restraint, denying to petitioners' 
organizations the range of associational 
activity described above. While a college has a 
legitimate interest in preventing disruption on 
the campus, which may justify such restraint, a 
'heavy burden' rests on the college to 





In this case the University claims a compelling 
interest in maintaining strict separation of church and 
State. It ~EH: ts d . $' h. er1ve t IS 
t\ 
interest from the 
' 





The University argues that it could not open its 
facilities to religious groups and speakers, on the same 
terms ~ they are open to all other registered student 
groups, without violating the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution of the United States. 8 We ~ that the 
University does have a compelling interest in complying 
with its constitutional obligations. But we disagree with 
its conclusion that an "equal access" policy could not 
satisfy the standard developed in this Court's 
/ Establishment Clause cases. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax --
Cornrn'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971); Committee for Public Education 
8 "congress shall make no law respecting 
establishment of religion •••• " U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. 
Establishment Clause ~~ been made applicable to 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell 






v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). Those cases make 
clear that a policy will not offend the Establishment 
Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the 
[governmental policy] must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ***· I 
finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive 
government entanglement with religion." Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 at 612-613. 
In this case two prongs of the test are ~ 
.-'\ 
~-~-
probla':mae ic. Both the district court and the court of 
appeals policy ? held a of nondiscrimination that ?s~~'~ • 9 
against religious speech would have a ~purpose and 
~~~ .. ~ 
would avoid entanglement with--fA,) religion. 1 But tl:le 
t~ :£4.. ~ \ (f r}tJ.IC."".... ~0\ t $ 0 ""l t ~ ( O!o\ ~~~ """'~ ""-t 
, / W1!!f! ~-t.s.(. ~ .(:c..-"""""' 4o e""'~~ i --~.J, 
~ -----..~{ f' t, ·~, 0> ~ ~, f--i v• t-" 1 e·Jn:l~wr 
9The ~~r~l' :{urpose would be to provi..~ a forum ~Y 
which ideas can be exchanged freely. The '=>purpose is ~ 
neaeF --t, when the public forum has been reated in a publ1c 
hall, see City of Madison Joint School District v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, supra; Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra, as when it involves the 
streets or the parks, see Mosely v. Police Department, 
supra; Hague v. CIO, supra. This case is therefore very 
different from those in whic this Court has struck down 
statutes permitting school facilities to be used for 
instruction by religious, b t not by other, ·groups. S 
McCollum v. Board of Educati n, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). It 
1s se~led that the Esta 1~ ent qause do~s not re_qu1r,e 
bu~ , ll~tuall forb'i,ds, / Sta e hosti'\ity tow-ard rel'igi6n. 
~51/. Claus-on, 343 u.s. (1952). 








district court concluded, and the University argues here, 
that allowing religious groups to share the limited public 
forum would have the "prim~ry effect" of advancing 
religion. 11 
10we agree with the ~urt of litnpeals that the 
University would risk g'?'eater "~~agnglement" by 
attempting to enforce an exclusion of "religious worship 
and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, 635 
F.2d at 1318. In order to exclude relig1ous speech and 
religious worship, the University would first need to 
determine which words and activites fall within the 
proscription. At least one Gourt of ~peals has concluded 
that this would be "an imp~ssible task in an age where 
many and various beliefs meet the constitutional 
definition of religion." O'hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 
937 (1979) (footnote omitted): see L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law § 14-6 (1978); cf. Fowler v. Rhode 
Island, 345 u.s. 67, 70 (1953).(.!!-f-I]t is no 6us1ness of 
tb~otlr ts to- say that .what .is a religious prac~tice or 
aG-tj ui ty -f ne._ group is no religion ~unde~f'• i!he First 
A_me.ndment .--Nor is it in the competence of court under our 
constitutional scheme to approve, disapprove, classify, 
regulate, or in any manner control sermons delivered at 
religious meeting.").~ Even if it could define religion, 
see Note, Toward a ~nstitutional Definition of Religion, 
91 Harv. L. Rev. 1056 (1978), the University would then 
need to monitor group meetings in order to enforce 
adherence to its stated policy. It has been argued 
powerfully that the attempt to administer "such a test 
would impermissibly entangle government and religion." 
O'hair v. Andrus, Supra, 613 F.2d at 937. See Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-676 (1970) (tax exemption for 
churches permissible in part because elimination of 
exemption would require more extensive government 
entanglement) • 
11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would 
have the primary effect of advancing religion, the 
O,istr ict ~urt relied primarily on the decision of this 
COurt in ~ilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1971). In 
Tilton th1s Court upheld the prov1s1on of federal 
financial assistance to sectarian colleges. But it 
emphasized that the funds must be used for secular 
purposes. Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings must not be used for sectarian or religious 
worship for a period of 20 years. This Court found this 
restriction to be insufficient. We held that "If, at the 
end of 20 years, , the building is, for example, converted 
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious uses, 
the original federal grant wiJ l in part have the 
[constitutionally impermissible ~~ffect of advancing 
Footnote continued on next page. 
I 
12. 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of 
this case. This is not a case in which a religious group 
seeks special privileges in order better to practice its 
faith.l 2 It is, rather, a case in which the University 
has created a forum open to student groups of all other 
religion." From this statement the ~istrict 6ourt derived 
the proposition that State funds ~may not ~ be used to 
provide buildings for use by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. 
In Tilton the Court had worried that a sectarian 
institution might actually convert federally funded 
buildings or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of 
religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on 
the State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to 
religious and other discussion. It cannot be held to 
reverse longstanding decisions holding that religious 
speakers are constitutionally entitled to equal access to 
parks and other facilities that have "immemorially been 
held in trust for use by the public and have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions." Heffron, v. 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559, 2565 (1981), quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 
496, 515 (1939). There may sometimes be differences 
between the exclusionary regulations permissible in a 
building and those permitted in a park. But restrictions 
based on the nature of the public forum have traditionally 
rested on "the State's interest in protecting the safety 
and convenience of persons using a public forum," Heffron, 
supra, 101 S. Ct. at 2565, not on any interest in 
censoring the content of what is said, see Carey, supra, 
447 u.s. at 470. 
12cf. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F. 2d 971 (CA2 
1980); Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD 
w. Va. 1971). It is because this case presents no such 
issue that we have not couched our discussion in terms of 
respondents' rights under the "Free Exercise" clause. We 
agree with the petitioners' argument that the policies of 
the "Free Exercise" clause and the "Establishment Clause" 
may sometimes be in tension, see Abington School District ~ 
v. Schempp, 373 U.S. 203, 22 ("the bre ela~:~se~ ma}' "\ 
o~ and that resolutio of the tension requires '' 
sensi tivil{. to the interest that both are aimed to '\ 
protect. Cf. Wisconsin v. oder, 406 U.s. 285, 240-241 oJ 
(1972) (Whl e, J. concurr· g) (when it is essential to ? \~ 
protect free exercise v ues which are threatened by an V ~ . 
otherwise neutral progr , no forbidden establishment can J ~ 
exist) J But we do not iew this as such a case. .f ;:~fJl tf; 
~t- JtJ' S-l-41\-k '5 e~, c,...~+;DVll'~r ~ tr~~ e."t(\ ,.{ , J, t-c -.....>v 
l ~ C ~ ""v" ~ e >' •:/fv.: 
., {o("'"""' ~.\.-~ . t,.,-t--« e,~. "" o --'-' v· lP t-. ()'\. a\o\"\' . ~l ,e'l,.-\' r (, ,.--- eot&-lc~TI ~~ s. </ I~ 1 
~~\\ v>,~'~ L\,~"'~t"'-t C\~~~.~j~ ~ulo\.C . . s:~ I l./1 '!J (Ac:l I ?ry?, '"" 
~ ~.,-~u II Y-. h., M\1\..S (' "'" G\ (.it I L. Jc owl • n -~ ~ ~- 4-4--;~Jt ot , 1 1 /} ?0 f)~" fo.bl,c 
~{~ 1f ~~ L' ~)\"" "" " VI( I~ A 11\,C>< 1 "\ l) C tM' .f1c. C tt> U lft1 ,1-/1 
c.JI' \\ (l'\A-&"\.~ 1 "' P>'\('1.'\--rA\r~'tl ( OlolvllV1t 1,\~"'·,\::uh""~ rd;Ci:)•bl"'\0 c,.., ~l. "' fU~,~ 
13. 
kinds, and must therefore justify its content-based 
exclusion of certain forms of religious speech. As held 
by the court of appeals, an "equal access" 
- -
policy would [not] have the primary effect of 
advancing religion. Rather, it would have the 
primary effect of advancing the University's 
admitted secular purpose--to develop students' 
'social and cultural awareness as well as their 
intellectual curiosity.' It would simply permit 
students to put their religious ideas and 
practices in competition with the ideas and 
practices of other groups, religious or secular. 
635 F.2d at 1317. Cft rt is possible--perhaps even 
foreseeable--that religious groups would benefit from an 
open forum policy. But this Court has held that a 
religious organization's enjoyment of merely incidental 
benefits will not violate the prohibition against the 
"primary advancement" of religion. See Roemer v. Board of 
' 
Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) }(~te fUnding O! private 
celle9ee ~ermi:!l:!lib1e because 1 t does not eir,.ctly Bl:i~~ert! 
•• • f • 11 :I: 0 • t 0 • t II~ speer rca i re l!let2~ ac rv I:J; Hunt v. McNair, 413 
u.s. 734 (1972) (•tate may give een:!ltraction grant:! - to 
FeligiotJ:s colltig,.s, s9 leA~ as 81e1ileing:!l are not usee! !or 
religions worshj12z); ed McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
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But indirect benefits di ~£t (...\~l\ 
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that the cha enged policies ..J ,v., 
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Perha equally important, '~ 
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a publi forum would be to imply state 
Wt" ..t..._ o/ C\. tl''j ttLNr ~""-+ 
religious actr~ity. !Ph is jf unpersuasive. 
we agree with the of the court of 
appeals. 
-z,-, 
Such a policy 
_. _.. 
more commit the 
University to religious goals," id. at than it is 
now committed to the goals of the Students for a 
S ~· LKlrf 1 02:e-~ 
~# ~rlJ: 
xY ~· ~ 1;;~ 
~ 
15. 
Society, the Young Socialist Alliance, or any other group 
eligible to use its forum. 13 
B. 
~.5,/.,U_~ 
Arguing that Missouri has gone further than the 
'l 
federal constitution in proscribing indirect State support 
for religion, the University also claims a compelling 
interest in complying with the applicable provision of the 
State constitution. 14 See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. 
13 rt should not be overlooked that University 
students are young adults. They may be less 
impressionable than students in primary school and even in 
high school, and better able to comprehend that i tate 
neutrality to religion is recisely that. Se~~~~~ v. 
B : Note, The 
R1 hts the First 
14The Constitution of the State 
in pertinent part: 
1008' 1052 (1981) 
2 
of Missouri pro~ 
That no person can be compelled to erect, 
support, or attend any place of worship, or to 
maintain or support any priest, minister, 
preacher or teacher of any sect, church, creed 
or denomination of religion .... 
That no money shall ever be taken from the 
public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid 
of any priest, preacher, minister, or teacher 
thereof ..•. 
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, 
city, town, township, schol district or other 
municipal corporation, shall ever make any 
apropr iation or pay from any public fund 
whatever, anything in aid of any religious 
creed, church or sectarian purpose .•. : nor shall 
any grant or donation of personal property or 
real property ever be made by the state, or any 
county, city, town, or wother municipal 
corporation, for any religious creed, church, or 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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16. 
Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 88 (1974). 
The Missouri courts have apparently not ruled whether 
a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied 
equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious 
and non-religious speech, would offend the State 
~nstitution. Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to our 
.... -
decision to make any determination of Missouri law. Nor 
do we find it necessary to decide whether a State 
interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever, 
under the Supremacy Clause15 , outweigh free speech 
interests protected by the First Amendment. Even if the 
State's interest were compelling, its regulations would 
~ 
ne.ed to.._l::)e- ~~l.-J::¥ ta4lerQ.d bo-t:-h ;( to protect that 
~~~-~~ 
interest and ....to_a.vo~_unnecess~ar:y abr ig9FReRt of protected 
-1 
rights of speech and association. See, e.g., Carey, --
supra, 447 U.S. at 465; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25 
sectarian purpose whatever. 
MO. CONST. Art. 1, §6; Art. 1 § 7; Art. 9 § 8. 
The Missouri courts have interpreted these prov1s1ons 
to be more restrictive than the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution in prohibiting expenditures of 
public funds in a way inuring to the benefit of religious 
institutions. American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 
720, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Harfst v. Hogen, 
163 s.w.ea 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane}. 
15 U. S. Const., Art. 6. 
17. 
(1976); Shelton v. Tucker, supra, 364 u.s. at 489. 
Measured against this standard, the University's policy of 
discrimination against religious speech and as soc ia tion 
fails 
~ 
on grounds of ove inclusiveness. 
The University regulation challenged in this case 
applies to "religious teaching" as well as "religious 
~' 
worship." It is therefore substantially overbroad. we 
~ ~~);, . , can 
~ ? under 
~· 
imagine no compelling state interest, congnizable 
the Supremacy Clause, in excluding all types of 
religious "teaching"--including, for example, informal 
conversational "instruction" in a public forum or 
analytical exposition in a classroom. "Broad prophylactic 
rules in the area of free expression are fatal. Precision 
of regulation must be the touchstone." NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted), quoted in 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 
620' 637 (1980) . 16 
16The University has not invoked other possible 
interests that might be compelling in an appropriate case. 
We have previously recognized a university's right to 
restrict even First Amendment activities that are 
disruptive of reasonable campus rules or substantially 
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain 
an education. Healy v. James, supra, 408 u.s. at 189; see 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, supra, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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IV. 
The decision of the court of appeals is, accordingly, 
Affirmed. 
393 U.S. at 513. 
( 
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DRAFT: NO. 2 
This case presents 
~ ~~·~4 .... .-~ •• , ...... -. -
university, which makes its facilities available for the 
~ ......... ~~. 
activities of all other registered student groups, may 
close its facilities to a registered student group 
desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and 
religious discussion. 
I. 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri 
at Kansas City1 to encourage the activities of student 
organizations. The University officially recognizes over 
90 student groups. It routinely provides University 
1The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) 
is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an 
institution of the State of Missouri. 
2. 
facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. 
Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-
1979) to help defray the costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group 
named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission 
to conduct its meetings · in University facilities. 2 In 
1977, however, the University informed the group that it 
could no longer meet in University buildings. The 
exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board 
of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University 
buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship or 
religious teaching." 3 
2co~nerstone is an organization of evangelical 
Christian students from different denominational 
backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 1977, 
"perhaps twenty students participate actively in 
Cornerstone and form the backbone of the campus 
organization." Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, 
Sept. 29., 1977, quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 
907, 911 (W.D. Mo. 1979). Prior to their termination by 
the University, on-campus meetings were held in classrooms 
and in the Student Center. Open to the public, they 
sometimes attracted up to 125 students. It is not 
disputed that a typical Cornerstone meeting in University 
facilities would include the offereing of prayer, the 
singing of hymns, the sharing of personal religious views, 
and commentary on the Bible. 
3The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds 
(except chapels as herein provided) may be used 
for purposes of religious worship o!: religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups 
The general prohibition against use of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Eleven students at the University, all members of 
Cornerstone, brought suit to challenge the regulation in 
the Federal District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri. 4 They alleged that the University's 
discrimination against religious activity and discussion 
violated their rights to free exercise of religion, to 
equal protection, and to freedom of speech under the First 
University buildings and grounds for religious 
worship or religious teaching is a policy 
required, in the opinion of The Board of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the 
State and is not open to any other construction. 
No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid 
the offering of prayer or other appropriate 
recognition of religion at public functions held 
in University facilities •••. 
4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on 
University grounds may be used for religious 
services but not for recurring services of any 
groups. Special rules and procedures shall be 
established for each chapel by the Chancellor. 
It is specifically directed that no advantage 
shall be given to any religious group." 
In spite of the regulation's reference to chapels, 
there is no chapel on the campus of the Uni ver si ty of 
Missouri at Kansas City. The nearest University chapel is 
at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of 
UMKC. 
Before 1977 University officials had not been aware 
of the religious character of the activities at 
Cornerstone meetings. The District Court found that 
University officials had never "authorized a student 
organization to utilize a University facility for a 
meeting when they had full knowledge that the purposes of 
the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious 
teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, 480 F. Supp. at 910. 
4c1ark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, 
the name plaintiff in the action in the district court, 
were among the students who initiated the action on 
October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the 
University's Board of Curators. 
4. 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979). It found the regulation 
not only justified, but required, by the Establishment 
Clause of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 916. Under 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1972), the Court 
reasoned, the State could not provide facilities for 
religious use without giving prohibited support to an 
' 
institutiori of religion. The District Court rejected the 
argument that the University could not discriminate 
against religious speech on the basis of its content. It 
found religious speech entitled to less protection than 
other types of expression. Id. at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (CAS 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University 
regulation as a content-based discrimination against 
religious speech, for which it could find no compelling 
justification. Id. at 1313-1316. The Establishment Clause 
5. 
did not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities 
were opened to groups and speakers of all kinds. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather 
to further the neutral purpose of developing students' 
"social and cultural awareness as well as [their] 
intellectual curiosity." Id. at 1317. 
Essentially for the reasons stated by the court of 
appeals, we now affirm. 
II. 
Through its policy of accommodating the meetings of 
registered student groups, the University has created for 
its students a quasi-public for urn. See Pol ice Dept. v. 
Moseley, 408 u.s. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 u.s. 
536 (1965); see also :aague v. CIO, 307 u.s. 496 (1939) .5 
5The concept of a "public forum" 
recognition, first expressed in Hague v. 
496 I 515 (1939) I that 
rests on the 
CIO, 307 U.S. 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may 
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6. 
The University may have assumed voluntarily the function 
of providing rooms for student meetings. 6 But the 
a-
Constitution forbids the / tate to enforce certain 
exclusions from a public forum that it has created, even 
though it was not required to create the forum in the 
first place. See City of Madision Joint School District 
This Court has recognized that the campus of a public 
university possesses many of the salient characteristics 
of a public forum. "The college classroom, with its 
surrounding environs, is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 u.s. 169, 180 (1972). 
Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to 
participate in the intellectual give and take of campus 
debate • . . [would be] limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the administration, 
faculty members, and other students." Id. at 181-182. 
We have therefore held that students enjoy-wirst Amendment 
rights of speech and association on the campus, and that 
the "denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and 
other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to the level 
of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint • 
.Id. at 181, 184; cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. 
conrad, 420 u.s. 546, 558 ([975) (denial of access 'to 
municipal theater, maintained as a public for um..- A-,.. 
constitutes "prior restraint" and therefore bears~ "heavy 
presumption against its constitutional 
validity") (citations omitted). 
~ 
On the other hand, our cases have never denied a 
niversity's capacity to impose regulations required to 
reserve the tranquility that its mission requires. we -L 
ave not held, for example, that a campus must make all of l) 
its facilities equally available to students and non-
students alike, or that a university must grant free J 
access to all of its grounds or all of its buildings. 
First Amendment rights must always be applied "in ligh 
the special characteristics of the ..• environment in the 
particular place." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
6The University's obligations to constitute its 
grounds and buildings as public forums may well be 
different. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s. 104, 
116 (1972). ("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its 
normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations to 
time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
2 
7. 
v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 
167, 175 & n.8. 
a.-
(1976) (although lf,ate 
1\ 
conduct 
business in private session, "where the / tate has opened a ? 
forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a 
heavy burden of justification); cf. Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra (having established 
municipal theater as a public forum, city could not 
exclude production without satisfying constitutional 
safeguards applicable to prior restraints). Thus, by 
creating a forum generally open to ~s students, the 
University undertook an obligation to justify its 
discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms. The Univer~ty's institutional 
mission, which it describes as providing a "secular 
education" to its students, Brief at 44, does not exempt 
its actions from constitutional scrutiny. Our cases leave 
no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and 
association reach uni ver si ty campuses with undiminished 
force. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ; see 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 u.s. 
8. 
503, 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 
(1960) . 
Here the Univeristy of Missouri has sought to 
discriminate against groups and speakers based on their 
desire to engage in religious worship and discussion. 
These are forms of speech and association protected by the 
First Amendment. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 u.s. 
558 (1948) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) ; 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-461 (1958); Heffron v. 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
s. Ct. 2559, 2563 (1981) • In order to justify 
discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the 
religious content of a group's intended speech, the 
University must therefore satisfy the standard of review 
appropriate to content-based exclusions. It ~~ead 5~ 
show that its regulation was necessary to serve a 
compelling j tate interest and that it was narrowly drawn 
to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 u.s. 455, 465 




In this case the University claims a compelling 
interest in maintaining strict separation of church and 
/ tate. It derives this interest from the "Establishment 
Clauses" of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A. 
The University first argues that it could not open 
its facilities to religious groups and speakers, on the 
same terms they are open to all other registered student 
groups, without violating the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution of the United States. 8 We agree that the 
University has a compelling interest in complying with its 
7cf. Healy v. James, supra, 408 u.s. at 184: 
It is to be rememebered that the effect of the 
College's denial of recognition was a form of 
prior restraint, denying to petitioners' 
organizations the range of associational 
activity described above. While a college has a 
legitimate interest in preventing disruption on 
the campus, which may justify such restraint, a 
'heavy burden' rests on the college to 
demonstrate the appropriateness of that action. 
8 "congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion ••.. " u. S. Const., Arndt. 1. The 
Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 u.s. 296, 303 (1940). 
10. 
constitutional obligations. But we disagree with its 
~~c.­
conclusion that an "equal access" policy_.{ ccul Q-*l9 e -satisfy 
this Court's Establishment 
Clause cases. ' See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 
664, 674 (1970); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602, 612-613 
(1971); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 
u.s. 756, 773 (1973). Those cases make clear that a 
policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can 
pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental 
policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion ***; finally, the [policy] 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 at 612-613. 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that 
an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against 
religious speech, would have 
11. 
a secular purpose9 and would avoid entanglement with 
religion. 10 But the District Court concluded, and the 
University argues here, that allowing religious groups to 
share the limited public forum would have the "primary 
which 
9I~: :~~~;::s ~~rJ1°dsebe~~~l~ ~~fvveil~ie~~ ~~ 
ideas. It does not undermine the State's essentially 
secular purpose that some groups Jtti'ght use its forum to ~ 
engage in religious speech. We do not understand 
petitioners to argue that the ;ftate could--much less that 
it must--exclude religious speech from the streets or from 
the parks that it maintains as public forums. Yet the 
State's purpose is as secular when the public forum has 
been created in a public hall, see City of Madison Joint 
School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 
supra; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra, as 
when it involves the streets or the parks, see Mosely v. 
~~ Police Department, supra; Hague v. CIO, supra. This case 
,- is therefore ~ different from those in which this Court 
ha n statutes permitting school facilities to 
instruction by religious, but not by other, 
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 
(1948). It is settled that the Establishment Clause does 
not require, but actually forbids, State hostility toward 
religion. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 1~ J ~ -6-t- 1'1c4~~ .. --~ I"'" 10we agree with e Court of Appeals that the 
University would r · sk greater "entas.flglement" by '-' 
attempting to enforc an exclusion of "religious worship 
and religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, 635 
F.2d at 1318. In o der to exclude rel1g1ous speech and 
religious worship, the University ~tebtiel :fil!ilt RQQd to 
determine which words and activites fall within the 
proscript\on. This could prove "an impossible task in an 
age where many and various beliefs meet the constitutional 
definition of religion." O'hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 
937 (1979) (footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law § 14-6 (1978) ; cf. Fowler v. Rhode 
~ ~ Island, 345 U.S."). Even if it could define religion, see 
- ~,.,-~ Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 
r ~~r~- Harv. L. Rev. 1056 (1978), t~ UQiVQ~•i~~ need T ~~ to monitor group meetings i order to enforce adherence to 
~ its stated policy. It has en argued powerfully that the 
attempt to administer "sue a test would impermissibly 
entangle government and r ligion." O'hair v. Andrus, 
Sulra, 613 F.2d at 937. S e Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 
66 , 674-676 (1970) ax exemption for churches 
permissible in part becau e elimination of exemption would 
require more extensive g ernment entanglement). 
I 
12. 
effect" of advancing religion. 11 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of 
this case. The question is not whether it would violate 
the Establishment Clause for the State to create a -
religious forum .1 2 Once the University opens its 
11 In finding that an "equal access" policy would 
have the primary effect of advancing religion, the 
District Court relied primarily on the decision of this 
Court in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672 (1971). In 
Tilton this Court upheld the provision of federal 
financial assistance to sectarian colleges. But it 
emphasized that the funds must be used for secular 
purposes. Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings must not be used for sectarian or religious 
worship for a period of 20 years. This Court found this 
restriction to be insufficient. we held that "If, at the 
end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted 
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious uses, 
the original federal grant will in part have the 
[constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing 
religion." From this statement the District Court derived 
------~ the reposition that State funds rna not be used to 
provi e buildings ~ use y religious organizations. ot 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadl • 
In Tilton the Court a a sec arian 
institution might ~ convert federally funded ~ 
I Ings r otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur~
religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on 
the State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to 
religious and other discussion. 
ve se o eciSions olding that religious 
speakers are constitutionally entitled to equal access to 
parks and other facilities that have "immemorially been 
held in trust for use by the public and have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions." Heffron, v. 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 
S. Ct. 2559, 2565 (1981), quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 u.s. 
496, 515 (1939). There may sometimes be differences --~~ 
between the exclusionary regulations permissible in a 
building and those permitted in a park. But restrictions 
based on the nature of the public forum have traditionally 
rested on "the State's interest in protecting the safety 
and convenience of persons using a public forum," Heffron, 
supra, 101 S. Ct. at 2565, not on any interest in 
censoring the content of what is said, see Carey, 
___ _... U.S. at 470. 
Footnote(s) 12 will 
13. 
facilities to student groups of all other kinds, it has 
7 
already created a quasi-public forum, and the burden lies 
on it to justify any exclusion. See Healy v. James, 
supra. In this context we are unpersuaded that the 
primary effect of the public forum, if religious speech 
were treated equally with other protected discourse, would 
al-~44!-
be to advance religion. ~ Jh the absence of empirical 
evidence to the contrary, we agree with the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. An "equal access" 
policy would [not] have the primary effect of 
advancing religion. Rather, it would have the 
primary effect of advancing the University's 
admitted secular purpose--to develop students' 
'social and cultural awareness as well as their 
intellectual curiosity.' It would simply permit 
students to put their religious ideas and 
practices in competition with the ideas and 
practices of other groups, religious or secular. 
635 F.2d at 1317. 
12cf. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F. 2d 971 (CA2 
1980); Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (SD 
W. Va. 1971). It is because this case presents no such 
issue that we have not couched our discussion in terms of 
respondents' rights under the "Free Exercise" clause. We 
agree with the petitioners' argument that the policies of 
the "Free Exercise" clause and the "Establishment Clause" 
may sometimes be in tension, see, e.g., Committee for 
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973), 
Abington School District v. Schempp, 373 U.S. 203, 222, 
and that resolution of the tension requires sensitivity to 
the interests that both are aimed to protect. But we do 
not view this as such a case. ' 
14. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's 
likely effects. It is possible--perhaps even foreseeable-
-that religious groups would benefit from access to 
University facilities. But this Court has settled that a 
religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental" 
benefits will not violate the prohibition against the 
"primary advancement" of religion. Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 771 (1973); see, e.g., 
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 u.s. 736 (1976); Hunt 
v. McNair, 413 u.s. 734 (1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
u.s. 420,422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an 
open forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the 
meaning of our cases. Two factors are especially 
relevant. 
First, the benefits of an open forum would 
a broad class of non-religious as well as religious 
~ ~ tt; 4) ~o&A~ ~~.tl_, .... ~~ . ~.,:;;... 
speakers.A The provision of benefits to so broad ar ps 4 
~ •, . ,.,, a ~ za:'"la: * .a J .J-4,.c_ 
c;i ~ ~iS- an ~peoc.t..an..t :i.A~Qn ef" secular ef feet. See, e.g. , 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 u.s. 229, 240-251 (1977); Committee 
for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S., at 782 
15. 
n.38. Otherwise "a church could not be protected by the 
police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk 
kept in repair." Roemer v. Maryland, supra, 426 U.S., at 
736 (plurality opinion)~ quoted in Committee for Religious 
Liberty v. Regan, 444 u.s. 646, 658 (1980) . 13 
Second, an open forum policy in a public university 
would not confer the imprimatur of State approval on any 
religious sect or practice. As the Court of Appeals quite 
aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the 
University to religious goals," 635 F.2d, at 1317, than it 
is now committed to the goals of the Students for a 
Democratc Society, the Young Socialist Alliance, or any 
other group eligible to use its facilities. 14 
13This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent 
argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden 
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to 
spend all its resources on religious ends." Hunt v. 
McNair, supra, 413 u.s., at 743~ see New York v. Cathedral 
Academy, 434 u.s. 125, 134 (1977). 
14It should not be overlooked that University 
students are young adults. They may be less 
impressionable than students in primary school and even in 
high school, and better able to comprehend that state 
neutrality to religion is precisely that. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, supra, 403 u.s., at 687~ Brandon v. Board of 
Education, supra, 635 F.2d at 978, 980~ Gianella, 
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal 
Development, pt. II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 
Harv. L. Rev. 513, 574 (1968) ~ Note, The Rights of 
SStudent Religious Groups Under the First Amendment to 
Hold Religius Meetings on the Public University Campus, 33 
Rutgers L. Rev. 1008, 1052 (1981) 
16. 
B. 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further 
than the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect 
State support for religion, the University also claims a 
compelling interest in complying with the applicable 
provision of the State Constitution. 15 See Leutkemeyer v. 
Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 
88 (1974). 
15The Constitution of the State of Missouri provides 
in pertinent part: 
That no person can be compelled to erect, 
support, or attend any place of worship, or to 
maintain or support any priest, minister, 
preacher or teacher of any sect, church, creed 
or denomination of religion .... 
That no money shall ever be taken from the 
public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid 
of any priest, preacher, minister, or teacher 
thereof •... 
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, 
city, town, township, schol district or other 
municipal corporation, shall ever make any 
apropriation or pay from any public fund 
whatever, anything in .aid of any religious 
creed, church or sectarian purpose ... ~ nor shall 
any grant or donation of personal property or 
real property ever be made by the state, or any 
county, city, town, or wother municipal 
corporation, for any religious creed, church, or 
sectarian purpose whatever. 
MO. CONST. Art. 1, §6~ Art. 1 § 7~ Art. 9 § 8. 
The Missouri courts have interpreted these provisions 
to be more restrictive than the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution in prohibiting expenditures of 
public funds in a way inuring to the benefit of religious 
institutions. American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 
720, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976)~ Harfst v. Hogen, 
163 S.w.ea 609, 613-614 (Mo. 1947) (en bane). 
17. 
The Missouri courts have apparently not ruled whether 
a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied 
equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious 
and non-religious speech, would offend the State 
Constitution. Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary to our 
decision to make any determination of Missouri law. Nor 
do we find it necessary to decide whether a State 
interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever, 
under the Supremacy Clause16 , outweigh free speech 
interests protected by the First Amendment. Even if the 
State's interest were compelling, its regulations would 
have to protect that interest without unnecessary 
abridgment of protected rights of speech and association. 
See, e.g., Carey, supra, 447 U.S. at 465; Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Shelton v. Tucker, supra, 
364 u.s. at 489. Measured against this standard, the 
University's policy of discrimination against religious 
speech and association fails on grounds of 
over inclusiveness. 
16 U. s. Const., Art. 6. 
18. 
The University regulation challenged in this case 
applies to "religious teaching" as well as "religious 
worship." It is therefore substantially overbroad. we 
can imagine no compelling State interest, congnizable 
under the Supremacy Clause, in banning all types of 
religious "teaching"--including, for example, informal 
conversational "instruction" in a public forum or 
analytical exposition in a classroom. "Broad prophylactic 
rules in an area of free expresion are fatal. Precision 
of regulation must be the touchstone." NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted), quoted in 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 
620, 637 (1980). 
IV. 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the 
capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulations. Cf. Heffron v. 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, supra. 
We also recognize the continuing validity of cases 
establishing a University's right to exclude even First 
Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules 
19. 
or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other 
students to obtain an education. Healy v. James, supra, 
408 U.S. at 189; see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
School District, supra, 393 u.s., at 513. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created 
a public forum, · the University sought to enforce a 
content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its 
exclusionary policy violated a fundamental principle of 
content neutrality, and the University was unable to 
justify this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards. 
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On the other hand, a university~i s eiriQ~@Re from 
a public street or park or even a municipal theater. A 
university's mission is education, and decisions of this 
Court have never denied its authority to impose reasonable 
regulations upon the use of its campus and facilities 
compatible with its educational mission. We have not held, 
for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities 
equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that 
a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or 
all of its buildings. 
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This case presents the question whether a state 
university, which makes its facilities generally available 
for the activities of registered student groups, may close 
its facilities to a registered student group desiring to 
use the f acilities for religious worship and r e ligious 
discussion. 
I 
It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri 
at Kansas Ci ty1 to encourage the activities of student 
organizations. The University officially recog n izes over 
100 student groups. It routinely provides University 
1The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) 
is one of four campuses of the University of Missouri, an 
institution of the State of Missouri. 
2. 
facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. 
Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-
1979) to help defray the costs to the University. 
From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group 
named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission 
to conduct its meetings in University facilities. 2 In 
1977, however, the University informed the group that it 
could no longer meet in University buildings. The 
exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board 
of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University 
buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship or 
religious teaching." 3 
2cornerstone is an organization of evangelical 
Christian students from various denominational 
backgrounds. According to an affidavit filed in 197v7 
"perhaps twenty students • participate actively in 
Cornerstone and form the backbone of the campus 
organization." Affidavit of Florian Chess (Sept. 29 , 
1977) , quoted in Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 911 
(W.D. Mo. 1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings 
in classrooms and in the student center. These meeting 
were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. 
A typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, 
Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and 
experiences. 
3The pertinent regulations provide as follows: 
"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds 
(except chapels as herein provided) may be used 
for purposes of religious worship or religious 
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. 
. The general prohibition against use of 
University buildings and grounds for religious 
worship or religious teaching is a policy 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
Eleven University students, all members of 
Cornerstone, brought suit to challenge the regulation in 
Federal District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri. 4 They alleged that the University's 
discrimination against religious activity and discussion 
violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal 
protection, and freedom of speech under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
required, in the opinion of The Bo~rd of 
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the 
State and is not open to any other construction. 
No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid 
the offering of prayer or other appropriate 
recognition of religion at public functions held 
in University facilities •••• 
4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on 
University grounds may be used for religious 
services but not for recurring services of any 
groups. Special rules and procedures shall be 
established for each chapel by the Chancellor. 
It is specifically directed that no advantage 
shall be given to any religious group." 
There is no chapel on the campus of the University of 
Missouri at Kansas City. The nearest University chapel is 
at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of 
UMKC. 
Before 1977 University officials were unaware of the 
religious character of Cornerstone's meetings. The 
District Court found that University officials had never 
"authorized a student organization to utilize a University 
facility for a meeting when they had full knowledge that 
the purposes of the meeting include [d) religious worship 
or religious teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 910. 
4c1ark Vincent, the respondent, and Florian Chess, 
the named plaintiff in the action in the District Court, 
were among the students who initiated the action on 
October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were the petitioner 
Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the 
University's Board of Curators. 
4. 
States. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v. Widmar, 
480 F. Supp. 907 (W.O. Mo. 1979). It found the regulation 
not only justified, but required, by the Establishment 
Clause of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 916. Under 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u. S. 672 (1971), the court 
reasoned, the State could not provide facilities for 
religious use without giving prohibited support to an 
institution of religion. Id., at 915-916. The District 
Court rejected the argument that the University could not 
discriminate against religious speech on the basis of its 
content. It found religious speech entitled to less 
protection than other types of expression. Id., at 918. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (CAS 1980). Rejecting the 
analysis of the Dis.trict Court, it viewed the University 
regulation as a content-based discrimination against 
religious speech, for which it could find no compelling 
justification. Id., at 1315-1320. The Establishment 
Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which 
5. 
facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of 
such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather 
to further the neutral purpose of developing students' 
"'social and cultural awareness as well as [their] 
intellectual curiosity.'" Id., at 1317 (quoting from the 
University bulletin's description of the student 
activities program, reprinted in id., at 1312 n.l). 
Essentially for the reasons stated by the Court of 
Appeals, we now affirm. 
II 
Through its policy of accommodating the meetings of 
registered student groups, the University has created for 
its students a quasi-public forum. 5 Having done so, the 
5The concept of a "public forum" 
recognition, first expressed in Hague v. 
496, 515 (1939), that 
rests on the 
CIO, 307 U. S. 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may 
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. 
See also Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox 
v. Louisiana, 379 u. S. 536 (1965). 
6. 
University assumed an obligation to justify its 
discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a State to 
enforce certain exclusions from a public forum, even if it 
was not required to create the forum in the first place. 
See, e.g., City of Madision Joint School District v. 
Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 u. S. 
167, 175 & n.8. (1976) (although a State may conduct 
business in private session, "where the State has opened a 
forum for direct citizen involvement," exclusions bear a 
heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Promotions, 
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 555-559 (1975) (because 
municipal theater was a public forum, city could not 
exclude a production without satisfying constitutional 
safeguards applicable to prior restraints). 
The University's institutional mission, which it 
describes as providing a "secular education" to its 
students, Brief for Petitioners 44, does not exempt its 
actions from constitutional scrutiny. 6 Our cases leave no 
6This Court has recognized that the campus of 
public university possesses many of the characteristics 




doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and 
association reach state university campuses with 
undiminished force. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 u. S. 
169, 180 (1972) ; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 39 3 U. S. 503, 506 (1969) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 u.s. 479, 487 (1960). 
Here the University of Missouri has discriminated 
against groups and speakers based on their desire to 
engage in religious worship and discussion. These are 
forms of speech and association protected by the First 
a public forum. "The college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is peculiarly 'the marketplace of 
ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 u. s. 169, 180 (1972). 
Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to 
participate in the intellectual give and take of campus 
debate . • . [would be] limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the administration, 
faculty members, and other students." Id., at 181-182. 
We have therefore held that students enjoy-First Amendment 
rights of speech and association on the campus, and that 
the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus 
facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes" 
must be subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate to 
any form of prior restraint. Id., at 181, 184. 
On the other hand, First Amendment rights must of 
course be analyzed "in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent School District, 393 u. S. 503, 506 
(1969). A university differs in significant respects from 
public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal 
theaters. A university's mission is education, and 
decisions of this Court have never denied its authority to 
impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission 
upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not 
held, for example, that a campus must make all of its 
facilities equally available to students and nonstudents 
alike, or that a university must grant free access to all 
of its grounds or buildings. 
8. 
Amendment. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); 
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951) ; Saia v. New 
York, 334 u. s. 558 (1948). In order to justify 
discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the 
religious content of a group's intended speech, the 
University must therefore satisfy the standard of review 
appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show 
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 u. S. 455, 461, 464-465 
(1980). 7 
III 
In this case the University claims a compelling 
7see also Healy v. James, 408 u. s. 169, 184 
(1972): 
"It is to be remembered that the effect of the 
College's denial of recognition was a form of 
prior restraint, denying to petitioners' 
organization the range of associational 
activities described above. While a college has 
a legitimate interest in preventing disruption 
on the campus, which • may justify such 
restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college 
to demonstrate the appropriateness of that 
action." 
9. 
interest in maintaining strict separation of church and 
State. It derives this interest from the "Establishment 
Clauses" of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. 
A 
The University first argues that it cannot offer its 
facilities to religious groups and speakers on the terms 
available to other groups without violating the 
Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United 
States. 8 We agree that the University has a compelling 
interest in complying with its constitutional obligations. 
But we disagree with its conclusion that an "equal access" 
policy would be incompatible with this Court's 
Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold that a 
policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can 
pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental 
policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion finally, the 
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion .••• " u. S. Const., Arndt. 1. 
The Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 u. S. 296, 303 (1940). 
10. 
[policy] must not foster 'an excessive government 
entanglement with religion ·,1' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u. S. 
602, 612-613 (1971). See also Committee for Public 
Education v. Nyquist, 413 u. S. 756, 773 (1973). 
In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that 
an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against 
religious speech, would have a secular purpose 9 and would 
avoid entanglement with religion. 10 But the District 
9The University's secular purpose is to provide a 
forum in which students can exchange ideas. It does not 
undermine this purpose that some groups will use the forum 
to engage in religious speech. we do not understand 
petitioners to argue that a State could--much less that it 
must--exclude religious speech from the streets or from 
the parks that it maintains as public forums. Yet the 
State's purpose remains as secular when the forum is a 
room within a government building, see City of Madison 
Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 u. S. 167 (1976) (meeting room); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 
(1975) (municipal theatre), as when it involves the 
streets or the parks, see Police Department v. Mosley, 408 
U. S. 92 (1972) (outdoor p~cketing); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. 
S. 496 (1939) (streets and other public places). 
This case is therefore quite different from those in 
which this Court has invalidated statutes permitting 
school facilities to be used for instruction by religious 
groups, but not by others. See McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 u. S. 203 (1948). The Establishment Clause 
does not require, but actually forbids, State hostility 
toward religion. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 u. s. 306, 
312 (1952). 
10we agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
University would risk greater "entanglement" by attempting 
to enforce its exclusion of "religious worship and 
religious speech." See Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1318. 
Initially, the University would need to determine which 
words and activites fall within "religious worship and 
religious teaching." This alone could prove "an 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
Court concluded, and the University argues here, that 
allowing religious groups to share the limited public 
forum would have the "primary effect" of advancing 
religion. 11 
The University's argument misconceives the nature of 
this case. The question is not whether the creation of a 
religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. 12 
impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs 
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'hair 
v. Andrus, 613 F. 2d 9 31, 936 (CADC 1979) (footnote 
omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §14-6 
(1978). There would also be a continuing need to monitor 
group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule. 
11In finding that an "equal access" policy would 
have the primary effect of advancing religion, the 
District Court relied primarily on the decision of this 
Court in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u. S. 672 (1971). In 
Tilton this Court upheld the grant of federal financial 
assistance to sectarian colleges for secular purposes. 
Although Congress had provided that federally subsidized 
buildings could not be used for sec tar ian or religious 
worship for 20 years, the Court considered this 
restriction insufficient: "If, at the end of 20 years, 
the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or 
otherwise used to promote religious interests the original 
federal grant will in part have the [constitutionally 
impermissible] effect of advancing religion." Id., at 
683. From this statement the District Court derived the 
proposition that State funds may not be used to provide or 
maintain buildings used by religious organizations. 
We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly. 
In Tilton the Court was concerned that a sectarian 
institution might convert federally funded buildings to 
religious uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur 
of religion. But nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation 
on the State's capacity to maintain forums equally open to 
religious and other discussions. Cases before and after 
Tilton have acknowledged the right of religious speakers 
to use public forums on equal terms with others. See, 
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc•y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 101 s. Ct. 2559 (1981); Saia v. New 
York, 334 u.s. 558 (1948). 
Footnote(s) 12 will appear on following pages. 
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The University has opened its facilities to student 
groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude 
groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy 
v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972). In this context we are 
unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, 
open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance 
religion. 
We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's 
likely effects. It is possible--perhaps even foreseeable-
-that religious groups will benefit from access to 
University facilities. But this Court has explained that 
a religious organization's enjoyment of merely 
"incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition 
against the "primary advancement" of religion. Committee 
12This case is different from the cases in which 
religious groups claim that the denial of facilities not 
available to bther groups deprives them of their rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause. See Brandon v. Board of 
Educ., 635 F. 2d 971, 975-976 (CA2 1980), cert. pending, 
No. 80-1396; Hunt v. Board of Education, 321 F. Supp. 
1263, 1266 (SD w. Va. 1971). Here, the University's 
forum is already available to other groups, and 
respondents' claim to use that forum does not--as in 
Brandon or Hunt--rest solely on rights claimed under the 
Free Exercise Clause. Respondents' claim also implicates 
First Amendment rights of speech and association, and it 
is on the bases of speech and association rights that we 
decide the case. It is for this reason that we have 
declined petitioners • invitation to couch our discussion 
in terms of respondents • rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
13. 
for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u. S. 756, 771 
(1973) ~ see, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U. 
S. 736 (1976) ~ Hunt v. McNair, 413 u. S. 734 (1972) ~ 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 u. S. 420, 422 (1961). 
We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an 
open forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the 
meaning of our cases. Two factors are especially 
relevant. 
First, an open forum in a public university does not 
confer any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects 
or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, 
such a policy "would no more commit the University • 
to religious goals," than it is "now committed to the 
goals of the Students for a Democratc Society, the Young 
Socialist Alliance," or any other group eligible to use 
its facilities. Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 1317. 13 
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of 
non-religious as well as religious speakers~ there are 
13university students are, of course, young adults. 
They are less impressionable than younger students and 
should be able to appreciate that the University's policy 
is one of neutrality toward religion. See Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 u. S. 672, 685-686 (1971) • 
14. 
over 100 recognized student groups UMKC. The provision of 
benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important 
index of secular effect. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U. S. 229, 240-241 (1977); Committee for Public Education 
v. Nyquist, supra, 413 u. S., at 756, 781-782 & n.38 
(1973). If the Establishment Clause barred the extension 
of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could 
not be protected by the police and fire departments, or 
have its public sidewalk kept in repair." Roemer v. 
Maryland, 426 u. S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
quoted in Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. 
S. 646, 658 n. 6 (1980) •14 At least in the absence of 
empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate 
UMKC's open forum, we therefore agree with the Court of 
Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the 
forum's "primary effect." 
B 
Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further 
14This Court has similarly rejected "the recurrent 
argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is forbidden 
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to 
spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. 
McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973). 
15. 
than the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect 
State support for religion, 15 the University claims a 
compelling .interest in complying with the applicable 
provisions of the Missouri Constitution. 16 
The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general 
policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to 
those wishing to gather to engage in religious and non-
religious speech, would offend the State Constitution. we 
need not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would 
decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to 
decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, 1 7 a state 
interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever 
outweigh free speech interests protected by the First 
Amendment. Even if a State's interest were compelling, 
its regulations would have to protect that interest 
15see, ~' American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 
711, 720, (Mo.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1029 
(1976) (holding Missouri Constitution requires stricter 
separation of church and state than does Federal 
Constitution)~ Harfst v. Hogen, 163 S.W.2d 609, 613-614 
(Mo. 1947) (en bane) (same). 
16see Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 364 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. 
Mo. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 88 (1974) (finding State has 
compelling interest in compliance with its own 
constitution). 
17 u. S. Const., Art. VI, §2. 
16. 
without unnecessary abridgment of protected rights of 
speech and association. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 u. 
S. 455, 465 (1980) ~ Shelton v. Tucker, 364 u. s. 479, 489 
(1960). Measured against this standard, the University's 
policy of discrimination against religious speech and 
association fails on grounds of overinclusiveness. 
The University regulation challenged in this case 
applies to "religious teaching" as well as "religious 
worship." It is therefore substantially overbroad. We 
can imagine no compelling State interest--which would be 
congnizable under the Supremacy Clause--in banning all 
types of religious "teaching" in an otherwise-open forum, 
including, for example, informal conversational 
"instruction." As we have noted in the past, "[b]road 
prophylactic rules in an area of free expresion are fatal. 
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone." 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 u. S. 
620, 637 (1980), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 u. S. 415, 
438 (1963) (omitting citations). 
IV 
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the 
17. 
capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulations. 18 we also affirm the 
continuing valiqity of cases, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 u. 
S. 169, 188-189 (1972), that recognize a University's 
right to exclude even First Amendment activities that 
violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere 
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an 
education. 
The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created 
a public forum, the University seeks to enforce a content-
based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary 
policy violates the fundamental principle that the State 
should be content-neutrality, and the University is unable 
to justify this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards. 
For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals 
is, 
Affirmed. 
18see, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 u.s. 
104, 116 (1972). ("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of 
its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations to 
time, place, and manner that are reasonable.'"). 
